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FOREWORD BY GUNTER w. REMMLING 
When Marx informed his collaborator Arnold Ruge that he had decided 
to "make man into man ,"  he rejected the notion of a human being as 
no more than an estranged producer of commodities belonging to some­
one else. More importantly , Marx had communicated to Ruge the central 
idea that was to give purpose to his entire l ife 's work : the realization of 
the true character of men and women. Marx crystallized this idea in the 
intellectual fires that produced his differentiation from Hegel and Feuer­
bach. The idea persuaded him to concentrate all his remarkable energies 
on identifying the forces that could dissolve the contradiction between 
idea and reality. Therefore , Marx set out to discover those elements in 
social action that had the power to break down the exist ing socioeconomic 
relations-elements that, because of their own inner contrad iction , would  
negate the  general estrangement in social life . 
Marx understood that these elements had to be found in the relations 
of active life .  He realized that they were present in the relations that domi­
nate as a nameless force the relations between persons-that is ,  in the eco­
nomic relations wherein all estrangement originates .  While commodities 
rel inquish their ultimate qualities in money , men and women rel inqu ish 
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theirs in becoming commodities ;  they become commodities as soon as 
their labor power becomes useless, unless it is sold .  In society , the worker 
is not a human being but merely the exponent of an abstract commodity : 
labor power. In selling this commodity , the worker sells himself or her­
self, and thus the estrangement of men and women reaches its ultimate 
form. The economic theorists of capitalism therefore regard proletarians­
the men and women who , without capital or ground rent , live entirely by 
their labor-as mere workers but not as human beings . 
Unlike bourgeois economists and sociologists , Marx viewed the division 
of labor as problematic. He maintained that the division of labor estab­
lished the mutual dependence of individuals and introduced the contra­
diction between the interests of the individual and the common interest 
of all individuals. In its complete form, the division of labor creates a situa­
tion whereby no one any longer disposes over the means of h is subsistence. 
Now the relations of production and trade completely replace human rela­
tions, and men and women no longer face each other as men and women 
but as mere exponents of  the anonymous· and all-powerful relations of 
production that separate and estrange one human being from the other. 
Hence , the discovery of the laws of political economy was at the same 
time the discovery of the conditions that had to be met in order to achieve 
the self-realization of the human being. This is the reason for Marx 's 
tireless analysis of economic laws and their development as reflected in 
his Kapital and kindred writings .  
I sidor Wallimann's  study of Marx's theory of estrangement introduces 
the long-needed proof that the concept of estrangement remained funda­
mental to Marx's thought throughout his life ' s  work . Equally important is 
the author's interpretation of the involuntary nature of the division of 
labor as the fundamental cause of estrangement . Most importantly , Walli­
mann's work shows in detail that Marx employs two different concep­
tions of human nature , and it explains how the relative (historical) and 
nonrelative (biological) conceptions of human nature bear u pon Marx's 
theory of estrangement. For the first time , Wall imann shows that Marx 
speaks of estrangement only in those instances wherein individuals are 
prevented from living according to their human nature (biologically con­
ceived) .  The structure of society prevents individuals from fully exercising 
the faculties nature has given them: they are estranged.  For i nstance, 
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they are prevented from subjecting their labor power and the product of 
their labor to their own wil l ,  although by nature they are capable of doing 
so . 
Wall imann's  interpretation is methodical, rigorous,  impeccably judicious, 
and based on an impressive mastery of the primary and secondary sources.  
As such, it  has raised the standards for academic Marxist scholarship . 
Malaga,  Spain 
November 1 97 9  GUNTER W. REMMLING 
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INTRODUCTION 
Although the term "alienation" is u sed frequently in popular and scientific 
circles ,  its precise meaning remains so unclear that many have questioned 
its value. Because the term has been imprecisely used and because present­
day usage seems equally imprecise, it has also been recommended that 
the term "alienation" be either abandoned or conceptually clarified and 
more rigorously defined. 
This study attempts to show that Marx used the terms "alienation " and 
"estrangement" both precisely and systematically , and that calls for the 
abandonment or clarification of the terms are unjustified with regard to 
the works of Marx. We are not convinced ,  however , that the lack of pre­
cision inherent in today ' s  use of the term "alienation " is reversible and 
that the term is at all useful as it has been employed in modern studies . 
It is therefore important to distinguish strictly between Marx 's precision 
and today 's ambiguity and thus to abandon the widely held notion that 
many modern studies involving the term are somehow related  to the Marx­
ian tradition , when in fact they are not . 
There are several reasons for today 's lack of consensus and systematic 
use of the term "alienation . "  In this short space , we can only briefly 
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touch upon some of them. As used in popular language today , the term 
designates individual or group remoteness from and/or disaffection  with 
something or someone. It may therefore be said that "alienation " stands 
for a discrepancy of some sort . Contemporary social scientists-not im­
mune fro m the influence of popular language-design studies intending 
to locate and measure the individual 's "alienation. " Thus, for example, 
the individual ' s  al ienation (that is, remoteness or disaffection) from gov­
ernment or the political process is studied ,  and phrases such as "urban 
alienations" ( Fischer, 1 97 3 ) are coined .  
In view of the multitude of cases in which it is possible to  speak of 
remoteness or disaffection , "alienation "  loses all  specificity . It is at best 
a sophisticated term denoting a variety of conditions that could ,  without 
loss of clarity , be just as well apprehended with numerous other words . 
In fact,  the use of vocabulary other than "alienation" to describe situa­
tions in which individuals or groups are remote from someone or some­
thing and/or are disaffected about something would most l ikely lead to 
increased  specificity in the way language is used  to describe social phe­
nomena ,  by both laymen and social scientists. Instead of an all-encompass­
ing term such as "alienation , " terms more descriptive of various types 
of remoteness and disaffection could be employed.  Certainly , this would 
not be a violation of the spirit of the "social science enterprise . "  On the 
contrary , social science as well as philosophy depends on a disciplined 
use of vocabulary in its attempt to apprehend reality . 
Given the all-encompassing way in which "alienation" is often used ,  
it is indeed understandable why some advocate dropping the  term al­
together from the social science vocabulary . Indeed ,  it does not seem to 
be necessary for a clear understanding of the various types of remote-
ness or disaffection . In actuality , the particularity of these various types,  
which are of special interest to social scientists because of their particular­
ity, tends to be glossed over when "alienation "  is used .  
Of  course , "alienation "  is not always employed in an  all-encompassing 
and indiscriminate way .  Thus, attempts have been made to arrive at par­
ticular dimensions that could be subsumed under the term-that is , to ap­
prehend particular situations of individuals' remoteness or disaffection .  
Seeman's six varieties of alienation ( 1 97 6 : 268)  serve a s  an example . These 
varieties  ( powerlessness, meaninglessness, normlessness, cultural estrange­
ment, self-estrangement, and social isolation) represent an effort to avoid 
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using a term that is too all-encompassing. It remains unclear, however , 
why the term "alienation ,"  when used in this way , should be retained at 
all . There is no apparent advantage , for example , in calling " social isola­
tion" a variety of alienation. "Social isolation ,"  however defined , re­
mains social isolation . 
It also remains unclear why only some situations and not others are 
categorized as "varieties of alienation . "  The criteria for categorization 
have been quite arbitrary ones and are likely to remain so . For example , 
Seeman 's "varieties of alienation"  only reflect one person ' s  judgment 
and attempt to abstract from the numerous ways in which the term 
"alienation" is used .  It represents an attempt to create a consensus con­
cerning the use of the term where there is no consensus. The basis on 
which this consensus could rest is in itself relative , making it both un­
likely that a discipline-wide consensus could be sustained and that 
"alienation"  as a term would be given a clearly defined meaning in the 
social science community. 
Seeman 's endeavor, then , does represent an attempt to clearly define 
and consistently apply the term "alienation . "  But the attempt has not  
been successful and the ambiguity often associated with today 's u se of 
the term has hardly been overcome . Recent social analysis has often 
linked the use of the term to Marx and has justified it on the basis of 
his writings. In  many cases, however, this l inking has expli citly or impl icitly 
distorted Marx's thought and the way he used the terms "alienation" 
and "estrange ment. "  
The present study addresses the main distortions that have arisen 
from linking Marx to modern research and commentary on "al ienation . "  
I t  also attempts to  break some new ground in interpreting Marx and 
points out the implications for scholars who wish to utilize Marx's con­
cepts of  estrangement and alienation 1 in their own work . The aim here 
is both to contribute to the understanding of Marx 's work and to pro­
mote greater clarity and rigor in the way certain concepts, especially 
"estrangement" and "alienation , "  are used in the social sciences.  
In addition to making certain that the correct vocabulary and trans­
lations are used when discussing Marx's theory of estrangement ,  it is 
equally important that Marx 's analytic framework as a whole be under­
stood correctly . Only then is it possible to apprehend the function and 
value of his theory of estrangement for today 's social sciences .  Marx 
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based his theory of estrangement on an " inventory " of each human being's 
capabilities. In  his investigation of the nature of social organization ,  he 
found that throughout most of history individuals have not been able to 
l ive according to their capabilities. For example , by nature human beings 
are capable of subjecting production and the product of their labor to 
their conscious control. Yet , in actual l ife they are prevented from do ing 
so . In other words, a discrepancy was found to exist between individuals '  
capabilities and how, in fact , they must l ive . Individuals were seen to be 
estranged  in the broadest sense of the word. More concretely , taking 
capitalism as an example , Marx showed why a discrepancy existed between 
individuals' capabilities and how in fact they must l ive . He specified pre­
cisely the social processes that force individuals into such a discrepancy . 
He also specified the basis upon which it can be said that individuals are 
estranged and from what they are estranged .  
For  Marx , the  desired form of social organization was communism , 
which,  contrary to capitalism, would assure that individuals would be able 
to l ive according to their capabilities. Thus, the need for a communist 
society as perceived by Marx was based on the value judgment that in­
dividuals should be able to live according to their capabilities .  Marx 's 
cal1 for a communist society did not , of course , only express the wish_ 
that individuals be able to l ive according to their capabilities . Marx main­
tained that once human beings have the opportunity to l ive according to 
their abilities, many other conditions would change for the better. There­
fore , man would no longer be dominated by the product of his own labor, 
and his physical existence would no longer be subject to arbitrary ex­
change relations. Hence , the call for a society without estrangement is 
not based only on the abstract postulate that man ought to be able to 
l ive according to his capabilities. Marx also realized that if estrangement -
were not eliminated ,  the undesirable conditions of l ife brought about 
by capitalist social organization could not be abolished .  
According to Marx , a form of  social organization such as  that which is 
prevalent under capitalism develops its own forces which in various ways 
will set the stage for the successful construction of a communist society . 
Marx did not advocate a society without estrangement only because of an 
abstract notion that it is desirable that individuals be able to l ive accord­
ing to their nature . Rather, he asserted that if and only if individuals are 
able to l ive according to their abilities ,  which they possess by nature , will 
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it be possible to free humanity of the numerous burdens brought about 
by a form of social organization (for example , capitalism) which does 
not allow man to live according to his nature . For Marx , the abil ity to 
l ive according to one's abilities was not completely subject to the will of 
individuals .  Sufficient historical development was seen as  a necessary 
prerequisite to the successful formation of a society in which individuals 
would be able to l ive according to their nature . 
This study shows that Marx considers estrangement to be a dichotomous 
phenomenon. If ,  as i s  the case under capitalism , individuals are prevented 
from living according to their capabilities ,  they are estranged . Evidence i s  
presented here showing that individuals cannot be  said to be  more or less 
estranged2 if Marx is not to be misinterpreted .  For Marx individuals are 
either estranged  or not estranged .  
Marx's  theory of estrangement becomes a tool  for the  critical analysis of 
the capitalist as well as social ist societies known to us today . It is a tool  for 
the critical analysis of all forms of social organization in which individuals 
are prevented from l iving according to their abilities .  
NOTES 
1. As the title of this study indicates, I do not speak of Marx 's theory of aliena­
tion but of his theory of estrangement. Marx made a clear distinction between the 
terms "estrangement" (Entfremdung) and "alienation" (Entausserung), and the two 
terms should not  both be translated as "alienation," as customarily has been the case. 
Based on inadequate transl ations, social scientists in the English-spe aking world have 
seldom made this distinction, which is so crucial to an understan ding of Marx. 
2. In t his context, it will also become apparent that many studies involving 
Marx 's theory of estrangement have overlooked this important fact. 
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1 
ISSUES AND PROCEDURES 
In the 1 9 20s, along with the ascent of the Frankfurt School,  Marxian 
thought experienced a revival that had far-reaching effects. The revival 
occurred in a political atmosphere that , to say the least,  was quite plural­
istic. The Weimar Republic ,  despite its short life-span ( 1 9 1 9- 1 9 3 3 ) ,  pre­
sented a stage on which,  as Remmling ( 1 97 3 : 3 -4 3 ) has pointed out ,  margin­
al  characters in the society could suddenly become socially accepted major 
characters (see also Meja ,  1 97 5 ) . Thus, very unlike the situat ion during 
Weber's imperial Germany,  Marxists were suddenly found at the university . 
This increasingly "tolerant" environment also provided fertile ground for 
thinkers like Mannheim who drew heavily from Marx and whose intellectual 
questions pertaining to the sociology of knowledge might easily be viewed 
as socially threatening (Remmling, 1 97 5 ) .  
Given the revival of Marxism and the interest i n  the sociology o f  knowledge 
in Weimar Germany , it is therefore not surprising that renewed attention was 
also paid to Marx's theory of estrangement .  In fact ,  this theory must be con­
sidered  a central element in the  evaluation of h i s  contribution to the  sociology 
of knowledge ( Remmling, 1 967 ) .  Outside the particular sphere of the sociol­
ogy of knowledge ,  Marcuse ( 1 964, 1 970 ,  1 9 72)  and Fromm ( 1 96 1 ,  1 968)-
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both members of the Frankfurt School-made extensive use of Marx' s  con­
cept of estrangement in their writings . 
Given this initial momentum,  many social scientists became interested in 
further employing Marx's theory of estrangement in their social analyses .  
In  retrospect, it has become apparent that many questions concerning the 
applicability and interpretation of Marx 's theory have not been resolved.  If 
there is to be a common discourse , and if Marx 's theory of estrangement is 
to be employed fruitfully , it is essential that sociologists share a common 
understanding of the nature of this theory . This study addresses itself to 
some of these stil l unresolved questions and represents an attempt both to 
give a logically consistent interpretation of Marx's theory of estrangement 
and to point out the scope of its applicability .  In short , the questions ad­
dressed here can be stated in the following way . 
-What is Marx's  concept of human nature ? 
-Is there only one theory of estrangement in Marx? 
-Is estrangement measurable : Does what Marx calls estrangement 
cause certain behavior, feelings ,  or attitudes ? 
-Is Marx's theory of estrangement also applicable to non capitalist 
societies? 
-Is estrangement as Marx views it a historically specific phenomenon , or 
is it an existential predicament? 
-What role does the division of labor play in Marx's theory of estrange­
ment? 
Unfortunately , students of Marx writing in the English language ( and 
many in  French) have generally not made a distinction between "estrange­
ment" and "alienation . "  One of the latest examples of this tendency can 
be found in Oilman ( 1 97 6 : 47 ,  1 3 2 ) ,  in which "estrangement" and "aliena­
tion" are synonyms. Unlike the work done by the I talian scholars ( see 
Bedeschi ,  1 968, and Chiodi ,  1 97 6) who are more precise , both the trans­
lations and the use of Entfremdung and Entausserung in the English-speakin1 
world are inexact. As one translator points out : 
There can hardly be said to be any very common practice among English 
translators. Thus , M.  Milligan (flconomic and Phi losophical MSS of 1844; 
cit . )  translates Entfremdung as "estrangement " and Entausserung as 
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"alienation "  (or "externalisation " ) ;  T. Botto more (Karl Marx: Early Writ­
ings) claims that Marx does not distinguish between the two terms and 
translates both as "alienation "  (or "estrangement" ) .  D. McLellan (Karl 
Marx: Early Texts ) and L. D. Easton and K. H. Guddat ( Writings of the 
Yo ung Marx ) translate Entfremd ung as "alienation "  and Enta usserung 
as "externalisation "  (Chiodi , 1976 : 1 24) . 
As will become clear in the course of this study , Marx does make a distinc­
tion between Entfremd ung and Entii usserung. This distinction,  though fine ,  
i s  an  important one  and will be  discussed later in this work . One  qualifica­
tion is necessary here . The distinction is not ,  of course ,  injected into those 
primary and secondary sources quoted which lack such a distinction , in 
order to preserve the authenticity of the sources .  Hence, in all  quotes , 
except those from the Collected Works ,  the reader should know that when­
ever the word "alienation " appears , it may actually mean "estrangement ." 
Social scientists and philosophers generally agree that if someone is said 
to be estranged,  he/she must be estranged fro m something or somebody . What 
is less often understood is the basis upon which Marx can say that someone 
is estranged ,  that is, the element distinguishing Marx's theory of estrange­
ment from,  say , a purely nominalist use of the concept of estrangement ,  
according to which individuals are arbitrarily said to  be estranged from all 
sorts of things.  On the basis of his concept of human nature , Marx can say 
that individuals are estranged.  Because Marx uses his concept of human na­
ture as a basis for determining why man is  estranged ,  he avoids making 
only tautological statements1 and having to give reasons of only a relativ-
istic nature . Thus ,  Marx's  theory of estrangement rests on a concept of 
human nature that allows for statements about man 's estrangement , state­
ments that are neither tautological nor relativistic .2 This concept can be 
termed "human nature in general . "  Generally , the literature dealing with 
Marx 's theory of estrangement (or with his concept of human nature) 
either fails to make this crucial distinction or fails to make it clearly (for 
example , Markovic, 1 974 : 2 1 7 -2 18 ) .  The present study shows that such a 
distinction can be made , and even must be made , if Marx 's theory of 
estrangement is to be properly understood and interpreted .  
Marx's theory of  estrangement cannot be  understood without an under­
standing of why man is estranged.  When discussing this theory , students 
of Marx usually focus on wage labor and the accompanying production of 
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commodities . Estrangement is usually , and correctly , said to result from 
the fact that man must sell h is  labor power and that he controls neither 
the product of his labor nor the act of production . However, Marx also 
speaks of the propertied class as being estranged , even though this class 
need not sell its labor power. The selling of one's labor power is therefore 
not the sole explanation for man 's estrangement .  As this study demon­
strates , for Marx the existence of an involuntary division of labor ultimately 
determines why man is estranged . Conversely ,  the voluntary division of 
labor under communism creates a condition of nonestrangement . Thus far, 
scholars have pointed out only that there is a connection between Marx ' s  
theory of estrangement and what he considered to be an  involuntary divi­
sion of labor (Remmling, 1 96 7 :  1 5 2 ;  Meszaros ,  1972 : 140- 14 3 ) .  This 
present investigation , however, shows in more detail not only that the 
"division of labor" is of central importance in Marx 's theory of estrange­
ment,  but also how it must be understood .  In the process ,  it will become 
obvious that for Marx "division of labor" has a much broader meaning 
than most writers on estrangement have assigned to it. In Marx , division of 
labor is not exclusively identified with the tendency to divide work into 
more and more minute tasks. Neither can it be identified only with what 
some might call the "man as cog in a wheel phenomenon ." The discussion 
in this work of the importance the division of labor plays in Marx 's theory 
of estrangement will also enable the reader to systematically deal with the 
question as to whether or not , according to Marx, one can speak of estrange­
ment under feudalism3 and present-day socialism, a topic also addressed 
by Ota Sik ( 1 972)  and Schwarz ( 1 967 : 82) . Schwarz maintains that once 
the private ownership in the means of production is abolished,  it is no 
longer possible to speak of estrangement, while Sik tends to take the op­
posite point of view. 
This analysis will also show that Marx does not require the abol ition 
of all division of labor if man is to l ive free from estrangement. Marx 's 
aim is not so much to do away with all division of labor as to create a 
society that allows individuals to engage in a division of labor voluntarily. 
This is not to say that a voluntary division of labor would not be different 
along various dimensions from an involuntary one. Rather, individuals are 
not estranged, even if they should engage in a certain division of labor , as 
long as they can do so voluntarily.  
Any study dealing with the interpretation and application of Marx 's 
theory of estrangement must address the question as to whether it is 
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legitimate to speak of only one theory of estrangement. This topic h as 
been under discussion for a considerable length of time , whereby some 
(such as Meszaros ,  1 9 7 2 ;  Petrovic , 1 967 ; E. Fischer , 1 970) represent the 
point of view that there is no difference between Marx 's early and later 
writings .  Others maintain that Marx abandoned his theory of estrangement 
in favor of a theory of reification in his later writings ( Israe l ,  1 97 1 ) .  (For a 
similar argument, see also Swingewood ,  1 9 7 5 :  9 5 -97 . )  Bell ( 1 96 7 :  3 6 5 )  
states that "the historical Marx had , i n  effect ,  repudiated the idea o f  aliena­
tion ,"  a proposition that Meszaros ( 1 972 )  vigorously counters. Based on 
the view that the division of  labor plays  a central role in Marx 's theory of 
estrangement , i t  will be shown how the issues raised by this rather fruit­
less debate can be "resolved" and in what sense it is possible to speak of 
only one theory of estrangement in Marx . 
In his excellent review essay on estrangement ,  Lu dz ( 1 97 3 :  2 7 )  mentions 
that, in  the contemporary use of Marx 's theory of estrangement , different 
" ideological realms as well as divergent methodologies confront one another." 
Lu dz correctly states that some authors believe that "[f] rom Marxist and neo­
Marxist points of view, alienation in the hands of empirical-analytical re­
searchers has become merely 'a concept of accommodation '  rather than a 
means of cultural criticism."  It is legitimate to ask for the basis of this be-
lief. One source of contention lies in the fact that in contemporary usage of 
Marx's theory of estrangement , the attempt is made to operationalize "es­
trange ment" in order to make it "accessible" to measurement. The operation­
alization has frequently been based on social-psychological con cepts, imply­
ing that if individuals did not perceive their existence and social environ-
ment in certain ways ,  they would not be estranged .  Estrange ment thus came 
to be viewed as a function of the individual 's state of mind .  Others con­
tended that for Marx estrangement was at  least in  part , i f  not totally , also 
a function of certain social-structural conditions (see Schacht ,  1 9 7 1 : 1 7 2 ;  
and Israel, 1 97 1 ) .  According t o  this latter view,  i t  follows that i f  estrange­
ment is to be abolished ,  basic social-structural changes must occur . This 
demand for social change is not necessarily implied in the position which 
holds that estrangement is only a function of whether individuals perceive 
their social environment in a particular way . In view of this debate , this 
study investigates whether , according to Marx , estrangement must be viewed 
as a function of social structure or as one of the individual 's states of mind . 
Contemporary application of Marx's theory of estrangement raises other 
crucial issues. Thus, many students of Marx who interpret and apply his 
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theory of estrange ment view estrangement as occurring to a greater or lesser 
extent .4 It is also very common to view estrangement as a cause for certain 
behavior, feelings ,  or attitudes .  Both of these views are discussed in detai l ,  
and it will become apparent how the application of Marx 's theory of es­
trangement i s  intricately linked with its interpretation .  I t  will also become 
apparent that a'l;'ly attempt to measure estrangement ,  that is , to view it in 
quantitative terms , is problematic .  The problem with measurement ,  as 
will be shown , does not lie with the multidimensionality of estrangement 
as Feuer ( 1 9 6 3 :  1 39-1 40) seems to think ,5 but with the implicit danger 
of misinterpreting Marx once estrangement is perceived to be a quantita­
tive phenomenon . 
The early postwar period witnessed an upsurge and popularization of 
existentialist thinking which did not leave the debate on estrangement un­
affected .  The years in which existentialism experienced its  growth were 
also characterized by an increased interest in Marx 's early writings, par­
ticularly the Manuscripts. For many , the Manuscripts were symbolic of 
the "revitalization" of Marxism and a "novel" source for an attempt to 
provide new interpretations of and insights into Marx in v iew of the Stalin­
ist experience. Marxist scholarship  had become a "weapon" that could be 
directed against both capitalism and "Russian socialism . "  Thus , it is not 
surprising that philosophers from socialist countries were put on alert . 
What produced a virtual counteroffensive , however , was the fact that exis­
tentialists like Sartre made heavy use of the concept of estrangement in 
their writings. Scholars like Schaff ( 1 964) , Oiserman ( 1 96 5 ) ,  and Schwarz 
( 1 967) subsequently accused Sartre and others of misinterpreting Marx. 
They claimed that the existentialists treated estrangement as if it were a 
phenomenon of all social life at all times, and they maintained that Marx 
thought estrangement should be associated with only a certain historical 
phase . 6 As a result of the investigation in this volume (including the topics 
of scarcity and estrange ment in present-day socialism) , it will become clear 
how the issues raised above must be resolved .  I do not endorse J ordan 's 
( 1 97 1 :  1 9 ) view that "Marx came to believe that estrangement (self-aliena­
tion) is an unavoidable conse quence of the necessity to work . "  
Focusing o n  the issues outlined above may give u s  the key t o  a novel 
interpretation of Marx's theory of  estrangement . The contribution this 
study makes with respect to the interpretation of Marx's writings will 
be of immediate relevance to the social sciences which have traditionally 
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sought to employ his theory for further social analysis. It will be of im­
mediate relevance to social science in the same way that the social scientists' 
application of the theory has affected its interpretation. 
This inquiry seeks to give an accurate and well-documented interpreta­
tion of Marx's theory of estrangement. Hence, I rely on the Marx/Engels 
Werke as the source of Marx's original writings.7 The translations of the 
relevant passages are taken from the sources indicated in the list of 
abbreviations. As a rule, all the translations provided here have been ex­
amined for their accuracy.8 Whenever the translation does not accurately 
convey the meaning of the original, it is amended. Any such alteration is 
indicated, and usually the justification for making a specific change is 
presented. 
This text deliberately excludes controversies concerning interpretations 
of what Marx says on certain topics in order to avoid confusion and over­
loading the text with too many details. In the process, it is hoped that the 
main theses of this book will also appear with greater clarity. This does 
not mean that points of controversy are not discussed. They are indeed 
addressed, but only in footnotes and in sections separately set aside for 
this purpose. The various interpretations of Marx are for the most part 
in those sections labeled "Introduction," "Discussion," "Comment," and 
the whole of Chapters 1 ,  9, and 10 .  
This work differs from similar studies in its conscious attempt to  separate 
the account of Marx's thought from points of debate and in its use of com­
plete quotes. In general, I refrain from quoting "phrases," and use full 
quotes for purposes of documentation. Seldom is there paraphrasing with­
out subsequent documentation by quotes. There are several reasons why 
this procedure is followed. First, any interpretative study depends for its 
"data" on the texts that are being interpreted. It is therefore very important 
that these data be presented in an unabridged form. An interpretation 
documented by complete quotes presents less risk of distorting the mean­
ing than does an interpretation based on paraphrase or quotation of phrases. 
Second, the reader will be directly involved in the ways Marx expresses him­
self, an emotional component that should not be separated from an attempt 
to understand Marx. Third, the reader's direct confrontation with Marx's 
text (as well as the reader's development of a feeling for it) facilitates a 
critical appraisal of the interpretation in this book, and allows a more ob-
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jective debate. While this approach does not guarantee a solution to all 
the questions of interpretation, it is at least a step in the right direction. 
In order to improve the readability of the "main text," quotes that provide 
additional evidence for a certain argument are presented in the appropriate 
notes. 
NOTES 
1. For example ,  "man is estrange d  because he is distant from, or does not control 
such and such." 
2 .  It  also allows for statements that are empirically founded. Mandel ( 1 97 1 :  1 6 1 )  
i s  in correct when h e  says that early writings lack "empirical foundations" a n d  are 
"largely philosophical and speculative ." Man del 's  misunderstanding comes from the 
fact that he does not fully appreciate the role Marx 's concept of human natu re plays 
with respect to his theory of estrangement. 
3 .  Feudalism is characterized by the almost total absence of a market in labor 
power. Oilman ( 1 976:  1 8 1 ,  2 5 2) points out that Marx speaks of estrangement under 
feu dalism, but he does not elaborate on the subject. 
4. See, for example , Swingewood ( 1 97 5 : 92)  and Krader (1975a: 269; 1 97 5b : 4 3 7 ) .  
5. The problem, then ,  i s  n o t  h o w  to measure a phenomenon which some (Neal 
and Rettig, 1967; Tatsis and Zito , 1975) claim is mult idimensional. Rather, the proble1 
is whether what Marx calle d  estrangement is at all accessible to measurement, if Marx 
is not to be misinterpreted. 
6 .  Similarly, others can be criticized :  "The glaring survival of phenomena of aliena  
t i o n  in Soviet society serves a s  a b asis for bourgeois i deologists to demo nstrate triumph 
ly the absolute inevitability of alienation 'in industrial society ' " (Mandel , 197 1 :  1 8 7) . 
7. An exception is The Poverty of Philosophy which was transl ated into German 
under Engels' supervision (see MEW, 4, pp.  5 5 8- 5 69, 621) .  
8 .  This does not imply that the translations are optimal with respect to clarity 
an d style. To provide optimal translations was beyond the province of this work. 
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MARX'S CONCEPTION 
OF HUMAN NATURE 
Marx's theory of estrangement is rooted directly in his theory of human 
nature . Before addressing the issue of what leads to estrangement , I will 
therefore examine the ways in which Marx's theory depends on his defi­
nition of human nature . 
When defining the characteristics that make man specifically human , 
Marx makes use of two different starting points which yield quite dif­
ferent definitions of human nature . First , he defines human nature using 
a biological model , and then an historical model. In the course of the dis­
cussion here , it will become evident that Marx 's theory of estrangement 
is based primarily on the biological model. This is not to say that Marx 
was not interested in the historical , for he used the historical model to 
counter the views of some of his most ardent intellectual competitors , 
as is evident when one reads, for example , The German Ideology. 
MAN VERSUS ANIMAL:  THE BIOLOGICAL MODEL 
The biological model of human nature is a continuous theme in Marx, 
appearing in both his early and later works. The same is true with regard 
to Marx 's historical model. He states that what is unique to the human 
species from a biological point of view are the very general ways in which 
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human beings differ from animals. As is indicated by the currently used 
definition ho mo sapiens (a term Marx does not tend to use but to which 
he would probably have no objections), human beings are knowing beings 
with a consciousness and the ability to reflect upon themselves and their 
human and natural environment. As a result, unlike the animals, human 
beings have a sense of history and can anticipate the future. They can con­
sciously and willfully create and produce for a manifold of purposes, as 
individuals and as a collective. Marx does not claim that his method (that 
is, isolating what is specifically human by contrasting human beings with 
animals) is new. On the contrary, he maintains that, since Aristotle and 
the Stoics, it has been common knowledge that human beings have "in­
tellect, emotion and will" (CW, 5 ,  p. 5 1 1 ;  MEW, 3, p. 500) . Marx believes 
that his premises with regard to the differences between human beings 
and animals are not arbitrary, but rather are empirically verifiable: "The 
premises from which we begin are not arbitrary ones, not dogmas, but 
real premises from which abstraction can only be made in the imagination 
. ... These premises can thus be verified in a purely empirical way" 
(CW, 5 ,  p. 31; MEW, 3, p. 20) . With respect to the differences between 
man and the animals he states: 
The animal is immediately one with its life activity. It does not dis­
tinguish itself from it. It is i ts life activi ty. Man makes his life activity 
itself the object of his will and of his consciousness. He has conscious 
life activity. It is not a determination with which he directly merges. 
Conscious life-activity distinguishes man immediately from animal 
life (CW, 3, p. 276) ; MEW, EB 1.T., p. 5 1 6) .  
Admittedly animals also produce . . . .  But an animal only produces what 
it immediately needs for itself or its young. It produces one-sidedly, 
whilst man produces universally. It produces only under the dominion 
of immediate physical need, whilst man produces even when he is 
free from physical need and only truly produces in freedom therefrom. 
An animal produces only itself, whilst man reproduces the whole of 
nature. An animal's product belongs immediately to its physical body, 
whilst man freely confronts his product. An animal forms objects only 
in accordance with the standard and the need of the species to which 
it belongs, whilst man knows how to apply everywhere the inherent 
standard to the object. Man therefore also forms objects in accordance 
with the laws of beauty (CW, 3, pp. 276-2 7 7 ; MEW, EB, l.T., p. 5 1 7). 
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Men can be distinguished from animals by consciousness, by religion 
or anything else you like. They themselves begin to distinguish them­
selves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of 
subsistence, a step which is conditioned by their physical organisation. 
By producing their means of subsistence men are indirectly producing 
their material life (CW, 5, p. 31; MEW, 3, p. 21). 
Language, like consciousness, only arises from the need, the necessity, 
of intercourse with other men. Where there exists a relationship, it 
exists for me: the animal does not "relate" itself to anything, it does 
not "relate" itself at all. For the animal its relation to others does not 
exist as a relation (CW, 5, p. 44; MEW, 3, p. 30). 
At this point [i.e., at the beginning of conscious social life] man is dis­
tinguished from sheep only by the fact that with him consciousness 
takes the place of instinct or that his instinct is a conscious one (CW, 
5, p. 44; MEW, 3, p. 31). 
But what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is this, 
that the architect raises his structure in imagination before he erects it in 
reality. At the end of every labour-process, we get a result that already 
existed in the imagination of the labourer at its commencement. He 
not only effects a change of form in the material on which he works, 
but he also realises a purpose of his own that gives the law to his modus 
operandi, and to which he must subordinate his will. And this subordina­
tion is no mere momentary act. Besides the exertion of the bodily organs, 
the process demands that, during the whole operation, the workman's 
will be steadily in consonance with his purpose. This means close atten­
tion. The less he is attracted by the nature of the work, and the mode in 
which it is carried on, and the less, therefore, he enjoys it as something 
which gives play to his bodily and mental powers, the more close his 
attention is forced to be (Cl, p. 174; MEW, 23, p. 193) . 
In postulating that, contrary to animals, human beings produce independent­
ly of need, Marx disagrees with Adam Smith. Adam Smith assumes that 
human beings by nature, prefer rest (Rube) to work, while Marx postulates 
that the individual, by nature, tends also to engage in work. 
Nonetheless, Marx would probably agree with the suggestion that under 
certain historical circumstances, individuals prefer rest to work. In a society 
in which work is not imposed on individuals (a subject discussed),  how­
ever, Marx would maintain that this is not the case (MEW, G ,  pp. 505, 507): 
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"it seems quite far from Smith's mind that the individual , ' in his normal 
state of health, strength ,  activity , skill , facility , '  also needs a normal por­
tion of work , and of the suspension of tranquillity" (G, p .  6 1 1 ) ;  MEW, 
G,  p .  505 ) .  
If Marx i s  willing to admit that under given circumstances human beings 
might prefer rest (Rube) to work , in order to be consistent ,  he must also 
admit that individuals may not behave or be able to behave in a way that 
corresponds to their "natural condition ."  This "natural conditio n "  is a non­
variable ( disregarding human evolution) condition ,  since , according to Marx 
himself, it is based  not on dogma but on observable , empirical reality , a col­
lection of facts derived from a comparison of the human being with animals. 
As a resu lt ,  one can speak of human nature in general-human nature, a 
"natural condition ,"  which exists uninfluenced by the course of history . 
Against J eremy Bentham, Marx argues therefore that general human nature 
cannot be defined from the utility theory , since what is useful is histori cally 
relative and general human nature is in no way relative : 
To know what is useful for a dog, one must study dog-nature . This nature 
itself is not to be deduced from the principle of utility. Applying this to 
man , he that would criti cise all human acts, movements, relations, etc . ,  
by the principle of utility , must first deal with human nature as modified 
in each historical epoch.  Bentham makes short work of it . With the 
driest naivete he takes the modern shopkeeper, especially the English shop 
keeper, as the normal man . Whatever is useful to this queer normal man, 
and to his world ,  is absolutely useful (Cl, p. 5 7 1 ;  MEW, 2 3 ,  p.  6 3 7) . 
As this quotation indicates, Marx also makes use of an historical model of 
human nature . 
THE B EHAVIOR OF I NDIVIDUALS CHANGE S :  
THE HI STORICAL MODEL 
Bentham, using the principle of utility , arrived at a definit ion of human 
nature or "normal man" (Norma/mensch) .  Marx objects to this definition ,  
arguing that Bentham's "normal man" i s  a mere historical phenomenon . 
Therefore , in addition to his theory of general human nature , Marx intro­
duces a theory of specific  human nature . Human nature as it is understood , 
in addition to the criteria that distinguish human beings from animals,  is 
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accordingly seen t o  be a function o f  history . Thus, what for Bentham is 
"normal man , "  that is ,  human nature as such , is for Marx merely human 
nature as manifested in Bentham's historical period .  With Bentham, as 
with many other philosophers, especially the German idealists, Marx is 
quick to point out that what is often seen to constitute immutable 
human nature i s  not immutable , but represents human traits under certain 
historical circumstances only . While Marx's biological model emphasizes 
the properties of human nature that are immutable (such as intellect , con­
sciousness, will , and emotion) ,  his historical model points to the properties 
of human ,nature that are subject to change . Marx illustrates this important 
distinction as follows: 
But in any case , why should the Germans brag so loudly of their knowl­
edge of human essence, since their knowledge does not go beyond the 
three general attributes ,  intellect , emotion and will , which have been 
fairly universally recognised since the days of Aristotle and the Stoics 
( CW, 5, pp. 5 1 1 -5 1 2 ;  MEW, 3, p . 5 00) . 
He also criticizes Herr Karl Griin for his conception of human nature . 
I t  is obvious too that this "whole man , "  "contained" in a single at­
tribute of a real individual and interpreted by the philosopher in terms 
of that attribute, is a complete chimera. Anyway , what sort of man is 
this "man" who is not seen in his real historical activity and existence , 
but can be deduced from the lobe of his own ear, or from some other 
feature which distingu ishes him from the animals?  
Similarly , Marx criticizes Feuerbach : 
Feuerbach resolves the e ssence of religion into the essence of man . But 
the essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each single individual .  
In  its reality i t  is the ensemble of the  social relations. 
Feuerbach,  who does not enter upon a criticism of this real essence, is 
hence obliged :  
1 )  To abstract from the historical process and to  define the religious 
sentiment (Gemiit) by itself, and to presuppose an abstract-iso /ated­
human individual (CW, 5 ,  pp. 7-8 ;  MEW, 3 ,  p. 6) . 
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We can see that Marx accepts a biological definition of human nature , but, as 
is clear fro m his comment on Herr Grlin , this definition is not  sufficient to 
understand other aspects of human nature . Thus, he introduces the notion 
that all the aspects of  human nature that cannot be derived from a compariso1 
of human beings with animals can be understood by seeing them in an his­
torical perspective . In the same vein , he criticizes those (Grlin ,  Feuerbach,  
and others) who attempt to understand the nonbiologically based aspects 
of human nature in ways other than through historical spectacles .  He ac­
cuses them of "abstracting" and creating "phantasies" about human nature, 
of falling into t he trap of seeing nonbiologically based aspects as absolute 
instead of mutable and relative . 
HUMAN NATURE AND MARX'S DEFINITION 
O F  MAN AS SPECI ES-B EING 
If a significant portion of Marx 's definition of human nature rests on 
the comparison of man with animals ,  so does his concept of species .  "Yet 
productive life is the life of the species" (CW, 3 ,  p .  276 ) .  When specifying 
the type of productive life which defines the species, Marx says :  
It is life-engendering life .  The whole character of a species-its specie s ­
character-is contained in the  character of i t s  l ife activity ; and free , 
conscious activity is man 's species-character . . . .  Conscious life 
activity distinguishes man immediately from animal l ife activity . I t  is 
just because of this that he is a species-being. Or it is only because he 
is a species-being that he i s  a conscious being, i .e . ,  that his own l ife is 
an object for him. Only because of that is his activity free activity" 
(CW, 3 ,  p. 276 ;  MEW, EB 1 .T . ,  p. 5 1 6) .  
I t  can readily be seen that , for Marx , the concept of species has a biological 
base .  It is also clear that ,  on the basis of consciousness, unlike the animals , 
man is able to reflect upon himself and recognize what makes him a unique , 
that is ,  a species-being, when compared to the rest of his nonhuman environ­
ment. 
Man is  a species-being, not only because in practice and in theory he 
adopts the species (his own as well as those of other things) as his 
object ,  but-and this is only another way of expressing it-also because 
he treats himself as a universal and therefore a free being (CW, 3 ,  p .  2 7 5 ; 
MEW, EB  1 .T. ,  p. 5 1 5 ) .  
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Since these characteristics ,  i f  based o n  the comparison o f  man with 
animals ,  are an integral part of all human beings ,  it has been possible to see 
them also as the characterizing elements of the human species .  Thus,  
"species" is defined by the sum of the parts (that is ,  individuals) possess­
ing the set of characteristics outlined above . However, this gives an atomis­
tic view of what the human species is and does not show that the parts 
within this species interact with each other. In the Manuscripts ,  Marx 
postulates that individuals stand in interaction with each other. It is in 
the Grundrisse, however, that he postulates that human interaction is 
qualitatively very different from that of animals .  He adds that precisely 
this qualitative difference further characterizes the human species :  
The fact that this  need on the part of one can be satisfied by the prod­
uct of the other, and vice versa, and that the one is capable of pro­
ducing the object of the other's need , this proves that each of them 
reaches beyond his own particular need etc., as a human being, and 
that they relate to one another as human beings ; that all know their 
species nature (Gattungswesen) to be socil!l (gemeinschaftlich ) .  It 
does not happen elsewhere-that elephants produce for tigers, or 
animals for other animals. For example . A hive of bees comprises 
at bottom (au fon d) only one bee , and they all produce the same 
thing (MEW, G, pp. 154-155; translation mine) . 1 
Marx further illustrates the social nature of man , as follows : " I f  man 
is confronted by himself, he is confronted by the other man . . .  in fact, 
every relationship in which man [ stands) to himself, is realised and ex­
pressed only in the relationship in which a man stands to other men " 
(MEW, EB l .T. , p .  5 1 8 ;  translation mine). 2 The above passages show that 
man is by nature a social being and that this aspect also characterizes 
the human species as a species. It  also is species-nature . Before leaving 
this discussion ,  a few comments on Marx 's terminology (such as species 
and species-being) and on interpretations of Marx are in order. 
DISCUSSION 
Marx's vocabulary has caused some discomfort among scholars, partially 
because when translated into English , h is terminology is often difficult 
and his word-combinations awkward. Even in German , Marx 's terminology 
concerning the subject of species is not always completely clear , and close 
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attention must be paid to the various twists associated with a particular 
usage of words. Hence , a short digression on his use of the term species 
in its various combinations may be useful .  
"Species" is a translation of Gattung, a word that has the following 
synonyms in German (Klappenbach and Steinitz ,  1 9 7 1 ) :  Art ( translated 
by Cassell as kind ,  species ,  variety, type , sort ; race , class, stock , breed ;  
nature) and Sorte (translated by  Cassell a s  kind ,  sort , type ,  species ,  qual ity ,  
grade , variety , brand) . Gattung itself i s  translated b y  Cassell a s  kind, class, 
type,  sort ; species ;  genus, race , breed ,  family (of plants) (Betteridge , 1 9 7 5 ) .  
A dictionary used  in Marx's t ime translates Gattung a s  k ind ,  sort, species, 
race (Adler , 1 864) . Thus ,  the term Gattung can take on various meanings 
and can be used  an d translated very flexibly .  
The  above cited Worterbuch der deutschen Gegenwartssprache (Klappen­
bach and Steinitz) gives the following description of Gattung:  general con­
cept which summarizes individual things or beings that have common es­
sential properties" (translation mine) .  This is how Marx defined what is 
human nature and species-nature , namely , by singling out those aspects of 
man that are not subject to historical change , yet distinguish him from the 
animals. On the basis of these aspects he called man a Gattung. 
Gattung is usually translated as "species , "  a word that is generally used 
in biology for those types of animals that can reproduce themselves. When 
Marx speaks of Gattung, however, he does not have this meaning in mind .  
For him, man belongs to a species because of the aspects that  separate h im 
fro m the animals and that he has  in common with other human beings ,  in ­
cluding the fact that man is social. "Species-being" therefore means "inter­
active-being," in addition to a being that has intellect , will , and emotion . 
Whenever Marx uses the word " species ,"  he may or may not imply all 
the characteristics that define the "species . " For example , when he says ,  
"Man is a species-being, not only because in practice and in theory he 
adopts the species (his own as well as those of other things) as his object" 
(CW, 3 ,  p .  2 7 5 ) ,  "species" refers to the interactive nature of the members 
of the species, since without interaction , it would be impossible to adopt 
one's own species as an object. On the other hand, when Marx says, " It is 
just in his work upon the objective world ,  therefore , that man really proves 
himself to be a species-being. This production is his active species-life " 
(CW, 3 ,  p .  2 77 ) , "species" refers to man's ability to act upon nature con­
sciously . Nothing is implied about any social processes through which this 
might occur. 
MARX'S CONCEPTION OF HUMAN NATURE 1 9  
This example shows that , i n  reading Marx's early work , cl ose attention 
must be paid to his precise meaning when he uses "species"  (Gattung) . 
This is also the case in another respect. As mentioned earlier ,  the term 
Gattung has synonyms; these synonyms are not considered when Gattung 
is routinely translated as "species . "  Consider the quote given above . Marx 
writes that "Man is  a species-being, not only because . . .  he adopts the 
species ( his own as well as those of other things) as his object ."  However , 
"species" when referring to "other things" could better be rendered by 
"nature of other things ."  In German , no word distinction must be made 
since the word Gattung (species) can substitute for its synonym Art 
(nature) .  Thus, if Gattung is translated by "spec ies" (as is usually the 
case) , the German synonyms for which "species" could stand must be 
kept in mind.  
Another potential source of confusion is Gattungswesen , a word fre­
quently used in Marx 's early writings . It is sometimes overlooked in trans­
lations that Wesen has different meanings in German . For example , Wesen 
can stand for Sein (translated by Cassell as being, existence ; essence , true 
nature ) ,  "Dasein " (translated by Cassell as presence ; existence,  life ) ,  or 
Natur (in the sense of "nature of someth ing") (Paul ,  1 966) . We sen itself 
is translated by Cassell as reality , substance , essence ; being, creature , living 
thing, organism ;  state , condition ;  nature , character ,  property , intrinsic 
virtue ,  and so forth) .  Thus, when Marx says that man is a species-being 
(Gattungswesen) , he refers to the fact that man , in his existence (Sein , 
Dasein ) ,  is a member of a species. When he says that man is "estranged 
fro m his (Gattungswesen ) "  (CW,  3 ,  p. 277 ; MEW , EB l .T . ,  p .  5 1 7 ) ,  he 
means that man is estranged from the nature of his species . The second 
meaning is markedly different from the first one ; yet , the same word 
( "Wesen ")  can be used in German to render both meanings . The second 
meaning, however ,  is sometimes rendered in English in the same way as 
the first , usually with "species-being. " This is inadequate since ,  according 
to Cassell , "being" does not translate into the German Natur , but only 
into Sein and Dasein. 
Not only is the inadequacy of a technical nature , but it also has im­
portant consequences in interpreting Marx . We have seen that, for Marx , 
man is a species-being because of the characteristics by which man differs 
from the animals and by which human society differs from animal colonies. 
Based on these characteristics, each human individual is a member of a 
group of other individuals sharing the same characteristics. The individual 
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exists as a member of a species , and he is a species-being. According to 
Marx's definition,  man is and remains a species-being as long as the defin­
ing characteristics remain the same . As long as man , contrary to animals , 
remains a being endowed  with certain faculties ,  he will remain a species­
being. It therefore i s  misleading to say that man is estranged from his 
species-being, since , although estranged ,  he remains man . I t  is more mean­
ingful to say that man is estranged from his species-nature ; that is ,  he is 
prevented from using the faculties that are given to him by nature and 
that define him as a species according to his will . Although a member of 
a species (a species-being) , he cannot produce as he wants , and he cannot 
interact as would be the case if he could produce as he wants.  I n  other 
words , he is estranged  from his species-nature . I t  would have been more 
beneficial to translate "estranged from his species-nature " instead of 
"estranged from his species-being" (CW, 3 ,  p. 277 ) .3 
Although the vocabulary of the young Marx is often difficult to decipher, 
it has been possible to show a very strong consistency in his use of terms. 
Consequently , I cannot endorse Adam Schaff's statement that Marx's  
early vocabulary "was neither consistent nor precise" (S chaff, 1 970a :  84) . 
There is yet another point of disagreement with Schaff and Fromm. 
It has been shown that Marx's theory of human nature consi sts of two 
clearly delineated components, one of which is based on Marx 's biological 
mo del and the other on his historical model of human nature . Quoting 
Fro mm, Schaff writes :  
Marx was opposed to two positions : the  unhistorical one  that the 
nature of man is a substance present from the very beginning of 
history , and the relativistic position that man 's nature has no in-
herent quality whatsoever and is nothing but the reflex of social 
conditions.  But he never arrived at the full development of his own 
theory concerning the nature of man , transcending both the unhistorical 
and the relativistic positions ;  hence he left h imself open to various and 
contradictory interpretations" (Schaff, 1 9 70a: 88 ) .  
Schaff's position is unjustified because , a s  Marx himself showed,  the  un­
historical position is based on criteria that distinguish man from animal . 
These criteria are not subject to historical change unless, of course , one 
assumes that man , at the beginning of his evolution , did not possess the 
characteristics that distinguish him today from animals. When defining 
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human nature , however, Marx does no t  seem to  have been concerned with 
such matters. Instead,  he based his theory on the "human animal "  as it 
is known to us today , assuming that , as far as the history of man is known 
to us ,  the defining characteristics have remained unchanged . 
Fro m another angle , Israel makes a similar charge against Marx's theory 
of human nature . He claims that Marx 's concept of man "contains meta­
physical notions concerning the characteristics which comprise man 's 
essence"(that is ,  man 's nature) and that it is not empirically testable 
(Israel , 1 97 1 :  8-9 , 7 5 ,  76 ) .  According to the presentation of Marx 's 
theory of human nature here , however, one would have to conclude 
that the characteristics which he specified as distinguishing man from the 
animals are empirically verifiable and therefore far from metaphysical . 
I srael 's presentation of Marx's theory of human nature is unclear in 
another respect . He writes that Marx adopted Schiller 's view "that human 
nature could reach perfection"  (Israel ,  1 97 1 :  24) and that "human nature 
can be conceived of, on the one hand ,  as the potentiali ties which mankind 
has and ,  on the other hand ,  as the existing human being seen as a con­
sequence of a certain social structure " (I srae l ,  1 97 1 :  5 7 ) .  Here , Israel 
fails to distinguish between the two components of Marx 's theory of hu­
man nature . He is likely referring to that part of Marx's theory of human 
nature that is labeled here as the historical model of human n ature . He 
does not specify , however. I t  would  not be possible to speak of human 
nature reaching perfection in any other way since it is perfect in its own 
right, as is shown in the comparison of man with animals. Israel believes 
that the 
young Marx's theory concerning man 's nature contained value premises 
which were anchored in a specific historical period characterized by 
specific  conditions :  it was a situation marked by the transition from 
the artisan to the industrial level of production . . . .  Marx 's theory of 
man as developed in the Manuscripts was characterized by romantic 
ideas and notions concerning the nature of work , which , in my opinion , 
were influenced by the historical situation preceding the p rocess of 
industrialization (Israel , 1 97 1 :  262 ) .  
If my delineation of Marx's theory of human nature is correct , no such 
conclusion can be drawn , regardless of what model (historical or unhis­
torical) is considered. First , a comparison of man with the animals does 
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not contain "value premises which were anchored in a specific historical 
period ."  Second, any determination of the characteristics of human 
nature which are historically determined does not depend on particular 
values , since it is  merely based on a comparison of human behavior under 
various historical conditions. Therefore, if anything depends on value , it 
is not Marx 's theory of human nature but his assumption that man ought 
to be able to live according to what he thinks is man's nature. Third, as 
our analysis of Marx 's theory of human natu re has shown , there is no 
evidence, contrary to Israel 's  implied view, that this theory changed 
as Marx wrote his later works. By selecting passages from Marx's early 
and later works ,  it could be shown that his theory of human nature did 
not change.  
In a recent essay , Daniel Bel l  suggests that Marx was seeking to resolve 
"a number of inherently irreconcilable dilemmas in the epistemology and 
sociology of the social sciences" ( Bell , 1977 : 1 89) .  Bell further asserts 
that one such dilemma is "human nature seen as an essence ( Wesen) versus 
human nature seen as recreated by history . "  Bell is correct in recognizing 
that Marx's  theory of human nature consists of two parts .  My analysis 
above , however, suggests no reason why these two parts should be thought 
of as irreconcilable opposites ;  on the contrary , they complement each 
other. Marx's biological model can determine only those characteristics 
that distinguish man from animals and that thus define human nature . I t  
cannot, and does not claim to , explain the differences i n  human behavior 
(that is ,  human nature ) over t ime .  For this ,  Marx makes use of an historical 
model . This and the biologi cal model are mutually exclusive , however, and 
are not irreconcilable but complementary . 
NOTES 
1. My translation di ffers from Martin Nicolaus'  translation o f  the Grundrisse 
insofar as it replaces "that their common species-being (Gattungswesen ) is acknowl­
e dge d  by all " with "that all know their species-nature (Gattungswesen )  to be social 
(gemeinscbaftlicb)" ;  an d "at bottom" with "at bottom (au fond)"  (see G, p .  243 ) .  
2 .  For additional illustration,  consider the following quotes: 
But also when I am active scientifically , etc.-an activity which I c an sel dom 
perform in direct community with others-then my activity is social, because I 
perform it as a man . Not only is the material of my activity given to me as a 
social product (as is even the language in which the thinker is active) : my 
o wn existence is social activity , and therefore that which I make of myself, 
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I make of myself for society and with the consciousness of myself as a social 
being. 
My general consciousness is only the theoretical shape of that of which the 
living shape is the real community, the social fabric ,  although at the present 
day general consciousness is an abstraction from real l ife and as such confronts 
it with hostility . The activity of my general consciousness, as an activity , is 
therefore also my theoretical existence as a social being. 
Above all we must avoid postulating "society " again as an abstraction 
vis-a-vis the in dividual . The individual is the social being . . .  man 's individual 
and species-life are not different. (CW, 3, p .  2 9 8-29 9 ;  MEW, EB 1 .T. ,  p .  5 3 8 ) .  
Lan guage, l ike consciousness, only arises from the need, the necessity, of  inter­
course with  other men. Where there exists a relationship,  it exists for me. 
(CW, 5, p .  44; MEW, 3 ,  p .  3 0) .  
In  a sort of way, it is with man a s  with commodities. Since h e  comes into the 
world neither with a looking glass in his han d ,  nor as a Fichtian phil osopher, 
to whom "I am I" is sufficient, man first sees  and recognises himself in other 
men. Peter only establishes his own identity as a man by first comparing him­
self with Paul  as being of l ike kind. And thereby Paul ,  just as he stands in his 
Pauline personality, be co mes to Peter the type of the genus homo (C l ,  p. 59 ; 
MEW, 2 3 ,  p. 67) .  
3 .  Marx himself (CW, 3 ,  p .  277 ;  MEW, EB ,  1 .T., p .  5 1 7) explains that estrange­
ment from Gattungswesen means estrangement from "species-nature ." In the 
Collected Works (Vol. 3, p. 2 7 7 ) ,  the translation is not consistent. 
Marx makes another use of Gattungswesen or Gattungssein : "the divine 
power of money l ie s  in its character as men 's estranged, alienating and self-disposing 
species-nature " (Gattungswesen) (CW, 3, p. 3 2 5 ;  M EW, E B  1 .T.,  p. 5 6 5 ) .  Here 
Gattungswesen refers not to the species' principal nature, but to its n ature as it 
applies to a certain historical situation. The word Gattungswesen is used in con­
junction with Marx's historical model of human nature rather than the biological 
one.  
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ESTRANGEMENT: THE CONSEQUENCES 
OF BEING COERCED INTO SELLING 
ONE'S LABOR POWER 
Before it can be shown how Marx's theory of estrangement derives 
directly from his concept of human nature , we must first examine how 
Marx perceived some other aspects of social l ife .  This examination will 
then be helpful in understanding Marx's theory of estrangement. 
Throughout his work , Marx emphasized that , although some individuals 
may have some choice as to the persons or institutions to which they sell 
their labor power, under a system of wage labor it is capital that commands 
labor. The observation that capital has more power than labor is manifest 
by the fact that the cap italist as the agent of cap ital has more alternatives 
than the worker. 
Wages are determined through the antagonistic struggle between capital­
ist and worker. Victory goes necessarily to the capitalist. The capitalist 
can live longer without the worker than can the worker without the 
capitalist (CW, 3, p. 2 3 5 ) ;  MEW, EB l .T . ,  p. 47 1 )  . 
. . . it is just the capacity of the capitalist to direct his capital into 
another channel which either renders the worker, who is restricted to 
some particular branch of labour, destitute, or forces him to submit 
to every demand of this capitalist ( CW, 3 ,  p. 2 3 6 ; MEW, EB 1 .T . ,  p. 472 ) . 
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Marx was even more distressed by capital 's apparent power to seriously 
threaten even the worker's physical survival : 
[ T]he worker has the misfortune to be a living capital, and therefore an 
indigent capital, one which loses its interest , and hence its l ivelihood,  
every moment it is not working . . . .  As soon , therefore ,  as it occurs to 
capital (whether from necessity or caprice) no longer to be for the 
worker, he himself is no longer for himself: he has no work , hence 
no wages ,  and since he has no existence as a human being but only 
as a worker, he can go and bury himself, starve to death ,  etc (CW, 3 ,  
p .  2 8 3 ;  MEW, E B  1 .T . ,  p .  5 2 3 ) .  
[ I ] n  those cases where worker and capitalist equally suffer, the worker 
suffers in his very existence , the capitalist in the profit on his dead 
mammon (CW, 3 ,  p. 2 3 7 ;  MEW, EB 1 .T . ,  p. 47 3 ) .  
In  view of  such a n  account of the power o f  capital , w e  should  n o t  be 
surprised by Marx's categoric statement that "Capital is thus the governing 
power over labour" (CW, 3 ,  p. 247 ;  MEW, E B  1 .T . ,  p .  484) . However , the 
agents of capital-the capitalists-do not possess this governing power on 
the basis of personal or human qualities ,  but merely because they own 
capital with its inherent power to purchase anything and everything. The 
capitalist 's power "is the purchasing power of his capital , which nothing 
can withstand" (CW,  3 ,  p. 247 ) .  Thus, whereas in earlier societies people 
were herded together to engage in forced labor , capital manages to ac­
complish the same coordination of labor power through the exchange of 
free labor (MEW, G ,  p .  427) .  
Capital represents 
a coercive relation , which compels the working class to do more work 
than the narrow round of its own life-wants prescribes.  As a producer 
of the activity of others, as a pumper-out of surplus-labour and ex­
ploiter of labour-power, it surpasses in energy , disregard of bounds, 
recklessness and efficiency , all earlier systems of production based on 
directly compulsory labour (C l ,  p .  29 3 ;  MEW, 2 3 ,  p .  3 2 8 ) .  
Capital not only governs labor in society a s  a whole , but also has command 
over labor during the act of production .  "Personified capital , the capitalist 
BEING COERCED INTO SELLING ONE'S LABOR POWER 27 
takes care that the labourer does his work satisfactorily (ordentlich) and with 
the proper degree of intensity" (Cl, p. 29 3 ;  MEW ,  2 3 ,  p. 3 2 8 ;  translation 
mine) . 
At first, it may appear that the worker is a free agent and that cap ital 
is not coercive . Indeed, the worker himself sells his labor power to the 
capitalist and engages in a contractual relationship with him. After the 
deal is made , however, it is discovered that the worker 
Was no "free agent ,"  that the time for which he is free to sell his 
labour-power is the time for which he is forced to sell it, that in fact 
the vampire will not lose its hold on him "so long as there is  a muscle, 
a nerve , a drop of blood to be exploited" (Cl,  p. 285 ; MEW, 2 3 ,  p .  3 1 9 ) . 1 
In fact , the worker was in the bondage of capital even before he appeared 
as a "free agent" of his labor power. As part of an unending cy cle , all he 
can do is sell his labor power over and over again .  I t  is the capital ist process 
of production itself which, based on the fact that the worker does not own 
his product of labor ,  "incessantly hurls back the labourer on to the market 
as a vendor of his labour-power, and that incessantly converts his own prod­
uct into a means by which another man can purchase him " (Cl, pp. 541 -
542 ; MEW, 2 3 ,  p .  603 ) .  The capitalist process of  production incessantly 
forces the worker "to sell his labour-power in order to live , and enables 
the capitalist to purchase labour-power in order that he may enrich him­
self" (Cl, p. 5 4 1 ; MEW, 2 3 ,  p .  603 ) . This process keeps the worker in con­
stant bondage ,  and in the case of child labor, even the formality of a volun­
tary sale disappears (MEW, 2 3 ,  p .  603 ) . 
WAGE LABOR:  THE COERCION TO GIVE UP 
ONE'S WI LL AND CONTROL OVER ONE'S BODY 
In return for his continued physical existence , the worker is compelled 
to repeatedly sell his labor power as one would sell any other commodity . 
But since labor po wer cannot in reality be separated fro m  the locus of this 
power-a human being with distinct qualities and needs-the individual as 
the locus of labor power is also treated as any other commodity. Not only 
does capital coerce the individual to become a commodity in that he or she is 
forced to sell his labor power, but also once the labor is sol d ,  the individual 
worker possessing this power loses control over it .  Once sold , labor power 
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is the property of capital , property for which the locus of this power (the 
worker) receives a sum of money in return . However , labor power cannot 
become the property of capital without the locus of this power, for the 
time contracted, also becoming the property of capital . As is the case with 
any other commodity , the capitalist owner of labor power has the right to 
subject this power to his will. Having this right ,  however, implies that the 
indivi dual , who is the source of labor power, no longer is allowed to exert 
his/her will over their own power, since the individual cannot be separated 
from the labor power he/she puts out. If labor power becomes a commodity 
so must the individual putting out this labor power. 
The worker is thus forced ( 1 )  to sell his labor power and ( 2 )  to give 
up his command over it once it is sold .  Even if the terms of employment 
are attractive , this principal condition does not change . Thus ,  Marx writes :  
"The raising of wages excites in the worker the capitalists '  mania to get 
rich, which he , however, can only satisfy by the sacrifice of his mind and 
body" (CW, 3, p .  2 3 8 ;  MEW, EB l .T . ,  p. 474) . And since the worker is 
forced to become a commodity by being coerced into selling his labor 
power as if it were any other commodity and giving up his control over it 
once it has been sol d ,  the stage is set for him to be treated as a thing , as 
a machine with the capacity to perform certain tasks and also subject to 
the owner's will . " Since the worker has sunk to the level of a machine ,  he 
can be confronted by the machine as a competitor" (CW, 3 ,  p .  2 3 8) .  
The worker therefore serves a will that i s  not his own .  Furthermore , he 
is treated as a commodity and ,  like a machine , acts in behalf of a will out­
side himself. This is not the case if the worker is not coerced into selling 
his labor power. "So far as the labour-process is purely individual , "  writes 
Marx, 
one an d the same labourer writes in himself all the functions,  that later 
on become separated .  When an individual appropriates natural objects 
for his livelihood, no one controls him but himself. Afterwards he is 
controlled by others .  A single man cannot operate nature without call­
ing his own muscles into play under the control of his own brain .  As in 
the natural body head and hand wait upon each other, so the labour­
process unites the labour of the hand with that of the head .  Later on 
they part company and even become deadly foes" (C l ,  p. 476 ;  MEW, 
2 3 ,  p .  5 3 1 ) .  
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And in the Grundrisse, Marx says that 
in the product ion  process of capital labour is a totality-a combination 
of labours-whose individual component parts are alien to one another, 
so that the overall process as a totality is  not the work of the individual 
worker, and is furthermore the work of the different workers together 
only to the extent that they are (forcibly) combined,  and do not (volun­
tarily) enter into combination with one another . The combination of 
this labour appears just as subservient to and led by an alien will and an 
alien intelligence-leaving its ani mating uni ty elsewhere . . .  " (G ,  p. 470 ;  
MEW,  G,  pp.  3 74- 3 7 5 ) .  
In summary , i t  may b e  noted that under capital , unlike slavery , "the 
worker is not a condition of production , only work is " (G ,  p. 498 ) .  That 
is ,  only the cost of labor power is considered in the decision-making pro­
cesses of the agents of capital .  The fact that the individual , as the locus 
of this power, also has needs remains ignored .  In addition ,  capital coerces 
the worker by appropriating his wil l :  "The presupposition of the master­
servant relation is the appropriation of an alien wi ll . . . , " and this relation 
is "reproduced-in mediated form-in capital " (G, pp. 5 00- 5 0 1 ; MEW, G, 
p .  400) .  
In order to elaborate on the fact that coercion alone makes wage labor 
possible , it will be fruitful to examine the parallels Marx sees between wage 
labor and ·other forms of coerced labor resulting in slavery , serfdom ,  and 
the like. 
Insofar as wage labor is subject to an alien will it resembles slavery : "A 
man is continually compelled to sel l  his labour-power , i .e . ,  himself to another 
man . . . " (C2 ,  p .  444 ; MEW, 24,  p .  4 3 8) .  Marx 's analogies to slavery further 
illustrate this point : 
The Roman slave was held by fetters : The wage labourer is bound to his 
owner by invisible threads (C l ,  p. 5 3 8 ;  MEW, 2 3 ,  p .  5 99) . 
The essential difference between the various economic forms of society , 
between , for instance , a society based on slave labour , and one based on 
wage labour, lies only in the mode in which this surplus-labour is in each 
case extracted from the actual producer, the labourer (C l ,  p. 209 ; MEW, 
2 3 ,  p. 2 3 1 ;  see also MEW, 24,  p .  3 8 5 ) .  
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The more they [the workers] wish to earn , the more must they sacrifice 
their time and carry out slave-labour, completely losing all their freedom ,  
i n  the service of greed (CW, 3 ,  p .  2 3 7 ;  MEW, EB l .T. , p . 4 7 3 ) . 2 
The analogy between wage labor and slavery is an apt one . Engels 
concisely summed up some of the paralle ls between wage labor and slavery , 
showing that the slave can have a better existence than the worker, since 
the slave 's b iological existence is guaranteed , while the worker's is not .  A 
slave is the property of his master,  who has an interest in keeping his slave 
pro ducing; the worker is forced to sell h is labor power on a daily and hour­
ly basis .  However, the worker's labor power is purchased only when it is 
needed ;  consequently , the worker's existence is threatened.  Capitalism 
secures only the existence of the proletariat as a class , and not the existence 
of the individual worker ( Engels, MEW, 4, p .  366 ) . 
Man under capital is forced to sell his labor power and is forced to sub­
ordinate his will to an alien will ; as Marx 's analogies with slavery point out, 
this condition is tantamount to slavery . The difference is that under capital 
slavery is a mediated form of slavery while , earlier , slavery was based on 
direct domination .  Armed with this knowledge as well as knowledge of 
Marx 's theory of human nature , it is now possible to address the question 
of estrangement. As will  be apparent,  Marx 's theory of estrangement rests 
directly on t he postulates outlined so far . 
THE CONSEQUENCES O F  BEING COERCED 
I NTO SELLI NG ONE'S LABOR POWE R 
Under capital , the worker is forced to sell his labor power in return 
for a wage , which then allows him to purchase commodities necessary for 
his sustenance. The worker then does not produce his sustenance directly. 
Nor does he own the means to do so. He is thus forced to sell h is only 
asset-his labor power. According to Marx , this process implies that the 
original connection of the means of production with the individual exert­
ing labor power has been dissolved .  As a result ,  "the mass of the people , 
the labourers , have , as non-owners, come face to face with the non-labourers 
as the owners of these means of production"  (C2 , p. 3 1 ;  MEW, 24, p. 3 8 ) . 3 
The workers not only lack the means to transform and manipulate nature 
in the process of production ,  but they also have no claim to the product 
of their labor. They produce the product for and in behalf of an alien will . 
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For the labor power expended, they are compensated not with the product 
of their labor but with a sum of money , a wage . Marx therefore concludes 
that the worker is estrange d  in two principal ways. He who i s  coerced into 
selling his labor power , and labor under the domination of an alien will is 
estranged  from ( 1 )  the product of his l abor,  and (2) the act of production .  
ESTRANGEMENT F ROM THE P RODUCT O F  ONE 'S LABOR 
As shown earlier, man differs from the animals in being a conscious 
being, and on the basis of such criteria Marx determines what human nature 
is. The criteria themselves, if they are to determine in an ahistorical way 
what human nature is, are derived from a comparison of man with animals. 
Thus ,  unlike animals ,  man by nature is able to confront his p roduct of labor 
freely , while the animal ' s  product belongs immediately to its physical body 
(CW, 3 ,  pp .  2 7 6-27 7 ) .  The nature of man is thus to confront his product 
of labor freely . Man not only has the natural faculty to make his "life 
activity itself the object of his will and of his consciousness" (CW , 3 ,  
p .  2 7  6) , but he is also by nature able to confront the pro duct of his labor 
both consciously and freely . This product, of course, is again an integral 
part of his environment and, thus, again an object of man 's will and consciou� 
life activity . For Marx , then, man has the faculty, given to h im by nature, 
to act consciously upon nature as such as well as upon the products of 
his labor. 
Under capital , man is not allowed to live according to his nature . Since 
he must sell his labor, his own product of labor ceases to be an object of 
his will and consciousness. Rather, under capital the product of a worker's 
labor becomes the object of a will that is alien to him/her. For Marx , this 
condition is unnatural , for by nature the human producer has the faculty 
to freely and consciously confront the product of his labor an d subject i t  
to h i s  wil l .  The capital ist mode of production prevents the  producer from 
subjecting his product of labor to his will as he has by nature the faculty 
to do . In this context , Marx speaks of the estrangement of man from the 
product of his labor (CW, 3, p. 274) . Referring to the worker ,  he speaks 
of "the estrange ment , the loss of the object , of his product" (CW,  3 ,  
p .  2 7  3 ) ,  "the estrange ment of the object o f  labour" (CW,  3 ,  p .  2 7  4 ) ,  and 
so forth .  
The producer's inalienable ability to subject the product of his labor to  
h i s  own will is denied ,  and instead, the  workers' products are subject to  a 
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will alien to the producers,  the will of the capitalists who appropriate the 
product of labor. Hence , the worker cannot dispose of  his product. And 
since it is subject to an alien wil l ,  h is own product confronts him as "some­
thing alien ,  as a power independent of  the producer" (CW, 3 ,  p.  2 7 2 ) .  This , 
Marx says ,  is a fact of political e conomy (CW, 3 ,  p .  27 1 ) .  While "the pro ­
duct of labour i s  labour which has been embodied in an  object ,  which has 
become material ,"  and while "labour's realisation is its objectifi cation , "  
under "these econ omic conditions this realisation of labour appears a s  a 
loss of realisation for the workers ; objectification as loss of the object 
and bondage to it ; appropriation as estrangement, as alienation "  (CW, 
3 ,  p .  2 7 2 ;  MEW, EB 1 .T. , pp. 5 1 1-5 1 2 ) . To this  Marx adds : "So  much 
does the appropriation of the object appear as estrangement that the 
more objects the worker produces the less he can possess and the more 
he falls under the sway of his product, capital" (CW, 3, p .  2 72 ; MEW, 
EB  1 .T. , p .  5 1 2 ) .  
The greater the  worker's product "the less is he himself" (CW,  3 , p .  272 ) .  
The alienation of the worker i n  his product means no t  only that his 
labour beco mes an object ,  an external existence , but that it exists 
o utside him, inde pendently , as something alien to him,  an d that it 
becomes a power on its own confronting him. I t  means that the life 
which he has conferred on the object confronts him as something 
hostile and alien (CW, 3 ,  p. 2 7 2 ;  MEW, EB 1 .T . ,  p. 5 1 2) .  
The relationship o f  the worker t o  the product o f  his own labor i s  there­
fore one in which the worker is dominated by his very own product .  This 
condition goes against the individual 's nature , since human beings have 
the capability to appropriate their own product as well as subject it to 
their will . The political economy under capitalism forcibly prevents the 
worker frnm doing this. Such a political economy is based o n  processes, 
although manmade ,4 that result in man not living according to his human 
nature . 
THE WORKER'S ESTRANGEMENT FROM THE 
ACT O F  PRODUCTION AND F ROM HIMSELF 
Marx asks the following question : "How could the worker come to 
face the product of  his activity as a stranger, were it not that in the very 
act of production he was estranging himself from himself? " (CW, 3 ,  p .  274 ;  
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MEW, EB 1 .T . ,  p .  5 14) . He postulates that "in the estrangement of the 
object of labour is merely summarized the estrangement ,  the alienat ion , 
in the activity of labour itself" (CW, 3 ,  p. 274 ;  MEW, E B  1 .T . ,  p .  5 14 ) .  
We  have seen that the  worker is coerced into selling h i s  labor power 
and that , once his labor power is sold ,  he himself becomes subject to an 
alien will .  He is forced to do so because he does not have any other means 
by which he could produce his livelihood ; he does not own any other 
means but his labor power-that is, he does not own the means of produc­
tion .  In  Capital , Marx emphasizes that, historically speaking, individuals 
"became sellers of themselves only after they had been robbed of all 
their own means of production "  ( C l ,  p.  669 ;  MEW, 2 3 ,  p.  743 ) .  The lack 
of ownership of the means of production is therefore directly related to 
wage labor and is the reason why , under capital, the worker is coerced into 
subordinating himself to an alien will .  This same lack is directly related to 
and expressive of the fact that the worker is prevented from appropriating 
the product of his own labor, since the means of production are in themselves 
nothing but the product of labor. Although the worker is the capitalist ' s  " per­
sonal source of wealth , "  he is "devoid of all means of making that wealth his 
own" ( C l ,  p. 5 3 5 ;  MEW, 2 3 ,  p. 5 96) .  The capitalist 's personal source of wealth 
of course, also includes the means of production he owns (see C l , p .  5 3 5  
and MEW, 2 3 ,  p .  5 9 5 ). I n  addition ,  it  is particularly the product of man 's 
labor as represented in the means of production which , subj e ct to an 
alien wil l ,  is turning into an alien power. Capital , constant and variable ,  
confronts the worker "as the totality of the objective conditions o f  labour ,"  
"as alien pro perty ," and a s  time proceeds the "conditions of labour con­
front the individual worker in an ever more gigantic form" (TS 3,  pp. 3 5 2-
3 5 3 ;  MEW, 26 . 3 ,  pp .  344- 345 ) . 5 In this context , it is therefore possible 
to s peak of the "alienation of the conditions of production "  (TS 3 ,  p. 5 3 0 ;  
MEW, 26 . 3 ,  p .  5 1 9) .  
Marx contends, then , that "estrangement from t h e  product o f  one 's 
labour" is directly connected with man 's "estrangement from the act of 
production ."  As we have just seen ,  under "the act of production" one 
should also understand the "totality of the objective conditions of labour," 
namely , capital in its constant and variable form. Both forms of estrange­
ment always exist simultaneously .6 Common to both is their source . A 
will alien to the worker controls the product of labor, and hence the totality 
of the con ditions of production as wel l ,  that is ,  capital in its constant and 
variable form. 
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According to Marx's theory of human nature ,  man by nature has the 
ability to make "his life activity itself the object of his will an d of his 
consciousness" (CW, 3 ,  p. 276 ) .  Man 's species-character is his free and 
conscious activity (CW, 3, p .  276 ) .  Under capitalism, however, the con­
ditions of labor are subject to a will alien to the worker ,  thus preventing 
the worker from making work a free and conscious activity . Marx points 
out that "labour i s  therefore not voluntary , but coerced ;  it i s  forced 
labour" (CW, 3 ,  p .  274) .  The act of production is one of coercion ,  out­
side of the individual worker's control. Thus, the worker is prevented 
fro m  producing freely and under the guidance of  bis will and conscious­
ness, and is coerced into producing according to a will alien to him . The 
worker is estranged from the act of production , which is also saying that 
he is estrange d  from himself: " [T] he external character of labour for the 
worker appears in the fact that it is not his own, but someone else 's, 
that it does not belong to him, that in it he belongs ,  not to himself, but 
to another" (CW, 3, p .  274 ;  MEW, EB 1 .T . ,  p. 5 14) .  Man is estranged 
from himself because his own active functions ,  his l ife activity , are not 
his but someone else ' s  ( CW,  3 ,  p. 276) . Self-estrangement consists in the 
fact that the worker's "personal l ife-for what is l ife but activity ?-is 
an activity which is turned against him, independent of him and not 
belonging to him" (CW, 3, p .  27 5 ;  MEW, EB  1 .T. , p. 5 1 5 ) .  S ince man 's 
activity is not his own but someone else 's ,  it becomes a mere means. As 
we have seen , since man is forced to sell his labor power , it  becomes a 
means to "maintain physical existence" (CW, 3 ,  pp .  274-277 ;  MEW, 
EB 1 .T . ,  pp.  5 1 4-5 1 7 ) .  
ESTRANGEMENT FROM NATURE 
Like the animals , man depends on nature for his livelihood . However , 
men begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin 
to pro duce their means of subsistence , a step which is conditioned by 
their physical organisation.  By producing their means of subsistence men 
are indirectly producing their material life " (CW, 5 ,  p .  3 1 ;  MEW, 3 , p .  2 1 ) .  
Man manipulates nature ; he does not merely live off it .  H e  also manipulates 
nature consciously . Hence,  the best of bees differ from the worst architect 
by the fact that 
the architect raises his structure in imagination before he erects it in 
reality. At the end of every labour-process , we get a result that already 
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existed in the  imagination of  the  labourer at  i t s  commencement .  He 
not only effects a change of form in the material on which he works , 
but he also realises a purpose of his own . (C l , p .  1 74 ;  MEW, 2 3 ,  p .  1 9 3 ) .  
Consciousness also allows man t o  produce "free from need ,"  "in accordance 
with the laws of beauty ," (CW, 3 ,  pp. 2 7 6-277 ) , and so on .  
The l ink  to nature is cut  i f  workers , against their natural ability , are pre­
vented from manipulating nature according to their wil l  and consciousness , 
and if in the act of production man is forced to manipulate nature according 
to an alien will , a will independent of the producer .  This point is illustrated 
in the Grundrisse : 
[T )he relation of labour to capital, or to the objective conditions of 
labour as capital, presupposes a process of history which dissolves the 
various forms in which the worker is a proprietor, or in which the pro­
prietor works. Thus above a l l  ( 1 ) Dissolution of the  relation to the  earth­
lan d an d soil-as natural condition of production-to which he relates 
as his o wn inorganic  being; the workshop of his forces ,  and the domain 
of his will (translation mine ) .  7 
When the link to nature is not broken ,  nature is man 's inorganic body . Under 
conditions in which man is not forced to produce under an alien will , "man 's 
physical and spiritual life is linked to nature " (CW,  3 ,  p. 2 7 6 ) .  But under 
capitalism this is not the case . Marx speaks of man 's estrange ment from 
nature (CW, 3 ,  pp .  2 7 6-277 ; MEW, EB  1 .T . ,  pp .  5 1 6-5 1 7 ) ,  which means 
that man 's "inorganic  body ,  nature , is taken away from him " (CW ,  3 ,  p. 27 7 ) .  
As a result , man is also prevented from seeing , through the act o f  produc­
tion , nature "as his work and his reality " (CW, 3 ,  p. 2 77 ) .  Marx goes so far 
as to say that even man 's advantage over animals is transformed insofar as 
"his inorganic body , nature , is taken away from him" (CW, 3 ,  p .  2 7 7 ) .  
ESTRANGEMENT FROM THE SPECIES AND F ROM MAN 
In the earlier discussion of Marx 's concept of species ,  it is concluded 
that the same characteristics differentiating each individual from animals 
also designate the nature of the species. In this sense , the human species 
consists of individuals sharing the same biological characteristics, those 
characteristics that also define human nature . Beyond that , however,  it is 
sho wn that the way in which human individuals interact also defines the 
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species. Hence , human interaction is by nature very different from animal 
interaction , particularly when it comes to production . For instance ,  the 
"need on the part of one can be satisfied by the product of the other. . .  , 
and . . .  the one is capable of producing the object of the need of the other" 
(G,  p .  243 ;  MEW, G ,  p. 1 54) .  According to Marx , this capability is qualita­
tively very different from that of animals. The species-nature is defined 
by the biological nature of human individuals comprising it , as well as by 
the quality of interaction among these individuals .  
When Marx says that "estranged labour estranges the species from 
man" (CW, 3 ,  p. 2 7 6) ,  he does not mean that man ceases to be a member 
of the species. Rather, man remains a member of his species by definition .  
Under capital , however, the species as  a whole is prevented from living 
according to its natural capability . The individual is therefore prevented 
from being a member of a "group "  (species) which is allowed to pursue 
life according to its natural capability . 
Marx maintains that "productive life is the life of the species" and that 
"free , conscious activity is man 's species-character"  (CW, 3 ,  p .  2 76 ) .  If ,  
however,  as is the case under capitalism, man is forced to produce under 
an alien will and is prevented from appropriating the product of his own 
labor, the species loses its species character, and individuals ,  although 
capable , are prevented from interacting in such a way that the "need on 
the part of one can be satisfied by the product of the other ."  Man is 
estrange d from the species .  He is forced to interact with other members 
of the species in a way that goes against the species '  natural abilitie s ,  
since ,  to the  worker, an  alien will determines what is produced , and how 
and for whom something is produced :  "estranged labour . . .  changes for 
him [ i . e . , man ] the life of the species into a means of individual l ife . . . .  
In  tearing away from man the object of his production , therefore , estranged 
labour tears from h im h i s  species-life, his real objectivity as  a member of 
the species" (CW, 3 , pp .  2 7 6-2 77 ; MEW, EB l .T. , pp. 5 1 6- 5 1 7) .  Estranged 
labor thus makes "man 's species-life a means to his physical existence " 
(CW, 3 ,  p .  277 ) .  It "estranges the life of the species and individual life , 
and . . .  makes individual life in its abstract form the purpose of the life 
of the species ,  likewise in its abstract and estranged form " (CW , 3 ,  p .  2 7 6 ;  
MEW, EB  l . T. ,  p .  5 1 6) . 8 
The form of human interaction under capital and wage labor is there­
fore quite different from what it could be according to the species-nature. 
Species membership becomes a mere formality , and interaction in pro­
ductive life (species-life )  a mere means to sustain physical existence . For 
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Marx , it is very obvious that "the proposition that man 's species-nature 
is estranged from him means that one man is estranged from the other" 
(CW, 3, p. 2 7 7 ;  MEW, EB 1 .T . ,  p .  5 1 7) .  At yet another place he states :  
An immediate consequence of the fact that man is estranged from the 
product of his labour, from his life activity , from his species-nature is 
the estrangement of man from man . When man confronts himself,  he 
confronts the o ther man . What applies to a man 's relation to his work , 
to the product of his labour and to himself, also holds of a man 's rela­
tion to the other man , and to the other man 's labour and object of 
labour (translation mine ; MEW, EB 1 .T . ,  pp. 5 1 7-5 1 8 ) .9 
In the Grundrisse, Marx reiterates this conclusion when he states that 
universal production on the basis of exchange value "produces . . .  the 
alienation of the individual from himself and others" (G ,  p. 1 6 2 ;  MEW, G ,  
p .  80) . 
ESTRANGEMENT O F  THE CAPITALIST 
Here we consider the question as to whether nonworkers-those who 
are not engaged in production-are also estranged .  First , we must remind 
ourselves that, although the workers are subject to an alien will and power , 
that will and power is mediated by other human beings . "I f  my own activity 
does not belong to me , "  asks Marx , "if it is an alien , a coerced activity , 
to whom,  then , does it belong?" His answer is that it belongs "to a being 
other than myself. " "The alien being to whom labour and the product of 
labour belongs, in whose service labour is done and for whose benefit the 
product of labour is provided ,  can only be man himself" (CW , 3 ,  p. 2 7 8 ;  
MEW, E B  1 .T . ,  p .  5 1 8) .  Capitalists , a s  the human agents o f  capital , are also 
the human agents of the alien power controlling the workers . As members 
of the nonworking class and subject to constraints such as competition , 
they represent the alien will to which the workers are subjected .  S ince the 
worker is continually forced to resell his labor power to capital ,  he con­
tinually renews his estrangement through his activity which is compelled 
to follow an alien will. Of course , the capitalist i s  not compelled to sell 
his labor for an existence,  but he, too , is a member of the species , and 
his human nature is the same as that of others . Although not forced to 
sell his labor power,  the capitalist is still not a free agent, and , as we have 
seen , is compelled to live in a situation in which man is estranged from 
3 8  ESTRANGEMENT 
man . Since the workers are prevented from interacting with others in 
such ways as their human nature enables them,  their interaction with the 
agents of capital is also marked by estrangement . From the capitalists '  
point of view, th is  estrangement is not the result of their own labor 
activity,  as is the case with workers . It is merely a condition that confronts 
them as a result of their relationship with the workers . Marx elaborates 
this point when he says :  
First it has to be noted that  everything which appears in the worker 
as an activity of alienation,  of estrangement, appears in the non-worker 
as a state of alienation ,  of estrangement . . . .  Secondly , . . .  the 
worker's real, practical a ttitude in production and to the product (as 
a state of mind) appears in the non-worker confronting him as a 
theoretical attitude" (CW, 3 ,  p. 2 8 2 ;  M EW, E B  1 .T . ,  p .  5 2 2 ) .  
Although both worker and capitalist are estranged ,  the estrangement,  
because of differences in the social position , has a different impact on the 
two groups. As Marx writes in The Holy Family: 
The propertied class and the class of the proletariat present the same 
human self-estrangement. But the former class feels at ease and 
strengthened in this self-estrangement , it  recognises estrangement as 
its o wn power and has in it the semblance of a human exi stence.  The 
latter feels annihilated in estrangement ; it sees in it its own powerless­
ness and the reality of an inhuman existence (CW, 4,  p. 3 6 ;  MEW, 2 ,  
p .  3 7 ) .  
While the capitalist 's existence resembles a human existence , i t  is never­
theless not what it  could be according to the nature of man and the species . 
THE CAPITALI ST'S RE LATIONSHI P TO THE WORKER 
As already indicated ,  "the capitalist, as capitalist, is simply the personifi­
cation of capital , the creation of labour with its own will and personality 
which stands in opposition to labour" (TS 3 ,  p. 296 ;  MEW, 2 6 . 3 ,  p. 290) . 
It must be kept in mind ,  however, that for capi tal to be capital and for the 
capitalist to be a capitalist , the capitalist must not only possess money.  He 
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must simultaneously have a social situation in which the means and con­
ditions of production are separated from those who produce . Thus,  Marx 
says  that 
it is not the ownership of money which makes the capitalist a capitalist . 
For money to be transformed into cap ital , the prerequisites for capital­
ist production must exist , whose first h istorical presupposition is that 
separation .  The separation ,  and therefore the existence of the means of 
labour as capital , is given in capitalist production ;  this separation which 
constantly reproduces itself and expands , is the foundation of produc­
tion (TS 3, p .  2 7 2 ;  MEW, 26 . 3 ,  p. 267 ) .  
Given the separation o f  the means and conditions o f  production from 
the worker,  money can assume the form of capital ; through the capitalist 
as an agent ,  money in its historically new form is now capable of employ­
ing labor. "Capital employs labour , "  writes Marx , and "the means of pro­
duction, the  material conditions of labour" ( all various forms of capital) 
are not subsumed by the worker, "but he is a means for the m "  (TS 1 ,  
p .  3 90 ;  MEW, 26 . 1 ,  p .  3 66 ) .  On the other hand,  the capitalist as the agent 
of capital , contrary to previous noncapitalist forms of production ,  "does 
not rule over the labourer through any personal qualities he may have , 
but only insofar as he is 'capital ' ;  his domination is only that of material­
ised labour over living labour , of the labourer's product over the labourer 
himself" (TS 1 ,  p .  3 90 ;  MEW, 26 . 1 ,  p. 3 66) .  
To say that the capitalist is "only capital personified "  and that "his 
soul is the soul of capital" ( C l ,  p .  2 24) is to imply that the capital ist him­
self is under certain constraints, and therefore not a free agent  h imself, 
since "capital has one single life impulse , the tendency to create value and 
surplus-value,  to make its constant factor,  the means of production , absorb 
the greatest possible amount of surplus-labour" (C l ,  p .  224 ;  MEW, 2 3 ,  
p .  247 ) .  Despite the fact that the capitalist as a person is motivated by 
the opportunity to retain and consume surplus value (see MEW, 24, p .  387 ) ,  
the capitalist's actions are constrained by  the free competition which 
"brings out the inherent laws of capitalist production ,  in the shape of 
external coercive laws having power over every individual capitalist " (C l ,  
p .  2 5 7 ;  MEW, 2 3 ,  p .  286) .  I f, under capital , human life is treated reck­
lessly , it is the result of the total conditions under which cap ital operates 
and competes. " Hence , "  Marx says ,  "capital is reckless of the health or 
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length of l ife of the labourer, unless forced by society not to be reckless" 
(translation mine ; 10  MEW, 2 3 ,  p .  2 8 5 ) .  With regard to the re cklessness of 
capital , he asserts that "looking at things as a whole , all this does not , in­
deed,  depend on the good  or ill will of the individual capitalist" (C l ,  
p .  2 5 7 ;  MEW, 2 3 ,  p .  286) .  
A COMMENT ON MARX'S TERMINOLOGY: 
. .  
ENTA USSER UNG, ENTFREMD UNG, ALI ENATI ON 
The word "alienation "  is  often used as the translation of the German 
words Entiiusserung and Entfremdung. However, use of this word is not 
consistent. In the Collected Works, Entfremdung tends to be rendered by 
the English word "estrangement , "  while Enttiusserung is  usually translated 
as "alienation . "  This is exempl ified by the sentence "In the estrangement 
(Entfremdung) of the object of labour is merely summarised the estrange­
ment (Entfremdung) , the alienation (Enttiusserung) , in the activity of 
labour itself" (CW, 3, p .  274 ;  MEW, EB 1 .T. , p. 5 1 4) .  Yet, the Progress 
Publishers edition of Theories of Surplus-Value and Capital (C3 , p .  8 5 ;  
MEW, 2 5 ,  p .  95 )  renders Entfremdung by the word "alienation , "  as ex­
emplified by "This alienation (Entfremdung) of the conditions of pro ­
duction corresponds . . .  " (TS 3 ,  pp .  296 ,  5 30 ;  MEW, 26 . 3 ,  p p .  290 ,  5 1 9 ) .  
Similarly , Nicolaus,  in Marx's  Grundrisse, translates Entfremdung with 
"alienation, " while at another place translating Entausserung with "dis­
possession" (G,  pp.  1 50,  1 60-1 6 2 ,  674 ;  MEW, G, pp .  68 ,  78-80,  5 66) . 
We will now consider what German words Marx used to convey the 
terms "alienation . "  While a few examples will have to suffice in this short 
space , they are sufficiently representative to allow an opinion on the 
subject .  There seems to be evidence that Marx used the term to mean pri­
marily , and possibly exclusively , the German word Enttiusserung. Marx 
translates alienation in J ames Stuart 's sentence "Labour, which through 
its alienation creates a universal equivalent , I call industry "  (CPE , p .  5 8 )  
with the  word Enttiusserung (MEW, 1 3 ,  p .  44) . In  the Grundrisse Marx 
also uses the English word "alienation" interchangeably with and to 
designate the German word Entiiusserung (MEW, G, pp .  7 22 -7 2 3 ) .  
Because money i s  the general equivalent, the general power of pur­
chasing, everything can be bought, everything may be transformed into 
money. But it can be transformed into money only by being alienated 
(alieniert) , because the owner al ienates (entiiussert) himself from it. 
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Everything is therefore alienable , or indifferent for the individual ,  external 
to him. Thus the so-called inalienable (unverii.usserlichen) , eternal pos­
sessions, and the immovable, solid property relations corresponding to 
them, break down in the face of money (translation mine) .  [When 
"alienation" renders a German word,  the particular German word was 
put in parentheses. " Everything is therefore alienable" is Marx 's own 
sentence. ] 
Since there is a discrepancy in the ways in which Marx and some translators 
used the term "alienation , "  it  is important to see whether and how these 
differences can be reconciled .  The above quotation shows that Marx uses 
Entiiusserung and Veriiusserung (or their derivatives) interchangeably . Both 
words can describe the situation in which somebody divests (veriiussert, 
enta'ussert ) himself of something, be it property in the form of a th ing, 
land ,  or one 's labor power. Marx predominantly uses Entci'usserung, not 
Vera'usserung, to describe this situation and ,  as we have seen , translates 
it with  the word "alienation . "  
A well-known Latin-German dictionary of 1 844 ( Freund) , translates 
the Latin word alienatio with Vera·usserung and Enta'usserung.  It adds 
that, figuratively speaking, alienatio can also be translated as Entfremdung, 
Sichentfernen van jemandem, Abfall, A bneigung. The verb alieno is similar­
ly translated by this dictionary . Although Marx did use the word Entfrem­
dung in the Grundrisse and the word fremd often throughout his work , 
he did not apparently use the term "alienation , "  or any derivative there-
of, to mean the German words Entfremdung or fremd. He did ,  however,  
use the term to translate the nonfigurative words Enta'usserung and Ver­
iiusserung. 
Since Marx used the word Enta'usserung to render the English "aliena­
tion , "  it will be useful to consult a Latin-English dictionary for its render­
ing on the word alienatio . Based on the Freund Latin-German edition of 
1 844, an English edition appeared in 1 8 54 (Andrews) , thus indicating how 
the terms alienatio and alieno were understood then. In  this work , alienatio 
is ( 1 )  the transferring of the possessions of a thing to another ,  so as to 
make it his property ; (2) the transferring of one 's self, that is, the going 
over to another ;  a separation ,  desertion . Unlike the German , no distinc­
tion is made between figurative and nonfigurative speech , although the 
conveyed mean ings are the same . Alieno is defined in this way : ( 1 )  To 
make one person another ;  to make something the property of another; to 
alienate , to transfer by sale ; to remove , to separate , to make foreign; 
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(2) (referring to the second rendering of alienatio ) to withdraw or re­
move anyone from friendship for or love to anyone, to alienate, estrange, 
set at variance , to make enemies .  Again , no differentiation between figura­
tive and nonfigurative speech is made . 
It can therefore be concluded that it is not incorrect to translate both 
Entiiusserung and Entfremdung as "alienation ,"  but that such a rendering is 
not optimal . Hence, Entfremdung should be translated as "estrangement" and 
Entiiusserung as "alienation"  (see also Schacht, 1 9 7 1 :  80-8 1 ) ,  for Marx 
himself seemed to have reserved the term "alienation "  for Entausserung 
(Andrews, 1 8 54) .  There is another reason that would strongly support a 
differentiation between the two terms. While it is possible to "transfer the 
possession of a thing to another ,"  it does not follow that this Entausserung 
( "alienation") designates estrangement (Entfremdung) . Marx is objecting 
to a very particular alienation (Entausserung) , namely , that which allows 
the previous owner of a thing to be affected in a way that is beyond his 
control .  Thus, Marx assumes that it is human nature , if not interfered with , 
to satisfy the needs of one individual with the product of another . On this 
basis, Marx sees human interaction as qualitatively different from that of 
animals .  However ,  Marx also assumes that it is human nature to alienate 
(entiiussern ) a thing such that another individual 's needs may be satisfied ,  
since otherwise all the  products would have to be consumed by the  pro­
ducer and could not become the property of another in order that the 
other 's needs may be satisfied .  Under capital , the conditions arc quite dif­
ferent .  First , labor power is alienated ,  as a result of which the worker also 
loses control over his product . Second,  since he is coerced into selling his 
labor power and loses control over the products of his labor, his own 
product confronts him as an object that is subject to another's will , an 
alien wil l .  The producer is estranged (entfremdet) from his p roduct be-
cause he was forced to alienate (entaussern) his labor power in return for 
a wage an d the abandonment of control over h is product of labor . 
It can now be easily seen why a clear distinction should be made be­
tween Entausserung and Entfremdung. Although for Marx they are not 
mutually exclusive, 11 under such social forms as exist , for example, under 
capital , Entausserung can and must exist if man is to l ive according to his  
nature. Marx 's vision of communism therefore consists of a soc iety in 
which products are mutually produced and consumed without permitting 
anyone to become an al ien power over anyone. 1 2 
NOTES 
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1 .  I n  this respect , it is important to note that Marx promoted a daily limit 
on working hours. He urged the workers to u nite and to push through the ap­
propriate legislation in the form of a class action .  
2.  Other passages make the same point: 
What does the primitive accumulation of capital , i .e. ,  its historical genesis, 
resolve itself into? In so far as it is not immediate transformation of slaves 
and serfs into wage-labourers, and therefore a mere change of form , it only 
means the expro priation of the immediate producers, i .e . ,  the dissolution of 
private property base d on the labour of its owner (C l ,  p. 7 1 3 ;  MEW , 2 3 , p. 789) .  
The wage-slave , just l ike the real slave , cannot become a creditor 's slave due to 
his position .  (C 3 ,  p .  595 ;  MEW, 25 ,  p .  609) . 
In Theories of Surplus Value and Grundrisse, M arx also compares slavery and wage 
labor, stating that wage labor is based on domination mediated throu gh the market, 
while slavery or other forms of forced labor are based on direct domination of one 
part of the society by the other (MEW, 26 .3 , p. 3 9 1 ;  MEW, G,  p .  6 5 5 ) .  
3 .  Consider also the following quote : "The process, therefore , th at clears the 
way for the capitalist system, can be none other than the process which takes away 
from the labourer the possession of his means of production . "  ( C l , p .  668;  MEW, 
2 3 , p. 742) . 
4. In chapters 5, 6, and 8 I discussed Marx 's comments on how human beings 
ever managed to start a process that by its very n ature became a detriment to them 
and prevented them from l iving according to t heir inalienable nature . 
5. " Conditions of labour" (Arbeitsbedingungen ) may not adequ ately convey 
the meaning of the German word. Arbeitsbedingungen are the conditions under 
which labor is  performed. "Conditions, " however, stan ds for all parameters to 
which labor is subject. 
6. Since, before entering on the process, his own labour has already been 
alienated from himself by the sale of his labour-power, has been approp riated by 
the capitalist and incorporated with capital , it must, during the process, be realised 
in a product that does not belong to him. Since the process of production is also 
the process by which the capitalist consumes labour-power, the p roduct of the 
labourer is incessantly converted,  not only into commodities, but into capital, 
into value that sucks up the value-creating power, into means of subsistence that 
buy the person of the labourer, into means of  p roduction that command the pro­
ducers (C l ,  p.  5 3 5 ;  MEW, 2 3 , p. 5 96) . 
7. "To which he relates as his own inorganic being" is rendered in the Nicolaus 
tran slation as "to which he relates as to his own inorganic being" (G, p. 497). See 
also Marx 's use of the word "inorganic" in the Manuscripts where he seems to use 
it as an adjective to n ature outside man 's organic  body (MEW, E B  1 .T . ,  p p .  5 1 5 -
44 ESTRANGEMENT 
5 1 6) .  The same is the case for other p assages in the Grundrisse (MEW, G, p p .  3 7 5 ,  
3 84- 3 90) . 
" [ N ) atural condit ions of production" includes also any raw materials contained 
on the planet earth (MEW, G,  p .  3 84) .  
For further elaboration , consider the following passages :  
Another presupposition is the separation of free labour from the objective con ­
ditions of its realization-from the means of labour and the material for labour . 
Thus, above all , release of the worker from the soil as his natural worksh op­
hence dissolu tion of small ,  free lan ded property as well as of communal land­
ownership resting on the oriental commu ne (G, p. 471 ; MEW, G, p. 3 7 5 ) .  
I t  i s  not the unity o f  living and active humanity with the natural , inorganic 
conditions of their metabolic exchange with nature , an d hence their appropria­
tion of nature ,  which re quires explanation or is the result of an historic process , 
but rather the separation between these inorganic con ditions of human existence 
and this active existence , a separation which is completely posited only in rela­
tion of wage labour and capital . In  the relations of slavery and serfdom this 
se paration does not take place ; "  (G, p. 489 ; MEW, G,  p. 3 89) . 
8. Here I disagree with Giddens ( 1 97 1 :  1 5 -16)  and Petrovic who makes a similar 
argument ( 1 967:  147).  Giddens suggests that estrangement from the species must be 
seen as "a separation from social ly ge nerated ch aracteristics and pro pensities. " Capital­
ism, he maintains, has created a poten tial wh ich , if real ized,  could b ring about Marx's  
envisioned society . Such a realization is constantly being fru strate d u nder capital ism ,  
a n d  estran gement i s  the result .  
According to the interpretation given in this stu dy, for Marx estrangement is 
not the frustrated realization of a potential created by the historical mode of p ro­
duction known to us as capital ism . On the contrary , it may be called the frustrated 
abil ity (that is, the inability) to l ive according to what is human nature -not potential , 
but factual an d empirically verifiable human nature . 
Giddens assu mes his position in part to avoid and warn again st an interpretation 
that postul ates that estrangement results from a separation from what might be called 
a "state of nature ." Such a postulate may imply certain assumptions concerning man 's 
goodness, intelligence, creativity , and the like . Clearly , Marx did not believe that 
estrangement resulted from civil ization preventing man from living according to a 
"state of nature ."  Stil l ,  Marx hol ds that estrangement results from the inability to 
l ive according to one's nature . This nature is defined by means of an empirical com­
parison with animals, an d not by projection in the sense that so cial theorists some­
times have projected a "state of nature . "  In h is concept of "human n ature in general , "  
there i s  no nostalgia o r  anything that might b e  viewed as historically relative . Hence, 
Marx's "human nature in general " cannot be compared with theories on a state of 
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nature postulate d by a Rousseau or Hobbes. Giddens doe s not make this mistake , 
but in avoiding it he neglects to see that estrangement results when m an is p revented 
from l iving according to his nature . 
Giddens'  interpretation of Marx 's theory of estrangement is problematic in other 
ways as well . How can estrangement be the frustrated realization of a socially created 
potential if it is a precon dition for the development of this potential ? As will become 
evident later, all development of the productive powers of man is seen to occur at 
the expense of estrangement. Only after sufficient development has o ccurred does 
Marx see a society without estrangement (communism) as real izable .  He gives a 
partial modification of this position for the case of Russia ;  see his letter to Sassulitsch 
(MEW, 1 9 ,  p .  242) and the preface to the secon d Russian edition of the Manifesto 
(MEW, 4, pp .  5 7 5-576) .  Estran gement, however, existed in Marx 's view long before 
the capitalistic foun dations for communism were laid. The period of primitive ac­
cumulation may be cited as an example . During this period,  wage labor was becom­
ing more universal , an d,  although Marx woul d  not claim that the foundations for 
communism had been laid by that time , it can be shown that the wage labourer 
coul d subject neither his labor power nor the product of his labor to his own will . 
In short, he was estranged. 
9. " Species-nature " is my translation of Gattungswesen . See my discussion on 
pp .  1 7-22 ;  see also CW, 3 ,  p .  2 7 7 .  
1 0. The Progress Publishers edition translates wo es nicht durch die Gesell­
schaft zur Rucksicht gezwungen wird as "unless under compulsion from society " 
(C l ,  p. 2 5 7 ) .  
1 1 .  A t  first , i t  may appear that Marx did not distinguish between Entiiusserung 
and Entfremdung in the French edition of Capital, the translation of wh ich he ap­
prove d. Thus, " Da vor seinem Eintritt in den Prozess se ine e igene Arbeit ihm selbst 
en tfremdet , dem Kapital isten angeeignet and dem Kapital c inverl e ibt  ist , "  is trans­
l ate d by " So n  travail ,  de'j � alie'ne', fait proprie'te' du cap italiste et incorpore au cap ital , 
meme avant que le proc�s commen ce . On closer inspection, entfremdet here refers 
to the fact that the worker's labor power is being taken away from him,  even before 
the process of pro duction can begin , to become the property of capit al .  Entfremdet 
therefore carries the meaning of entiiussert in the sense that, even before the p rocess 
of production begins, the worker's labor power has been alienate d from him and h as 
been made the p roperty of cap ital ,  that is ,  the property of the capital ist  as the agent 
of cap i tal (MEW, 2 3 ,  pp. 596- 5 9 7 ; Le Capital: Livre I ,  p .  4 1 3 ) .  
Marx sometimes uses the two words alienation and estrangement i n  conjunc­
tion with each other, merely separating them by a comma . This is nothing but a 
technique to emphasize that, although the meanings of the two words are different, 
t hey are not mutually exclusive under capital ( see MEW, E B  1 .T . ,  pp . 5 1 2 ,  5 1 4, 
5 1 8 , 522) .  
1 2. Although I have criticise d  translations that ren der Entfremdung as  "al iena­
tio n "  instead of as "estrangement," whenever quotes from these sources are used , 
the transl ation is not changed so that as much authen ticity as possible can be pre­
served. The reader must therefore remember that when sources other than the 
Collected Works are quotes,  "alien ation " could stand for Entfremdung. 

4 
THE NATURE OF CAPITALIST 
SOCIETY AND ECONOMY 
In an attempt to review what Marx saw as key elements of capitalism , topics 
such as surplus value and division of labor must be addressed .  
LABOR THEORY O F  VALUE, SURPLUS VALUE 
A full review of the economic debates in which Marx engaged concerning 
the labor theory of value is not possible here , nor will I elaborate on what is 
known today as the "transformation problem."  Labor theory of value ,  sur­
plus value ,  and exploitation will be defined not in terms of price but in terms 
of time, as Marx did throughout much of his work . For an account of the 
principal ways in which he analyzed capitalist society , this procedure will 
be adequate and not misleading. 
Because the worker is forced to sell his labor power and to let it be sub­
ject to an alien will , he not only becomes estranged ,  but also "divests h im-
self (entaussert sich) of labour as the force productive of wealth " (G, p. 307) . 1 
Through this exchange in which the worker receives  wages ,  the capitalist 
controls the labor of the worker and becomes the owner of the product of 
labor (see MEW, 2 3 ,  pp. 1 99-200) .  In the Grundrisse, Marx writes that the 
"separation between labour and property in the product of labour, between 
labour and wealth , is thus posited  in this act of exchange itself" (G ,  p .  307 ; 
MEW, G, p. 2 1 4) .  He explicitly postulates that labor is the source of wealth 
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and that , since the product of labor does not belong to the worker, it is the 
capitalist who appropriates this wealth . The capitalist, of course , does not 
stockpile his wealth in the form of the product produced by the labor power . 
The capitalist produces for a market on which he sells the commodities, and 
in turn , through the medium of money ,  he accumulates the wealth in the 
form he desires ,  be it the means of production or other forms of wealth . In 
order to accumulate wealth ,  however ,  the capitalist must be able to sell 
his commodities above the cost of production . 
Marx assumes that, on the average , commodities are sold above cost. 
Cost,  however, is nothing e lse but the labor time embodied in a commodity 
for which the worker is compensated by the panicular capitalist, plus the 
cost of all materials re quired to produce the commodity . The raw materials 
in themselves include labor cost and surplus value which one capital ist 
pays to the other. Generally , an individual capitalist can sell his commodities 
above cost only if the worker is not fully compensated for the labor per­
formed. Expressed in terms of labor time , it can be said that a particular 
worker also produces during a certain number of hours without being com­
pensated for this production . The commodities produced during this time 
are at no labor cost ; nevertheless, they are appropriated by the capitalist 
who can then sell them at whatever price the market will bear. In  terms 
of each particular product, it is therefore possible to say that it  contains 
a ponion of labor time for which the worker was not compensated ,  al­
though he was forced to spend the time in the service of the capitalist 
as an obligation in return for receiving wages .  Marx calls the labor time 
which the worker performs without compensation surplus labor,  and 
compensated labor he calls necessary labor time. I n  the following pas-
sage , he summarizes his notions of labor value : 
The value of every commodity is the product of labour; hence this is 
also true of the value of the product of the annual labour or of the 
value of society 's annual commodity-product. But since all labour 
resolves  itself 1 ) into necessary labour-time , in which the labourer 
reproduces merely an e quivalent for the capital advanced in the pur­
chase of his labour-power, and 2)  into surplus-labour, by which he 
supplies the capitalist with a value for which the latter does not give 
any e quivalent,  hence surplus-value , it follows that all commodity­
value can resolve itself only into these two component parts, so that 
ultimately it forms a revenue for the working-class in the form of 
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wages, and for the capitalist class in the form of surplus-value. As 
for the constant capital-value , i .e . ,  the value of the means of produc­
tion consumed in the creation of the annual product , it cannot be ex­
plained how this value gets into that of the new product (except 
for the phrase that the capitalist charges the buyer with it in the sale 
of his goo ds) , but ultimately , since the means of production are them­
selves products of labour, this portion of value can, in tu rn, consist 
only of an e quivalent of the variable capital and of surplus-value ,  
of a product of necessary labour and of surplus-labour. The fact that 
the values of these means of production function in the hands of 
their employers as capital-values does not prevent them fro m having 
"originally , "  in the hands of others if we go to the bottom of the mat­
ter-even though at some previous time-resolved  themselves into the 
same two portions of value , hence into two different sources of revenue 
. . .  the matter presents itself differently in the movement of social 
capital, i . e . ,  of the total ity of individual capitals , from the way it pre­
sents itself for each individual capital considered separate ly , hence 
from the standpoint of each individual capitalist .  For the latter the 
value of commo dities resolves itself into 1 )  a constant element (a  
fourth one, as Adam Smith says) , and 2 )  the sum of wages and surplus­
value ,  or wages, profit ,  and rent . But from the point of view of society 
the fourth element of Adam Smith , the constant capital-value, dis­
appears (C2 ,  p. 3 8 8 ;  MEW, 24, pp .  3 8 3 -3 84) . 
Once the labor theory of value is accepted ,  that is ,  once it is recognized 
that all wealth and the value of all commodities are a function of the labor 
time embodied in it , 
the independent, material form of wealth disappears and wealth is 
shown to be simply the activity of men . Everything which is not the 
result of human activity , of labour, is nature , and ,  as such , is not social 
wealth. The phantom of the world of goods fades away and it is seen 
to be simply a continually disappearing and continually reproduced 
objectivisation of human labor .  All solid material wealth i s  only transi­
tory materialisation of social labour, crystall isation of the p roduc-
tion process whose measure is time , the measure of a movement itself. 
The manifold forms in which the various component parts of wealth 
are distributed amongst different sections of society lose their apparent 
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independence. Interest is merely a part of profit ,  rent is m erely surplus 
profit .  Both are consequently merged in profit ,  which itself can be re­
duced to surplus-value ,  that is to unpaid labour. The value of the com­
modity itself, however, can only be reduced to labour-time (TS 3 ,  
p .  429 ;  MEW, 26. 3 ,  p .  42 1 ) .  
As  soon as the postulate that "the value of the commodity itself can 
only be reduced to labour-time" is accepted ,  it also becomes clear why 
both labor and the means of production are continually devalued . Let 
us consider Marx's argument in The Poverty of Philosophy, a work that he 
repeatedly mentioned in his later writings and that represents the founda­
tion of any of the economic theories which he developed later in his life : 
" It is important to emphasize the point that what determines value is not 
the time taken to produce a thing, but the minimum time it could pos­
sibly be produced in ,  and this minimum is ascertained  by competition" 
(CW, 6, p. 1 3 6 ;  MEW, 4, p. 9 5 ) .  Since the exchange value of a commodity 
is base d on the minimum labor time , the method and means of produc­
tion used in the production of commodities are subject to constant change . 
Thus, if the productivity of labor can be augmented sufficiently through 
the employment of new methods and/or means of production ,  the pre­
viously used means of production may become obsolete (devalued) before 
its life-span is exhausted. Similarly , without going into the various con­
tingencies of a particular situation , it is po ssible to say that , since less 
labor time is required  to produce the same commodity if productivity is 
increased ,  labor will be less costly ( devalued) . Here as well competition 
will bring about a reduction of wages as a result of a greater abundance of 
workers. 
Competition implements the law according to which the relative value 
of a product is determined by the labour time needed to p roduce it. 
Labour time serving as the measure of marketable value becomes in 
this way the law of the continual depreciation of labour . . . .  There 
will be depreciation not only of the commodities brought into the 
market, but also of the instruments of production and of whole plants 
(CW, 6,  p. 1 3 5 ; MEW, 4 ,  pp.  94-9 5 ) .  
I n  view of  the fact that labor devalues ,  that i s ,  that the workers looking 
for work become more numerous and therefore replaceable as productivity 
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increases , the employer also has less , o r  n o ,  incentive to protect human life 
and health. This leads Marx to observe that the capitalist mode of produc­
tion is wasteful both with respect to human resources and to material 
means : 
The capitalist mode of production is generally , despite all its n iggard­
liness, altogether too prodigal with its human material , just as, con­
versely,  thanks to its method of distribution of products through com­
merce and manner of competition , it is very prodigal with its material 
means, and loses for society what it gains for the individual capitalist 
(C3 ,  pp. 86-8 7 ;  MEW, 2 5 ,  p. 97 ) .  
We have seen that according to Marx the  capitalist qua cap italist can 
exist in his competitive world only if he can appropriate enough products 
of unpaid labor. This surplus value is generally realized and is tran sformed 
into the appropriate form of wealth through exchange . The p roducts of 
labor are exchanged to recover both fixed and variable expense (capital) 
as well as to obtain additional capital from the surplus produ ct produced 
by unpaid labor. Since ,  under capital, the products of labor are produced 
for a market ,  in contrast to personal use by the capitalist or the worker , 
exchange is of prime importance to the capitalist. Only thro ugh exchange 
can he re cover his outlays in constant and variable capital as well as obtain 
additional capital from the surplus product appropriated .  The capitalist, 
then ,  pro duces for exchange , he produces commodities ( Waren ) in con-
trast to only use value. He produces for the exchange value2 of a par­
ticular thing, not for its use value.The capitalist produces only commodities ,  
things which in exchange will yield sufficient money , because only through 
exchange can he both recover his original capital outlays and obtain ad­
ditional capital . This is not to say that the commodities produced do not 
also have use value . They obviously do since it is through exchange that 
individuals satisfy their needs and that ,  under capital, individuals obtain 
those products of labor (commodities) that will be of use to them (see 
MEW, 2 3 ,  pp.  5 5 ,  57 , 62 ; C l , pp .  48 , 50, 54) . The capitalists '  interest is 
in the exchange value of commodities ,  as opposed to their use value, since 
it is only through exchange and the value obtained therein that the capitalist 
can recover his additional outlays and enlarge his original cap ital . When 
Marx discusses exchange in general , he says that "what . . .  concerns pro­
ducers when they make an exchange , is the question , how much of some 
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other product they get for their own ?  in what proportions the products 
are exchangeable? "  (C l ,  p. 7 9 ;  MEW, 2 3 ,  p. 89) .  This observation is equally 
applicable for the capitalist , who depends on the exchange of his com­
modities in order to obtain ,  through the medium of money , the commodi­
ties he re quires for his own personal consumption as well as for continuing 
his process of accumulation . 
In summary , it can be said that , under capital , things of use value are 
exchanged and through this exchange obtain an exchange value . Once 
things of use value are being exchanged and produced for exchange they 
are commodities. Commodities contain both a use value and an exchange 
value. Concerning the distinction between the two kinds of value , Marx 
notes : 
A thing can be of use-value , without having value . This is the case when­
ever its utility to man is not due to labour .  Such are air, virgin soi l ,  
natural meadows , etc . A thing can be useful ,  and the product of 
human labour, without being a commodity . Whoever dire ctly satisfies 
his wants with the produce of his own labour,  creates ,  indeed ,  use­
values ,  but not commodities ( C l , p. 48 ; MEW, 2 3 ,  p. 5 5 ) .  
And concerning the transformation of things with use values into com­
modities,  Marx remarks that 
it is only by being exchanged that the products of labor acquire , as 
values, one uniform social status, distin ct from the sensually differen t 
ways by which they can exist as objects of utility . This division of a 
product into a useful thing and a value becomes practically important ,  
only when exchange has  acquired such an extension that useful articles 
are produced for the purpose of being exchanged, and their character 
as values has therefore to be taken into account , beforehand ,  during 
pro duction (MEW, 2 3, p. 87 ; translation mine) . 3 
We have seen that Marx distinguishes between two forms of value which 
a product of labor can assume and that the capitalist who produces for the 
market is interested in the exchange value of a commodity . "Hence com­
modities must be realised as values before they can be realised as use-values , "  
writes Marx , since the  commodities will not  be  brought to market (that is ,  
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they will not be purchasable for use) in case they do not yield the ap­
pro priate exchange value (C l ,  p. 89 ; MEW, 2 3 ,  p. 1 00) . As the product of 
labor assumes a different form of value in exchange , so does the labor em­
bodied in the product.  
At first sight ,  a commodity presented itself to us as a complex of two 
things-use-value and exchange-value . Later on , we saw also that labour , 
too , possesses the same two-fold nature ; for ,  so far as it finds expression 
in value, it does not possess the same characteristics that belong to it 
as a creator of use-values (C l ,  pp. 48-49 ; MEW, 2 3 ,  p. 5 6 ) .  
All productive activity i s  "nothing but the expenditure of human labour­
power . . .  productive expenditure of human brains ,  nerves ,  and muscles ."  
(C l ,  p .  5 1 ;  MEW,  2 3 ,  p .  58 ) .  Although the  above is the  case , p roductive 
activity which produces a thing with a particular use value is qualitatively 
different from that which produces a different object of util ity . Thus, 
"tailoring and weaving are necessary factors in the creation of the use­
values ,  coat and linen ,  precisely because these two kinds of labour are of 
different qualities " (C l ,  p. 5 2) .  With respect to the general defin ition of 
productive activity , tailoring and weaving are only "two different modes 
of expending human labour-power" (Cl , p. 5 1 ) .  Nevertheless , these two 
different modes of productive activity are characteristic of the production 
of very distinct use values such as coats an d  linen .  I f  in the production 
an d exchange of commodities exchange value is of prime importance , the 
mode of expending human labor power also becomes unimportant in the 
process of exchange .  What gives a product a particular use value is the 
distinct skill that transforms the elements of nature into an object of 
utility . Thus , use value is created by a particular mode of expending labor 
power. Exchange value , on the other hand ,  is not derived from any par­
ticular mode of expending labor power .  Whether a product will  exchange 
against other goods in certain proportions is not dependent on the quality 
(mode) of the labor power expended ,  but on its quantity . Accordingly , 
commodity production is bound only by the quantity of "productive 
expenditure of human brains, nerves and muscles" and not by any mode 
in which human brains ,  nerves and muscles are expended in the process of 
production .  The mere quantitative expenditure of human brains ,  nerves , 
and muscles ,  however,  is an activity of which any individual is capable . I t  
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is simple labor. Since simple labor is the common denominator of all 
human beings ,  it is incapable of reflecting the uniqueness of human labor 
which , through its particular mode , creates a certain use value . 
Exchange value , then , is not determined by any particular mode of 
expended labor power. According to Marx , "The value of a commodity 
represents human labour in the abstract , the expenditure of human labour 
in general" (C l ,  p .  5 1 ) (MEW, 2 3 ,  p. 5 9) .  A commodity , he says ,  "may be the 
pro duct of the most skilled labour,  but its value , by equating it to the 
pro duct of simple unskilled labour,  represents a definite quantity of the 
latter labour alone" ( C l ,  p .  5 1 ) . 4 At another place he write s :  
On  the  one  hand all labour is ,  speaking physiologically , an  expenditure 
of human labour-power ,  and in its character of identical abstract human 
labour, it creates and forms the value of commodities .  On the other hand ,  
all labour i s  the expenditure of human labour-power in  a special form 
and with a definite aim, and in this ,  its character of concrete useful 
labour, it produces use-values" (C l ,  p .  5 3 ;  MEW, 2 3 ,  p .  6 1 ) .  
For a commodity t o  b e  exchanged in certain proportions ,  it must be 
compared with other goods .  The proportion in which a certain commodity 
exchanges against other commodities is determined by the quantity of 
abstract simple labor embodied in it .  Essentially , individuals who exchange 
commodities merely compare the amount of simple labor embodied in each 
commodity and equate the labor of others on a society-wide scale : 
Whenever by an exchange ,  we equate as values our different products, 
by that very act , we also equate , as human labour, the different kinds 
of labour expended upon them. We are not aware of this ,  nevertheless 
we do it. Value , therefore , does not stalk about with a label describing 
what it is (C l ,  p. 7 9 ;  MEW, 2 3 ,  p. 88 ) .  
Although exchange is possible on  this basis and  although the capitalist can 
recover his initial outlay and augment h is total capital on the basis of such 
exchange ,  a contradiction is involved .  In the act of exchange , two things 
of different use value are equated and then exchanged in certain propor­
tions as if their u se values could be equated .  Marx accepts Aristotle 's  view 
and ,  quoting Aristotle , claims that " 'it is . . .  in reality impossible that 
THE NATURE OF CAP IT AUST SOCIETY AND ECONOMY 5 5  
such unlike things can  be  commensurable '-i .e . ,  qualitatively equal . "  Never­
theless, individuals do exchange things of different use value in certain 
proportions as if use value could be equated and quantified .  "Suc h an equal­
isation can only be something foreign to their real nature " (C l ,  p. 6 5 ;  
MEW, 2 3 ,  p .  74) ,  that is ,  t o  the real nature o f  the things with different 
use values to be exchanged .  The contradiction exists insofar as commodities 
are exchanged for use. Use value is not quantifiable , however. Although a 
commodity has an exchange value that makes this commodity acquirable 
for use , what is measured is not the commodity 's use value but the quantity 
of abstract labor power embodied in it . 
In summary ,  Marx lists three peculiarities that arise when things of un­
equal use value are exchanged :  ( 1 )  "Use-value becomes the form of mani­
festation , the phenomenal form of  its opposite ,  value " (C l ,  p. 62 ; MEW, 
2 3 ,  p .  70) ;  ( 2) " concrete labour becomes the form under which its op­
posite , abstract human labour, manifests itself" (C l ,  p .  64 ;  MEW, 2 3 ,  p .7 3 ) ;  
and ( 3 )  "the labour o f  private individuals takes the form o f  its opposite , 
labour directly social in its form" (C l ,  p .  64 ;  MEW, 2 3 ,  p .  7 3 ) .  The labor 
of private individuals can be said to become social in its form in the sense 
that private labor must produce use value for others (C l ,  p .  7 8 ;  MEW, 2 3 ,  
p .  88) . This is so because the worker is forced to produce according to an 
alien will and because he is prevented from appropriating his own product 
of labor. Instead,  he must produce for a market ; he must pro duce com­
mo dities that the capitalist will se ll to the highest bidder. The worker must 
pro duce commodities which when exchanged will be of utility to others . 
Just because labor has become social in its form-"although , like all other 
commo dity-producing labour, it is the labour of private individuals"-
it manifests itself in products that are "directly exchangeable with other 
commodities" ( C l , p. 64;  MEW, 2 3 ,  p .  7 3 ) .  Accordingly , Marx states in 
the third volume of  Capital :  
No producer, whether in dustrial or agricultural , when considered by 
himself alone , produces value or commodities .  His product becomes 
a value and a commodity only in the context of definite social inter­
relations.  In  the first place , in so far as it appears as the expression of 
social labour, hence in so far as the individual producer's labour-time 
counts as a part of the social labour-time in general ; and ,  secondly , this 
social character of his labour appears impressed upon his product through 
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its pecuniary character and through its general exchangeability deter­
mined by its price (C 3 ,  pp. 6 3 8-6 3 9 ;  MEW, 2 5 ,  pp .  6 5 1 -6 5 2 ) .  
Since ,  i n  order for commodity exchange t o  occur, i t  must reduce 
all qualitatively different private labor to abstract labor (the mere ex­
penditure of human brains ,  nerves ,  and muscles) ,  it becomes social in 
its nature , being based on the most common denominator underlying 
all labor regardless of its different qualities .  However, labor is social 
not only in its nature , but in distinct ways .  From the moment things 
of utility are produced for exchange , 
the labour of the individual producer acquires socially a two-fold 
character. On the one hand ,  it must , as a definite useful kind of 
labour, satisfy a definite social want , and thus hold its  place as part 
and parcel of the collective labour of all ,  as a branch of a social divi­
sion of labour that has sprung up spontaneously . On the other hand ,  
it  can  satisfy the manifold wants of the individual producer himself, 
only in so far as the mutual exchangeability of all kinds of useful 
private labour is an established social fact , and therefore the private 
useful labour of each producer ranks on an equality with that of all 
others (C l ,  p. 7 8 ;  MEW, 2 3 ,  p. 8 7 ) ;  see also MEW, 2 3 ,  p. 89) . 5 
Insofar as a producer can satisfy his manifold wants only by exchanging 
the product of his labor, he must be indifferent to the use value of the 
product of his labor. Exchange and exchange value become more important 
than use value , once commodity exchange has reached a cert ain scale . 
The product is increasingly produced as a commodity in the strict 
sense of the word, its exchange-value becomes the more independent 
of its immediate existence as use-value-in other words its produc-
tion becomes more and more independent of its consumption by the 
producers and of its existence as use-value for the producers-the more 
one-sided it itself becomes, and the greater the variety of commodities 
for which it is exchanged ,  the greater the kinds of use-values in which 
its exchange-value is expressed ,  and the larger the market for it becomes . 
The more this happens ,  the more the product can be produced as a 
commodity ; therefore also on an increasingly large scale . The producers '  
indifference to the use-value of h i s  product i s  expressed quantitatively 
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in the amounts in which he produces it , which bear no relation to his 
o wn consumption needs , even when he is at the same time a consumer 
of his own product" (C 3 ,  pp. 268-2 6 9 ;  MEW, 2 5 ,  p. 264) . 
S U RPLUS VALUE AND EXPLOITATI ON 
Since all value originates in labor, the worker can be said to work for the 
capitalist without being compensated fully . He is forced to supply surplus 
labor, the product of which becomes surplus value on exchange . The capital­
ist as an individual is the mere personification of capital , wh ile the worker 
is the mere personifi cation of labor. The capitalist is also con strained in his 
behavior by competition , that is, by capital as it is personified through 
other capitalists. Therefore , the rate at which surplus value is extracted 
depends not  so much on the individual capitalist as  on capital as a whole 
and as personified by all its agents. Although the rate at which surplus 
value is extracted from labor may vary , capital 's "single life impulse , the 
tendency to create value and surplus-value "  (C l ,  p. 224) remains . 6 Hence ,  
its emphasis is on exchange value and  not  on use value , since i t  is only 
through exchange that surplus value can be realized . The economy comes 
to a halt not because the needs that are met through use values are satisfied ,  
but because profits that are based on exchange value are not realized (MEW , 
2 5 ,  p. 269) : 
[ C) apitalist production is in itself indifferent to the particular use-value , 
and distinctive features of any commodity it produces . I n  every sphere 
of production it is only concerned with producing surplus-value , and 
appropriating a certain quantity of unpaid labour incorporated in the 
product of labour. And it is likewise in the nature of the wage labour 
subordinated by capital that it is indifferent to the specific character 
of its labour and must submit to being transformed in accordance with 
the requirement of capital and to being transferred from one sphere of 
production to another ( C 3 ,  p. 1 9 5 ; MEW, 2 5 ,  p .  205 ) . 7 
Capital 's simple life impulse is the creation of value and surp lus value by 
compelling workers to create surplus
-
in a process of pro duction in which 
labor controls neither the process of production nor the product of its 
o wn labor. In  this sense , it is possible to speak of exploitation . Marx states 
that production founded on capital creates a situation in which man ex-
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ploits man (MEW, 2 3 ,  p. 743 ) ,  that is, capital exploits labor (MEW, 2 3 ,  
p .  309) . I t  also creates a 
system of general exploitation of the natural and human qualities ,  
a system of general utility , utilising science itself just as much as all 
the physical and mental qualities ,  while there appears nothing higher 
in itself, nothing legitimate for itself , outside this circle of social 
production and exchange (G ,  p. 409 ; MEW, p. 3 1 3 ) .  
Historically , capitalist production i s  not the "inventor" o f  surplus value . 
Thus , if ,  historically speaking, 
the labourer needs all his time to produce the necessary means of sub­
sistence for himself and his race , he has no time left in which to work 
gratis for others . Without a certain degree of productiveness in his 
J abour, he has no such superfluous time at his disposal ; without such 
superfluous time , no surplus-labour and therefore no cap italists ,  no 
slave-owners , no feudal lords, in one word no class of large proprietors 
(translation mine ; MEW, 2 3 , p. 5 34) .8 
According to Marx , capitalist production is the most effective system of 
exploitation.  
[ E )very enterprise engaged in commodity production becomes at the same 
time an enterprise exploiting labour-power .  But on ly the capitalist pro­
duction of commo dities has become an epoch-making �ode of exploita­
tion , which ,  in the course of its historical development ,  revolutionises ,  
through the organisation of the labour-pro cess and the enormous im­
provement of technique , the entire economic structure of society in a 
manner eclipsing all former epochs (C2 ,  p .  3 7 ;  MEW, 24 ,  p .  42 ) .  
The question may be  asked a s  to  why the capitalist system is most success­
ful in exploiting labor power, that is, in appropriating surplus labor. Marx's 
answer is unequivocal : 
[ I ] t  is . . .  clear that in any given economic formation of society, where 
not the exchange-value but the use-value of the product predominates ,  
surplus-labour will be limited by a given set of  wants which may be 
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greater or less , and that here no boundless thirst for surplus-labour 
arises from the nature of the production itself. Hence in antiqu ity 
over-work becomes horrible only when the object is to obtain exchange­
value in its specific independent money-form ; in the production of gold 
and silver (C l ,  p. 2 2 6 ;  MEW, 2 3 ,  p .  2 5 0 ) .  
A s  soon a s  production becomes primarily production for exchange , certain 
processes are set in motion which will promote particularly extreme exploi­
tation ,  which according to Marx can be witnessed under capital and com­
modity-producing slavery. In a commodity-producing economy , the more im­
mediate community ceases to be the primary consumer of its products . In­
stead, those whose exchange bid is the highest become the consumers . 
Hence the negro labour in the Southern States of the American Union 
preserved something of  a patriarchal character ,  so long as production 
was chiefly directe d to immediate local consumption . But in propor­
tion ,  as the export of cotton became of vital interest to these states ,  
the  over-working of the  negro and  sometimes the using up of  his l ife 
in 7 years of labour became a factor in a calculated and calculating 
system.  I t  was no longer a question of obtaining from him a certain 
quantity of useful products. It was now a question of production of 
surplus-labour itself ( Cl , pp .  226-227 ; MEW, 2 3 ,  p. 2 5 0) .  
Under capital , high wages do not prove the absence of exploitation .  The 
boundless thirst for surplus value exists even then . 
[ T] he whole capitalist system of production turns on the prolongation 
of this gratis labour [ i . e . ,  surplus-labour] by exten ding the working 
day or by developing the productivity , i .e . ,  the greater intensity of 
labour power,  etc . ,  that , consequently , the system of wage labour is  
a system of slavery , and indeed a slavery which becomes more severe 
in pro portion as the social productive forces of labour develop , whether 
the worker receives better or worse payment (CGP , p. 1 5 ;  MEW, 1 9 ,  
p .  2 6 ;  see also MEW, EB 1 .T . ,  p .  47 3 ) . 
As capitalist commodity production becomes increasingly efficient and 
widespread,  exploitation also increases under capital , just as it did under 
slavery which became increasingly commodity-producing. 
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DISC USSION 
Marx maintains that commodity production was present in most histor­
ical periods ,  because at least some use value was produced fo r exchange and 
for use by communities other than one 's own .  He argues that in historical 
periods with commodity production such production was based on exploita­
tion .  Although he may be correct in the h istorical sense , it is conceivable 
that commo dity production could exist without exploitation , and vice 
versa. Hypothetically speaking, for example , commodity production could 
exist without exploitation wherever isolated producers whose labor pro­
ductivity is high enough produce some of their products specifically for a 
market. It could also exist in a society where the total product of labor 
is collectively appropriated,  providing the community as a whole also pro­
duces for exchange .  On the other hand ,  exploitation alone could take place 
even if no products are specifically produced for exchange as long as some 
numbers of the society have the power to coerce others into producing 
more than they need and are able to appropriate this surplus .  
Engels has a comment on this topic .  When Marx states that in order for 
a worker to produce a commodity "he must not only produce use-values, 
but use-values for others ,  social use-values , "  Engles interjects as follows: 
And not only for others , without more . The medieval peasant pro­
duced quit-rent-corn for h i s  feudal lord and tithe-corn for his parson . 
But neither the quit-rent-corn nor the tithe-com became commodities 
by reason of the fact that they had been produced for others . To be­
come a commodity a product must be transferred to another, whom it 
will serve as a use-value , by means of an exchange (Cl , p. 48 ; MEW, 2 3 ,  
p .  5 5 ) . 9 
I am inserting the parenthesis because its omission has often given rise 
to the misunderstanding that every product that is consumed by some 
one other than its producer is considered in Marx a commodity (C l ,  p. 48) 
I t  can therefore be concluded  that the quit-rent-corn consumed by the 
feudal lord, although the product of exploitation , is neither a commodity 
nor the result of commodity production . Not all quit-rent-com may be 
consumed,  however, in which case it may be exchanged for other things 
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and thus assume the nature o f  a commodity . This exchange may be ac­
cidental in the sense that only the corn left over after the lord 's consump­
tion, if any , may be exchanged .  Exchange may also be planned , in which 
case the amount of quit-rent-com demanded from the peasant is set at a 
level that will predictably allow for exchange . In this sense , the peasant ,  
a s  labor_ under capital , is forced to  produce things specifically for  exchange , 
the difference being that the peasant 's livelihood does not completely de­
pend on the exchange of his total product .  Rather , the peasan t reproduces 
his labor for himself, while the worker under capital is prevented from 
doing so , so much so that even his existence comes to be threatened (TS 3 ,  
p .  4 1 6 ;  MEW, 2 6 . 3 ,  p .  408) . Only the peasant's surplus, and not his total 
product, is appropriated by another class. The surplus product produced 
may be appropriated to a greater or lesser extent , thus reflecting a higher 
or lower level of exploitation,  or more or less commodity production. Engels' 
remark should not be understood to mean that , under feuda lism , com­
modity production did not exist . It should merely indicate that not all 
the products of surplus labor become commodities ,  even though they are 
appropriated and consumed by individuals other than the producers . 
Marx 's examples suggest that for him commodity -producing slavery 
and the capitalist mode of production primarily lend themselves to a 
boundless thirst for surplus labor.  While exploitation was often quite 
horrible under feudalism, we must conclude that Marx does not believe 
that there existed a boundless thirst for surplus labor under feudalism 
which arose directly "from the nature of the production itself. " 
Here it may be objected that the feudal lords were in competition 
for land and that, therefore , each individual feudal lord was also con­
strained by the actions of all the members of  his class . According to 
Marx, the individual capitalist also does not determine the level of sur-
plus labor extracted from the workers and the level of recklessness brought 
upon them. He , too , is constrained in his action by competition ,  that is ,  
by capital ( personfied in the capitalists) as a whole. Similarly ,  it may be 
argued that the level of exploitation in feudalism was set and determined 
not by the wants of any particular lord, but by the level of competition 
among the lords. Furthermore , since there was competition for land ,  
theoretically , a s  under capital , a boundless thirst for surplus labor could 
develop depending on the level and nature of competition .  No doubt, the 
burden on the peasants was often extreme. Why , then , according to Marx. 
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did this boundless thirst not develop under feudalism? Aside from the fact 
that the acquisition of land did not totally depend on the level of surplus 
labor extracted, as is shown by feudal marriage strategies, the extraction of 
surplus labor itself was l imited by the fact that the bulk of the population 
controlled the means of production needed to reproduce itself. Thus, al­
though surplus labor in its various forms needed to be made available to 
the lord, the production through which the feudal population secured its 
own existence was not dependent on the lord , and a degree of human auton­
omy was preserved .  
This can be  said neither of slavery nor  of labor under capital . Marx's 
analogies of wage labor with slavery illustrate this fact . Because of this 
autonomy ,  productive activity could not be subject to the will of the 
lords and the development of commodity production was limited .  Al­
though commodity production did occur, it was limited in scale . As a 
result ,  exploitation , according to Marx , never reached the in ten sity it 
did under capital and commodity-producing slavery . Both cap ital and 
slavery systematically destroyed the health of the producers and reduced 
their life expectancy . 
THE I NABI LITY TO APPROP RIATE ONE'S 
PRODUCT OF LABOR AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 
Under capital , the worker,  in exchange for a wage , is prevented from ap­
propriating the product of his labor . He is forced to produce in excess of 
what he is being compensated ,  and he is engaged in commodity produc­
tion rather than in the production of use values to be consumed without 
prior exchange .  Therefore , unlike feudal production , under capital the 
pro ducer's total product belongs to the capitalist and is produced not for 
use but for exchange .  That part of the total product which results from 
uncompensated labor ( i .e . surplus labor) for the  capitalist is also exchanged ,  
and through this exchange takes on a form desirable for the  capitalist . The 
capitalist can augment his capital , if he docs not consume the surplus value , 
which he will again advance in a constant form as means of production and 
materials and a variable form as wages .  In this operation ,  the capitalist is 
subject to competition which , in turn , influences the form in which capital 
is put back into circulation .  
The manner in which capital i s  advanced and put  into circulation deter­
mines the conditions of production to which the workers are subject .  It 
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can readily be seen that ,  under capital , the worker loses all control over 
the state of things inasmuch as he must sell his labor in order to exist 
and, consequently ,  inasmuch as he is prevented from controlling the 
product of  his labor. Since he does not own any means of production 
and must sell whatever is left to him-his labor power-he even depends on 
the capitalists to advance capital so that he can sell his labor power in re­
turn for a livelihood .  The capital advanced in the form of wages is simply 
objectified labor-labor that the capitalists appropriated from the workers 
in the first place . The worker can therefore be said to have become de­
pendent on the product of his own labor even for his l ive lihood ,  in ad­
dition to being depen dent in terms of the conditions of production .  The 
product of his own labor confronts him in a way that he does not con-
trol in any way , not even to the extent that he can secure his e xistence . 
The product of his own labor, owned by and mediated through the capital­
ist in every way ,  confronts him as an alien force.  
In  the 1 844 Man uscripts ,  Marx already remarks that capit al is accumu­
lated labor, which constitutes wealth .  Wealth in a society is advanced "when 
the capitals and the revenues of a country are growing. " This is possible 
only because 
more and more of his products are being taken away fro m the worker , 
that to an increasing extent his own labour confronts him as another 
man 's property and that the means of his existence an d his activity 
are increasingly concentrated in the hands of the capitalis t" (CW, 3 ,  
p .  2 3 7 ;  MEW, E B  1 .T. , p .  47 3 ) .  
The fact that the product i s  being taken away from the worker means "that 
it exists outside him, independently , as something alien to h im ,  and that 
it becomes a power on its own confronting him. I t  means that the life which 
he has conferred on the object confronts him as something hostile and 
alien"  (CW, 3 ,  p. 2 7 2 ;  MEW, EB  1 .T . ,  p .  5 1 2 ) . 10 As more and more of the 
producer's product is taken away from him , the worker is increasingly con­
fronted not only by his own labor as another man 's property , but by the 
fact that exchange relations become ever more uncontrollable . Thus, the 
more numerous the products are that are being taken away from him , the 
more expanded commodity production , the more extended commodity 
production has become. As the market is continually extended , 1 1  " its 
interrelations and the conditions regulating them assume more and more 
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the form of a natural law working independently of the producer , and 
become ever more uncontrollable " (C 3 ,  p .  245 ; MEW, 2 5 ,  p .  2 5  5 ) .  Marx 
even goes so far as to say that, for the worker,  capital "piles up dangerous­
ly over and against h im." The consequences are premature death , the 
worker's decline to a machine , more competition ,  and ,  for some, even 
starvation and beggary (CW,  3 ,  p. 2 3 8 ;  MEW, EB 1 .T . ,  p. 474) . 
The observable phenomenon of capital accumulation and its con­
sequences for those who produce the wealth being accumulated are sum­
marized by a passage from the Grundrisse : 
[A ] ll the progress of civilization ,  or in other words every increase in the 
powers of social production (gesellschaftliche Produktivkr�fte) ,  if you 
like , in the pro ductive powers of labour itself-such as results from 
science , inventions, division and combination of labour , improved 
means of communication ,  creation of the world market ,  machinery 
etc .-enriches not the worker but rather capital ; hence it only magnifies 
again the power dominating over labour ;  increases only the productive 
power of capital . Since capital is the antithesis of the worker,  this mere­
ly increases the o bjective po wer stan ding over labour .  The transforma­
tion of labour (as living, purposive activity) into capital is , in itself, 
the result of the exchange between cap ital and labour , in so far as it 
gives the capitalist the title of ownership to the product of labour 
(and command over the same) (G , p. 308 ;  MEW, G, p. 2 1 5 ) . 12 
Marx compares the fact that the laborer ,  through the capitalist , is con ­
trolled by his own product of labor to religion :  "as in religion ,  man is 
governed by the products of his own brain ,  so in capitalist production, he 
i s  governed by the products of his own hand" (Cl , p. 5 8 2 ;  MEW ,  2 3 ,  p. 649) . 
On the other hand ,  Marx observes that in bourgeois society o ne can mis­
leadingly think that the individual has great freedom,  while in fact the op­
posite is the case . 
[ P ] recisely the slavery of civil society is in appearance the greatest 
freedo m  because it i s  in appearance the fully developed independence 
of the individual, who considers as his own freedom the uncurbed 
movement , no longer bound by a common bond or by man , of the 
estranged  elements of his l ife , such as property , industry , religion ,  
etc . ,  whereas actually this i s  his fully developed slavery and inhumanity 
(CW, 4, p. 1 1 6 ;  MEW, 2 ,  p .  1 2 3 ) .  
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One manifestation of capital 's domination of labor and of the workers ' 
confrontation with the product of their labor and conditions  of pro­
duction as powers independent and alien to them can be seen in the de­
velopment and nature of the division of labor .  Thus ,  a particular division 
of labor emerges with commodity production . I t  can be said that 
[T ]o  all the different varieties of values in use there correspond as many 
different kinds of useful Jabour,  classified according to the order ,  
genus, species ,  and variety to which they belong in the  social division 
of labour. This division of labour is a necessary condition for the pro­
duction of commo dities ,  but it does not follow,  conversely , that the 
production of commodities is a necessary condition for the division 
of labour. In  the primitive Indian community there is social divis ion 
of labour, without production of commodities ( C l ,  p .  49 ; MEW, 2 3 ,  
p .  5 6 ) . 
It is not only in Capital that Marx made this observation con cerning the 
origin an d  nature of the division of labor .  As was shown earl ier, estrange­
ment occurs when man must subject his will to an alien will in order to 
gain an existence and when , as a result ,  he is also prevented from appropriat­
ing the product of his own labor. The product of his own labor ,  capital , 
confronts him in its various forms as constant and variable capital . As a 
result ,  certain conditions of labor are imposed on the worker :  
[L)abo ur i s  only an expression of human activity with in alienation, 
of the manifestation of life as the al ienation of life ,  the division of 
labour, too is therefore nothing else but the estranged, alienated 
positing of human activity as a real activity of the species or as 
activity of man as a species-being (CW, 3 ,  p .  3 1 7 ;  MEW, E B  1 .T . ,  p. 5 5 7) .  
Estrangement from the  product of  one 's labor ,  a s  well a s  the  accompany­
ing division of labor based on alienated labor ,  can exist only if private 
property exists. Without the institution of private property , the private 
appropriation of the products of the labor of others would be impossible , 
and the worker could not become dependent on the capitalist 's resources 
for his existence.  Likewise , since the division of labor under capital is 
expressive of "nothing else but the estranged ,  alienated positing of human 
activity ,"  it is also dependent and rests on private property (CW,  3 ,  p .  3 2 1 ;  
MEW, E B  l .T . ,  p .  5 6 1 ) . 1 3 
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In the Grundrisse, Marx postulates that "exchange and division of 
labour reciprocally condition one another" (G ,  p. 1 5 8 ;  MEW, G, p. 76) . 
With capital 's boundless thirst for surplus value , realized ,  in part , by in­
creasing the volume of commodities exchanged ,  the division of labor 
increases and the increased division of labor further enhances an expan­
sion of exchange .  Marx observes that ,  through this process , which h as a 
momentum of its own ,  the amount of simple labor in a society also in­
creases .  "Just as in bourgeois society , " 14 
a general or a banker plays a great part , but mere man , on the other 
hand ,  a very shabby part , so here with mere human labour. I t  is the 
expenditure of simple labour-power ,  i .e . ,  of the labour-power which , 
on an average , apart from any special development , exists in the organ­
ism of every ordinary individual . Simple average labour,  i t  is true ,  
varies in character in different countries and at  different times, but  in  
a particular society it is given. Skilled labour counts only as  simple 
labour intensified ,  or  rather, as multiplied simple labour, a given 
quantity of skilled being considered equal to a greater quantity of 
simple labour.  Experience shows that this re duction is constantly 
being made (Cl , p .  5 1 ;  MEW, 2 3 ,  p. 5 9) .  
An illustration from The Poverty of Philosophy may make this point 
somewhat clearer :  " [W] hat characterises the division of labour inside 
modern society is that it engenders specialties ,  specialists , and with them 
craft-idiocy " (CW, 6, p. 1 90 ;  MEW, 4 ,  p. 1 5 7 ) .  And in Capital Marx 
writes that "not only is the detail work distributed to the different in­
dividuals , but the individual himself is made the automatic motor of a 
fractional operation . "  (C l ,  p. 340 ;  MEW, p .  340) . 
NOTES 
1. Consider the following statement in this context :  
I t  would be wron g  to say that l abour which produces use-values is the only 
source of the wealth produced by it , that is of material wealth.  Since labour 
is an activity which adapts for some purpose or other,  it needs material as a 
prere quisite . Different use-values contain very different proportion s of l abou r 
and natural products, but u se-value always comprises a natural e lement (CPE, 
p .  36;  MEW, 1 3 , p .  2 3 ) .  
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2. It should be kept in mind that when Marx speaks of exchange value , he 
often merely u ses the word Wert (value) . Also , when writing exchange value 
rather than value only,  the following passage in Capital is of importan ce : 
When at the beginning of this chapter, we said ,  in common parlan ce ,  
that a co mmo dity i s  bot h  u se-value and exchange-value , we were , accurately 
speaking, wron g. A commodity is a use-value or object of util ity , and a value.  
I t  manifests itself as this  two-fold thing, that it is,  as soon as its  value assumes 
an independent form-viz . ,  the form of exchange value . I t  never assumes this 
form when isolated ,  but only when placed in a value or exchange relation with 
another commodity of a different kind. When once we know this , such a mode 
of expression does no harm ; it simply serves as an abbreviation (C l ,  p. 66 ;  
MEW, 23 ,  p .  75 ;  see also Engels' comment in C l ,  p .  48 ;  MEW, 23 ,  p .  5 5 ) .  
3 .  The word sinnlich (sensual) remains untranslated i n  C l ,  p .  7 8 .  This i s  a 
lack inasmuch as man assesses the util ity of an object through sen se p erception ,  
while value i s  not  determined through sense perception .  
4. For Marx, skilled labor is labor that , through some training, requires 
faculties that go beyond the mere expenditure of human brains, nerves, an d 
muscles. Since training re qu ires an initial expen diture , skilled labor, he states, 
commands higher wages. I t  is not that its real wages are higher and that therefore 
the surplus product produced by it less; it is exploited to the same degree (MEW, 
23, pp.  2 1 2,  360;  M EW, 25, pp .  1 5 1 ,  3 1 1 ) .  
The above concepts must b e  viewe d  with some skepticism . A s  M arx writes 
in a footnote : 
The distinction between skilled and unskilled labour rests in part on pure 
illusion ,  or to say the least, on distinctions that have long since ceased to be 
real , an d that survive only by virtue of a traditional convention ; in p art on 
the helpless condition of some groups of the working-class , a condition that 
prevents them from exactin g equally with the rest the value of their labour­
power. Accidental circumstances here play so great a part, that these two 
forms of labour sometimes change places. Where , for instance , the physique  of 
the working class has deteriorate d,  an d is ,  relatively speaking, exh austed ,  
which i s  the  case in a l l  countries with a well developed capitalist productio n ,  
the lo wer forms of labour, which deman d great expenditure of muscle, are 
in general considered as skilled,  compared with much more delicate forms 
of labour ;  the latter sink down to the level of unskilled labour (C l ,  p .  1 92 ;  
MEW, 2 3,  p .  2 1 2) .  
5 .  For additional elaboration or commentary on social l abour, see C l ,  p p .  7 8 , 
80; MEW, 2 3 ,  pp .  88,  90 ;  and C 3 ,  pp.  81-82 ,  88 ,  1 04, 5 1 6 ;  MEW, 2 5 ,  p p .  92 ,  
99,  1 1 3 , 5 3 3 .  Among other things, i n  M E W  2 5 ,  Marx directly relates credit , 
waste of human l ives, and so on to the social nature of labor , that is,  that all 
production is commodity production . 
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In  t his context ,  it  is useful to point out the mean in g  of terms such as 
"average simple labor ,"  "average labor ,"  "universal labor ,"  "cooperative labor, " 
"directly associated labor ,"  and "common l abor" :  
1 .  "einfache Durchschnittsarbeit is "simple l abour power . . .  which ,  on  an 
average ,  apart from any special devel opment ,  exists in the organism of 
every ordinary individu al " (C l ,  p. 5 1 ;  M EW, 2 3 ,  p. 59 and see also p. 2 1 3 ) .  
2 .  Durchschnittsarbeit (average labor) can also mean "average paid labor " 
( see MEW, 2 5 ,  p. 3 1 1 ) .  
3 .  allgemeine Arbeit (universal l abor) and gemeinschaftliche A rbeit (co­
o perative labor) : 
Both kinds play their role in the process of p roduction ,  both flow one 
into the other, bu t both are also differentiated.  Universal labour is all 
scientific labour,  all discovery and all inventions. This l abour depends p art­
ly on the utilisation of the labours of those who have gone before . Co­
o perative labour ,  on the other han d ,  is the direct co-operation of individuals 
( C 3 ,  p .  1 04; MEW, 2 5 ,  p. 1 1 4) . 
4. Marx uses vergesellschaftete Arbeit inconsistently .  Thus, it can mean "associated 
l abor, or common labor" as is re quired, for example , to operate big machinery 
( C l ,  pp. 364- 3 6 5 ;  MEW, 2 3 ,  p. 407) .  I t  can also mean " directly associated " 
labor as is made clear in the sentence "Owen pre-supposed directly associate d 
l abo ur,  a form of production that is entirely inconsistent with the p roduction 
of commodities" (C l ,  pp. 97-98 ;  MEW, 2 3 ,  pp. 1 09- 1 1 0) .  
6 .  The capital ist does not buy labor power i n  order to satisfy , through the 
product of this labor ,  his personal wants or needs.  He buys it for the production of 
surplus value (C l ,  p .  580;  MEW, 2 3 ,  p .  647 ) . 
7 .  Marx makes the same observation elsewhere : 
[T )he real barrier of capitalist p roduction is capital itself It is that capital and its 
self-expansion appear as the starting and the closing point , the motive and the 
purpose of production ; that production is only production for cap ital and not 
vice versa, the means of production are not mere mean s for a con stant expansion 
of the l iving process of the society of producers (C 3 ,  p. 250 ;  MEW, 2 5 ,  p. 260) . 
8. Translation mine insofar as I render braucht by "needs" instread of by "wants ."  
Capital has  not invented surplus-labour.  Wherever a part of society p ossesses 
the monopoly of the means of produ ction , the labourer ,  free or not free , must 
add to t he working-time necessary for its own maintenance an extra working­
time in order to produce the means of subsistence for the owners of the means 
of production,  whether this proprietor be the Athenian aristocrat , Etruscan 
theocrat , civis Romanus, Norman baro n ,  American slave-owner, W allachian 
Boyard, modern landlord or  capitalist (C l ,  p. 226 ;  MEW, 2 3 ,  pp. 249-250) .  
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9.  Ho wever, it would be incorrect to infer that commodity production only 
characterizes capitalist society . In the secon d volume of Capital , Marx mentions 
that commodities can be produced under various modes of productio n :  
No matter whether commodities are the  output  of  production based on 
slavery , of peasants (Chinese , Indian ryots) . of communes (Dut ch East 
I n dies) , of state enterprise (such as existe d in former epochs of Russian 
history on the basis of serfdom) or of half-savage hunting tribes ,  etc . -as 
commodities and money they come face to face with t he money and com­
modities in wh ich the in dividual capital presents itself. (C2 ,  p. 1 1 3 ; M EW, 
24,  p . 1 1 3) .  
In  t h e  third volume of Capital, w e  can read: 
No matter what the basis on which products are p rodu ce d ,  which are thrown 
into circulation as co mmodities-whether the basis of the primitive community , 
of slave production ,  of small peasant and petty bou rgeois, or the c ap ital ist 
basis, the character of products as commodit ies is  not altered . . . .  The extent 
to which products enter trade an d go through the merchants'  hands depends 
on the mode of production , an d reaches its maximum in the ultim ate develop­
ment of capitalist produ ction ,  where the product is produced solely as  a com­
modity, and not as a direct means of subsistence (C 3 ,  p. 3 2 5 ;  MEW, 2 5 ,  p. 3 3 7) . 
1 0. In Theories of Surplus-Value ( Vol . I l l ) , Marx again states that accumulation 
is " the conversion of surplus-value into capital . "  The unpaid labor embodied in 
surplus labor, which has been converted into capital , confron ts the worker as 
the totality of the objective conditions of labour. In t his form it  confronts him 
as an alien property with the result  that the capital which is antecedent to his 
l abour, appears to be independent of i t  . . . .  the conditions of labour confront 
the individual worker in an ever more gigantic form and in creasingly as social 
forces, the chance of his taking possession of them himsel f as is the case in 
small-scale in dustry disappears (TS 3 , p p .  3 5 2-3 5 3 ;  MEW, 26. 3 ,  p p .  344-34 5 ;  
see also CW, 3 , p .  2 7 5  and MEW, E B  l .T . ,  p .  5 1 5  as referred t o  o n  p .  3 4  of 
t he present text) . 
1 1 . For reasons which,  according to Marx , are inherent in cap ital ism but which 
cannot be addressed here .  
1 2 . T h e  following quo tes may further illustrate t h e  nature of t h e  dominating 
forces controlling the worker. The worker is confronted with 
capital , as master over l iving labour capacity, as val ue endowed with its own 
might and wil l  . . .  " All this, " says Marx ,  " arose from the act of exch ange, in 
which he exchanged his living labour capacity for an amount of objectified 
labour, except that this objectified labour-these external conditions of his 
being, and the independent  externality (Ausseribmsein ) (to him) of these ob-
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jective conditions-now appear as posited by himself, as bis own pro duct, 
as his own self-objectification as well as t he objectification of himself as a 
power independent of himself, which moreover rules over him, rules over him 
through his own actions (G,  p .  45 3 ;  MEW, G ,  p. 3 5 7 ) .  
O n e  manifestation of t h e  condition that the worker i s  dominate d by h i s  own 
pro duct in such a way that everythin g has an alien will  an d is independent of h im 
is for Marx the worker's attitu de toward that which dominates him independent of 
his will . 
Finally, we have earlier seen that, in fact ,  the labourer looks at the social 
nature of his labour, at its combination with the labour of others for a com­
mon purpose ,  as he would at an alien power ; the condition of realising this 
combination is alien property , whose dissipation would be totally indifferent 
to him if he were not compelled to economise with it .  The situation is qu ite 
different in factories owned by the labourers themselves. (C 3 ,  p. 8 5 ;  MEW, 2 5 ,  
p p .  9 5-96) . 
[ I ) f  landed p roperty became people's property then the whole basis of capital i st 
production would go, the foundation on which rests the confrontation of the 
worker by the conditions  of labour as an indepen dent force (TS 2 ,  p. 97; MEW , 
26.2 ,  p. 97) .  
1 3 . Later, I discuss to what extent estrangement is dependent only  on cap ital 
rather than on private property as such, of which capital is merely one historical 
form. 
1 4. C l ,  p.  5 1 ,  leaves out bourgeois, although it is contained in MEW, 2 3 ,  p. 5 9 .  
5 
MARX'S EVALUATION OF 
THE CONDITION OF MAN 
IN PRECAPIT ALIST SOCIETIES 
Marx illustrated his theory of estrangement by analyzing the nature of 
capitalist society , and he defined human nature in order to show how capital­
ism prevents man from living according to his nature . Based on the analysis 
of production and life under capital , he was able to demonstrate the various 
ways in which individuals are prevented from living according to their nature 
and from making use of the abilities they are endowed with by nature . How­
ever ,  because Marx's effort was devoted primarily to obtaining a better under­
standing of the principles governing capitalist society , it cannot necessarily 
be concluded that his theory of estrangement could not also be valid in the 
analysis of noncapitalist social formations.  Thus , it remains to be investigated 
whether Marx 's theory of estrangement contains properties that also can 
apply to noncapitalist societies. Of course , since Marx does not generally 
talk about estrangement in noncapitalist societies, this assessment will 
have to be based on inference. 
THE DELI N EATION O F  THE CAPITALIST MODE O F  PRODUCTION 
Since commodity production seems to be a reality in various social for­
mations, the question arises as to what exactly distinguishes capitalist pro­
duction from noncapitalist production .  Marx contends that the level at 
which commodities are produced distinguishes the two . 
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The product appears as a commodity in the most varied organ isms of 
social production .  Conse quently what characterises capital ist produc­
tion would then be only the extent to which the product is created 
as an article of commerce , as a commodity , and hence the extent also 
to which its own constituent elements must enter again as articles of 
commerce , as commodities ,  into the economy from which it emerges .  
As a matter of fact capitalist production is commodity production 
as the general form of production .  But it is so and becomes so more 
and more in the course of its development only because labour itself 
appears here as a commodity . . . .  For this reason capitalist production 
(and hence commodity production) does not reach its fu ll scope until 
the direct agricultural pro ducer becomes a wage-labourer ( C2 ,  pp. 1 1 9-
1 20 ;  MEW, 24, pp .  1 1 9- 1 20) .  
Capitalist production is distinguished from the outset by two character­
istic features. 
First. I t  produces its products as commodities. The fact that it produces 
commodities does not differentiate it from other modes of production ; 
but rather the fact that being a commodity is the dominant and deter­
mining characteristic of its products. This implies, first and foremost, 
that the labourer himself comes forward merely as a seller of com­
modities ,  and thus as a free wage-labourer ,  so that labour appears in 
general as wage-labour. . .  The second distinctive feature of the capitalist 
mode of production is the production of surplus-value as the direct aim 
and determining motive of production .  Capital produces essentially 
capital , and does so only to the extent that it produces surplus-value . 
( C 3 ,  pp .  88 1 -88 2 ;  MEW, 2 5 ,  pp .  887-888) .  
Under capital , the nature and basis of authority are clearly distinct from 
those in noncapitalist production . As a consequence , although the extrac­
tion of surplus value is not unique to capital , the form in which it is ex­
tracted differs from that in noncapitalist production .  
The authority assumed by the  capitalist as the  person ification of capital 
in the direct process of pro duction ,  the social function performed by 
him in his capacity as manager and ruler of pro duction ,  is essentially 
different from the authority exercised on the basis of production of 
means of slaves ,  serfs , etc. (C 3 ,  p. 8 8 1 ; MEW, 2 5 ,  p. 888) . 
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Under capital , the worker is subject to the authority of the capitalist as a 
result of exchange ,  and not  as a result of human bondage and political or 
theocratic do mination .  
Whereas , on the basis of capitalist production ,  the mass o f  direct pro­
ducers is confronted by the social character of their production in the 
form of strictly regulating authority and a social mechanism of the 
labour process organised as a complete hierarchy-this authority 
reaching its bearers, however, only as the personification of the con­
ditions of labour in contrast to labour , and not as political or theocratic 
rulers as under earlier modes of production-among the bearers of this 
authority , the capitalists themselves,  who confront one another only as 
commodity owners , there reigns complete anarchy within which the 
social interrelations of production assert themselves only as an over­
whelming natural law in relation to individual free will (C 3 ,  p. 88 1 ;  MEW, 
2 5 ,  p .  888;  see also MEW, G ,  pp.  3 67-3 68) . 
COMMUNITI ES  I N  WHICH PROPERTY WAS HELD IN COMMON 
If capitalist society is characterized by primarily commodity produc­
tion ,  earlier noncapitalist social formations are characterized by the ab­
sence of systematic commodity production .  The question arises as to 
what types of exchange ex ist in societies "based on property in common" -
societies of the form of "a patriarchal family ,  an ancient Ind ian community, 
or a Peruvian Inca State . "  First, however, it must be noted that Marx dis­
tinguishes between various types of exchange . For example , he states  that 
savages often do not exchange one particular use value for another; instead , 
"a chaotic mass of articles are offered as the equivalent of a single art icle " 
( C l ,  p. 9 1 ; MEW, 2 3 ,  p. 1 02) . Barter differs from the type of exchange 
often found with savages as well as from the type of exchange character-
istic in cap italist society. 
' 
The direct barter of products attains the elementary form of the 
relative expression of value in one respect , but not in another . That 
form is x Commodity A = y Commodity B .  The form of direct barter 
is x use-value A =  y use-value B.  The articles A and B in th is case are 
not as ye t commodities, but become so only by the act of barter.  The 
first step  made by an object of utili ty towards acquiring exchange-
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value is when it forms a non-use-value for its owner ,  and that happens 
when it forms a superfluous portion of some article requi red for his 
immediate wants (C l ,  p .  9 1 ;  MEW, 2 3 ,  p .  1 02) . 
Capitalism systematically produces more commodities than the producer 
needs and ,  more importantly , i t  produces directly for exchange . Unlike a 
barter econo my under which products become commodities only through 
the act of exchange , under capital products immediately become com­
modities .  
I n  the direct barter of products, each commodity is dire ctly a means 
of exchange to its owner, and to all other persons an equivalent ,  but 
that only insofar as it has use-value for them. At this stage , therefore , 
the articles exchanged  do not acquire a value-form independent of their 
own use-value , or of the individual needs of the exchangers (C l ,  p p .  9 1 -
9 2 ;  MEW, 2 3 ,  p .  1 0 3 ) .  
If, however, individuals consistently barter, exchange becomes a regular 
social process an d the desire for foreign use values becomes an every day 
phenomenon.  
[ l ] n  the course of t ime,  therefore, some portion at least of the products 
of labour must be produced with a special view to exchange . From 
that moment the distinction becomes firmly established between the 
utility of an object for the purpose of consumption ,  and its utility 
for the purposes of exchange .  Its use-value becomes distinguished 
from its exchange-value . On the other hand ,  the quantitative propor­
tion in which the articles are exchangeable , becomes dependent on 
their production itself. Custom stamps them as values with definite 
magnitudes" (C l ,  p. 9 1 ;  MEW, 2 3 ,  p. 1 0 3 ) .  
Marx postulates that exchange begins a t  the point where the community 
stops (MEW, 2 3 ,  pp .  2 5 ,  1 02- 1 0 3 ,  1 87 ) . That is, i t  exists between com­
munities. If me mbers of two different communities engage regularly in 
direct barter, their products become commodities on a regular basis, al­
though they may not be commodities from the very outset of their pro ­
duction .  However ,  "as soon . . .  as products once become commodities in 
the external relations of a community , they also , by reaction , become so 
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in its internal in tercourse . "  The communities based on common property to 
which Marx referred had not yet become subject to this process. In their 
internal re lations,  products had not become commodities because the com­
munities '  external relations consisted of  an exchange that at best was in­
frequent and erratic. While no set pattern had emerged ,  some exchange 
may have occasionally occurred .  
(T ] hose small and extremely ancient Indian communities, some of which 
have continued down to this day , are based on possession in com-
mon of the land ,  on the blending of agriculture and handicrafts , and on 
an unalterable division of labour, which serves ,  whenever a new com­
munity is started ,  as a plan and scheme ready cut and dried . . . .  The 
chief part of the products is destined  for direct use by the community 
itself, and does not take the form of a commodity . Hence , production 
here is independent of that  division of labour brought about ,  in Indian 
society as a whole , by mean s of the exchange of commodities .  I t  is 
the surplus alone that becomes a commodity , and a portion of even 
that, not until it has reached the hands of the State , into whose hands 
fro m time immemorial a certain quantity of these products has found 
its way in the shape of rent  in kind. (C l ,  p.  3 3 7 ;  MEW, 2 3 ,  p . 3 78 ) .  
I t  is now possible to  return to  our  original question as to what type of  
exchange exists with socie ties "based on property in  common . " According 
to Marx , commodity production does not exist within such communities, 
and there is no or only minimal barter between the members . This does 
not mean that some individuals do not produce more than they need for 
themselves. On the contrary , there are surplus products , some of which 
are exchanged with o ther communities (barter) , some given as tribute to 
government , and the rest distributed among the members . Strictly speaking, 
this distribution of products internal to the community "based on property 
in common" is a form of exchange ,  sin ce the surplus of "A" may benefit 
" B "  and inverse , or the products of one type of manufacture may benefit 
those who manufacture a different product (MEW, 2 3 ,  pp .  3 78-3 79 ) .  The 
decisive point is that this process occurs without the products becoming 
commodities ,  either by being exchanged  in barter fashion or, worse , by 
being produced for a market in which exchange value and use value have 
already become distinguished as separate forms of value . According to 
which criteria ,  then , are products exchanged  in communities "based on 
76 ESTRANGEMENT 
pro perty in common ? "  To my knowledge , Marx does not answer this 
question. Engels, however, says in A nti Diihring that both work and prod­
ucts for consumption are distributed according to tradition and needs 
(MEW, 20 ,  p .  288) .  Implicitly , Marx makes the same assertion when dis­
cussing the Inca Indians : " [T ] ransportation played a prominent role in the 
lan d  of the Incas, although the social product neither circulated as a com­
modity nor was distributed by means of barter" (C2 , p. 1 5 2 ;  MEW, 24 ,  
p .  1 5 2) .  
COMMUNISTIC SOCIETI ES BASED O N  THE GENTI LE ORGANI Z ATION 
It is useful to know how Marx views societies that have no products 
to be exchanged or that do not exchange with other communities .  As is 
well known ,  both in his views and his techniques of reasoning Marx relies 
heavily on the work of L. H .  Morgan.  Morgan 's method is on e of evolution­
ary prediction in reverse . Instead of pre dicting the state into which a given 
society will evolve , a state about which we have no informat ion whatso­
ever ,  knowledge about the history of societies is used to infer the type of 
society fro m which they evolved .  For example ,  information on tribal 
societies is used to infer the social organization from which these tribal 
societies evolved .  Thus, the attempt is made to construct a view of society 
and its organizational structure for a period in human history for which 
we have no living examples .  
In  this  context , it is not important to assess whether the method used 
by Marx, as well as Engels and Morgan , is appropriate . Nor is it impera­
tive to discuss whether Marx was correct in his inferences concerning the 
original condition of societies. What is important is to note some of his 
views on this subject ,  since they will be helpful in assessing his theory 
of estrangement. 
Unfortunately , Marx's thinking on societies in the original condition 
is available only in a rather incomplete and sketchy form. Through Lawrene< 
Krader, however, some of Marx's views in the Ethnological Notebooks 
have become available to a larger circle . Largely with the help of the 
Notebooks, an attempt is made here to extract those Marxian views that 
may have a bearing on the interpretation of his theory of estrangement . 
Even so ,  the Notebooks do not give us a complete account of his thinking 
on societies in the original state . To escape this l imitation ,  so me use of 
Engels '  writings will be made on this subject.  Certainly it would be better 
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to have Marx 's complete views, but under the circumstances ,  it is better to 
"supplement" Marx 's thinking on the subject rather than rely solely on 
the Ethnological Notebooks.  This procedure is justified ( 1 )  because Engels 
had access to Marx's notes on Morgan and used them for his book on the 
origin of the family , and (2 ) because in view of their intimate friendship 
and their mutual cooperation until Marx 's  death , Engels '  views can be 
assumed not to have deviated significantly from those of Marx in this 
respect. As Engels tells us in his foreword , Marx intended to write a 
book on the family similar to the one Engels wrote shortly after Marx's 
death in 1 88 3 .  A close exchange of ideas must have taken place , and there 
is no evidence that the two disagreed  significantly concerning communist 
societies based on the gentile organization . 
According to Engels (MEW, 2 1 ,  p. 7 1 ) ,  Marx often said that the key 
to understanding  our own primitive age can be found among the American 
Indians .  This primitive age at first consisted of life in the form of hordes ,  
a form of human life that Marx thought could not  be found anymore and 
that was "far below the lowest savage now living" (EN , p. 1 2 5 ) .  Sexual 
relations at this level are characterized as "pro miscuous intercourse " and 
"the ruder flint implements found over part of the earth 's surface , and not 
used by existing savages ,  attest extreme rudeness of man 's condition " (EN ,  
p .  1 2 5 ) .  After man emerged from this primitive habitat , he commenced as 
a fisherman to spread over continental areas (E N ,  p .  1 2 5 ) .  Thus,  the first 
stage of the family was formed. It was the consanguine family which "recog­
nized pro miscuity within defined limits" (EN ,  p .  1 2 5 ) .  Further organiza­
tion into gentes (kinship) occurred within which brothers an d sisters were 
prohibited from marrying, although monogamy had not been established 
and sexual access was not l imited to one partner . Gens ,  the general name 
for organizational forms in which kinship was derived from one ancestral 
mother-since as a result of promiscuity the father was not known-were 
democratically organized. The council of the gens with the I roquois was 
the instrument of government and had supreme authority over gens.  
[E]very adult male and female member had a voice upon al l  questions 
brought before i t ;  it elected and deposed i t s  sachem and chiefs . . .  i t  
con doned or  avenged the murder of a gentilis, i t  adopted persons into 
the gens. It  was the germ of the higher council of the tribe, and of that 
still higher of the confederacy, each of which was co mposed exclusively 
of chiefs as representatives of the gentes . . . . All the members of an 
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Iroquois gens perso nally free, bound to defend each other 's freedo m; 
equal in privileges and personal rights. Sachem and chiefs claiming to 
superiority ; a bro therhoo d  bound together by the ties of kin. Liberty, 
Equality, and Fraternity, though never formulated ,  were cardinal 
principles der gens and those the unit of a social and governmental 
system, the foundation on which I ndian society organized (EN , 
p. 1 50 ;  translation mine where necessary ; see also EN , p .  1 6 2 ) .  
Marx notes that " [ i ] n  th is lower a n d  middle ethnical period democratic 
principles were the vital element of gentile society " (EN ,  p .  1 72 ;  trans­
lation mine where necessary ) .  The sachems, who were the counselors of 
the people , were required to make unanimous decisions concerning all 
public questions.  Such unanimity was essential to the validity of every 
public act (EN,  p. 1 70 ;  see also EN,  pp .  1 6 5 - 166  and MEW, 2 1 ,  p .  2 1 ) .  
Marx also notes that all the members o f  an I roquois gens were personal­
ly free . Thus,  even 
{M]ilitary q uestio ns usually left to the actio n of the voluntary principle. 
Theoretically each tribe at war with every o ther tribe with which it had 
not formed a treaty of peace. Any person at liberty to organize a war 
party and conduct an expedition wohin he wollte . He announced bis 
project by giving a war-dance and inviting volunteers . . .  When a tribe 
was menaced with an attack, war parties were formed to meet it in 
much the same manner. Where forces so raised were united in one body , 
each under its o wn war-captain and their joint movements determined 
by a council of these captains (EN ,  p. 1 62 ) .  
Since the Iro quois were organized according t o  the principle of consanguin­
ity , it can be inferred that they practiced a communistic life -style . Marx 
remarks that "co mmunism in living seems to have originated in the neces­
sities of the co nsanguine family " (EN ,  p. 1 1 5 ) . Although a certain office 
may have passed from father to son , it does not follow that there was 
hereditary succession .  As shown above , the Iroquois members of the gens  
had the power to  e lect and recall their representatives .  If  succession from 
father to son occurred ,  it was "by the free consent of the people . " Accord­
ing to Marx, hereditary succession came "fro m force (usurpation) " (EN ,  
p. 1 7 3 ) .  
O n  this level of social and economic development , with regard t o  the 
labor time required for individuals to insure subsistence propagation of 
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the species, Marx comments in the Grundrisse that " [ in )  the lowest stages 
of production . . .  few human needs have yet been produced ,  and thus few 
to be satisfied .  Necessary labour is therefore restricted ,  not because labour 
is productive, but because it is not very necessary" ( G ,  p .  3 9 8 ;  MEW, G, 
p.  302 ) .  Although few products are being produced at this level of develop­
ment , it does not follow that there is no surplus .  However ,  "in the less 
productive stages of exchange ,  people exchange nothing inore than their 
superfluous labour time ; this is the measure of their exchange , which there­
fore extends only to superfluous products , "  while under capital "the exis­
tence of necessary labour time is conditional on the creation of superfluous 
labour time " (G ,  p. 3 98 ;  MEW, G, pp. 3 0 1 - 302) . 
Certainly , Morgan 's description of communism associated with con­
sanguineous kinship relations appealed to Marx in many ways .  Yet , it 
would be wrong to conclude that Marx "approved"  of life at this stage of 
development and proclaimed it to be the ideal human condition .  Already 
in the Manuscripts, he shows a certain kind of contempt for the "simplicity 
of the poor and crude man who has few needs and who has not only failed 
to go beyond private property , but has not yet even reached it " (CW,  3 ,  
p .  2 9 5 ; MEW, E B  1 .T . ,  p .  5 3 5 ) .  He states his objections to primitive com­
munism more precisely in Capital : 
[T ) hose ancient social organisms of production are ,  as compared with 
bourgeois society , extremely simple and transparent .  But they are 
founded either on the immature development of man individually , 
who has not yet severed the umbilical cord that unites him with his 
fellowmen in a primitive tribal community , or upon direct relations 
of subjection . They can arise and exist only when the development of 
the productive power of labour has not risen beyond a low stage , and 
when ,  therefore , the social relations within the sphere of material 
life , between man and man , and between man and nature , are cor­
respondingly narrow (C l ,  pp .  8 3 -84 ;  MEW, 2 3 ,  pp .  9 3 -94) . 
I n  The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State, Engels 
elaborates on this theme. 
[T ]he gentile constitution in its best days, as we saw it in America, 
presupposed an extremely sparse population over a wide area .  Man 's 
attitude to nature was therefore one of almost complete subjection to 
a strange incomprehensible power,  as is reflected in his childish rel igious 
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conceptions. Man was bounded by his tribe , both in relation to strangers 
from outside the tribe and to himself; the tribe , the gens ,  and their in­
stitutions were sacred and inviolable , a higher power established by 
nature , to which the individual subjected h imself unconditionally in 
feeling, thought , and action .  However impressive the people of this 
epoch appear to us ,  they are completely undifferentiated from one 
another ; as Marx says, they are still attached to the navel string of the 
primitive community (OF ,  p. 8 8 ;  MEW, 2 1 ,  p. 97 ) . 
For Marx , the communistic primitive community is not the ideal state 
of existence, although in some respects it was attractive to h im. If, at 
one t ime ,  these primitive societies were communistic ,  however , what factors 
contributed to the decay of this communism? In  the following pages ,  again 
with the help of Engels' writings ,  an attempt is made to reconstruct Marx's 
thought concerning the historical developments that led to the "fall from 
the simple moral greatness of the old gentile society " (O F ,  p .  88)  and 
started the process of civil ization for these societies. 
Engels comments that the organization of the Iroquois people was 
doo med  to collapse and that the highest form of their social organization­
the confederacy of tribes-already marked the beginning of its collapse . 
As evidence ,  he cites the I ro quois '  attempts to subjugate others and the 
fact that war was common and only later mitigated by self-interest (OF , 
p. 87 ; MEW, 2 1 ,  p .  97 ) .  The more profound source of decay lay elsewhere , 
however. According to Marx , the differences in the distribution of personal 
property were primarily responsible for the beginning crack in the founda­
tions of communism. Marx's examples are not necessarily drawn from the 
Iro quois ,  however, since Marx 's assumption is that the slightly more 
developed social forms from which the examples are often drawn were at 
one time also communistic .  Consequently , evidence of the emergence of 
personal property is not confined to the I ro quois ,  and according to Marx 
and Engels, can also be found in the history of other societies .  In  the 
German Ideology, Marx and Engels propose the idea that "real private 
property began with the ancients, as with modern nations, with movable 
property" (CW, 5 ,  p .  8 9 ;  MEW, 3 ,  p .  6 1 ) .  And in his Ethnological Note­
books Marx notes that at the stage only slightly h igher in development 
than that of the Iroquois there is a 
great increase in personal property and some changes in the relations 
of persons to land. The territorial do main still belonged to  the tribe 
in common;  but a portion now set apart for support of the govern -
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ment, another for religious uses, and a still more important  portion­
that fro m  which the people drew its subsistence, divided among the 
several gentes, o r  communities of persons who resided in the same 
pueblo . . . .  Individual ownership of ho uses and lands excluded by 
communal property of lands by gentes or communities of persons, 
joint-tenement houses and mode of occupation by related families 
. . . . Their lan d is held in co mmon, but after a person cultivates a 
lot he has the personal claim to it which be can sell to one of the 
co mmunity. (EN ,  p .  1 3 2 ;  translation mine where necessary ) .  
Here Marx is referring t o  the Laguna Pueblo Indians whom he states 
are an example of the stage of development slightly higher th an the one 
of the Iro quois .  
Of the Mogui  Village Indians, he remarks that they "now have flocks 
of sheep, horses and mules and considerable other personal property " 
(EN,  p .  1 3 2 ; translation mine where necessary) . On this leve l ,  Engels 
points out that , in contrast to the lowest levels of development ,  a steady 
surplus may be produced ,  facilitating a regular exchange and a division 
of labor that is not based merely on sex ,  age , and physical strength (OF , 
p. 1 50 ;  MEW, 2 1 ,  p .  1 60) . 1 Citing Marx , Engels maintains that "the 
property differences within one and the same gens . . .  transformed its 
unity of interest into , antagonism between its members ."  These property 
differences were also accompanied by "greed for riches" (see also EN ,  
p .  1 28) and transformed the whole gentile constitution ,  with its roots in  
the people , i n  gens ,  phratry , and  tribe , into i t s  opposite : 
[ F ) rom an organization of tribes for the free ordering of their own affairs 
it becomes an organization for the plundering and oppression of their 
neighbors ; and correspondingly its organs change from instruments of 
the will of the people into independent organs for the domination and 
oppression of the people (OF ,  p. 1 5 0 ;  MEW, 2 1 , p. 1 60) . 
According to Engels ,  at this point in history the threshold of civilization 
was reached (OF ,  p .  1 50) . 2 
MARX'S USE O F  THE TERM "PRIVATE P ROPERTY" 
In his Ethnological Notebooks, Marx does not , to my knowledge , use the 
term "private property . "  As we have seen , however, he does use the terms 
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"property" (Eigentum) , "objects of ownership" (EN,  pp .  1 2 7 - 1 28 ) ,  
" personal property , "  and  "individual ownership " (EN , p .  1 3 2 ) .  These 
terms are used in the context of describing how the original communism 
was undermined by the unequal accumulation of products by individuals. 
These may not have been isolated individuals , but in contrast to the pre­
vious form of communistic ownership ,  it was personal property and a form 
of private property . This may also have been Engels' reason for occasionally 
substituting the term Privateigentum (private property) with Sondereigentum 
(separate ownership of) for his later editions of The Origin of the Family, 
Private Property and the State (see MEW, 2 1 , pp .  5 8 ,  1 5 6 ) ,  wh ile in his 
first edition he used Privateigentum with no qualification . The substitution 
allowed him to emphasize that it was not Privateigentum in the sense known 
today , but neither was it communal property anymore . The following pas­
sage from Engels illustrates this point : 
But to whom did this new wealth belong? Originally to the gens ,  with­
out a doubt .  Private property in herds must have already started at an 
early period ,  however . . . .  What is certain is that we must not think of 
him as a property owner in the modern sense of the word .  And it is 
also certain that at the threshold of authentic history we already find 
the herds everywhere separately owned (Sondereigentum) by heads of 
families, as are the artistic products of barbarism--metal implements, 
luxury articles and,  finally , the human cattle-the slaves (OF ,  p .  48 ; 
MEW, 2 1 ,  p. 5 8 ) .  
For Marx the term Privateigentum seems to refer primarily to  property 
as appropriated in the city-states of Rome and Greece , under feudalism, 
and under capitalism. This can be said despite the fact that Marx , in the 
German Ideology, says that "real private property began with the ancients , 
as with modern nations,  with movable property " (CW, 5 ,  p .  89 ;  MEW, 3 ,  
p .  6 1 ) .  On the contrary , his emphasis o n  real private property can be seen 
as a conscious distinction from the way he commonly uses the term "private 
property ," namely , to designate the ownership of the means of production , 
be it in the form of feudal landholdings or machinery under capital . Thus, 
in the Manuscripts, Marx maintains that feudal property in land was the 
beginning of the domination of private property and that it was the root 
of private property (MEW, EB  l .T . ,  pp. 505 -506) .  In  the Manuscripts he 
also states that 
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only at the culmination of the development of private property does 
this, its secret , appear again , namely , that on the one hand it is the 
pro duct of alienated labour, and that on the other it is the means 
by which labour alienates itself, the realisatio n  of this alienation 
(CW, 3 ,  p .  280 ;  MEW, E B  1 .T . ,  p .  5 20) . 
As a result of the private ownership of the means of production , it is pos­
sible to coerce others into giving up their product of work , or a portion 
of it, in return for a wage . This, in turn , perpetuates the abil i ty of some 
to compel others to sell their labor. The owners of the means of produc­
tion are able to maintain their property and accumulate more only if 
surplus labor can be extracted from others , whose existence depends 
on earning a wage . 
The term "private property" is also used in Marx 's  Theories of Surplus­
Value in such a way as to designate clearly the private ownership of the 
means of production .  
The original unity between the  worker and the  conditions of produc­
tion (abstracting from slavery , where the labourer himself belongs to 
the objective conditions of production) has two main forms : the 
Asiatic communal system (primitive communism) and a small-scale 
agriculture based on the family (and linked with domestic industry)  
in one form or another. Both are embryonic forms and both are 
equally unfitted to develop labour as social labour and the productive 
power of social labour. Hence the necessity for the separation , for 
the rupture ,  for the antithesis of labour and property (by which 
property in the conditions of production is to be understood) . The 
most extreme form of this rupture , and the one in which the pro­
ductive forces of social labour are also most powerfully developed,  
is capital . The original unity can be re-established only on the material 
foundation which capital creates and by means of the revolution s 
which,  in the process of this creation , the working class and the whole 
society undergo (TS , 3, pp. 422-423 ; MEW, 26 . 3 ,  pp. 4 1 4-4 1 5 ) .  
And i n  Capital, Marx mentions that the "legal view o f  free private owner­
ship of land ,  arises in the ancient world only with the dissolution of the 
organic order of society , and in the modern world only with the develop­
ment of  capitalistic production"  (C 3 ,  p. 6 1 6 ;  MEW, 2 5 ,  p. 6 2 9 ) .  
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In summary , Marx reserved the term "private property " to designate 
private o wnership of the means of production ,  and he used  o ther terms 
to designate the privately accumulated products which were not means 
of production .  Thus, the personal and unequal accumulation of herds and 
other objects which undermined the communism of the gens cannot be 
considered  to be means of production .  Accordingly , he used the term 
"personal property" rather than "private property . "  Unfortunately , 
Marx 's death prevented him from showing how unequally accumulated 
personal property led to the ownership of the means of production (private 
property) .  Hence, Engels'  work on the origin of the family and private 
property assumes an important place in the interpretation of Marx's 
thought. 
NOTES 
1.  Similarly ,  Marx writes about the Russian community that owned large 
parts of land in common and combined work in agriculture with handicraft . 
Those communities were not engaged in commodity production and adjusted 
their craft activities to the agricultural seasonal production schedule.  Craftman­
ship complemente d agricultural production (MEW, 24,  p p .  243-244) . Thus the 
Russian community , too, was quite resistant to being torn apart by commerce . 
In this context Marx 
·
says that 
The obstacles presented by the internal sol idi ty and organisation of  pre­
capitalistic ,  national modes of production to the corrosive influence of 
commerce are strikingly i l lustrated in the intercourse of the Engl ish with 
I ndia and China. The broad basis of the mode of production here is formed 
by the unity of small-scale agriculture and home in dustry , to which in India 
we should add the form of village communities built upon the common owner­
ship of land, which identical ly ,  was the original form in China as wel l .  In  India 
the English lost no time in exercising their direct pol itical and economic power, 
as rulers and landlords, to disrupt these small economic communities. English 
commerce exerted a revolutionary influence on these communities and tore 
them apart only in so far as the low prices of its goods served to destroy the 
spinning and weaving industries, which were an ancient integrating element 
of this unity of industrial and agricultural production .  And even so this work 
of dissolution proceeds very gradually . And still more slowly in China, where 
it is not reinforced by direct political power. The substantial economy and 
saving in time afforded by the association of agriculture with manufacture 
put up a stubborn resistance to the products of the big industries ,  whose 
prices include the faux frais of the circulation process which pervades them . 
Unl ike the English, Russian commerce, on the other hand, leaves the economic 
groundwork of Asiatic production untouched (C 3 ,  pp. 3 3 3-3 34;  MEW, 2 5 ,  p. 346 .  
See also C l ,  p .  3 3 3 ;  MEW, 2 3 ,  p. 3 72 ) .  
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2. It  would, of course , be incorrect to assume that the increase in  personal 
property emerged from one day to the next. Marx notes that "the objects of 
ownership increase , of course, in every 'successive ethnical period' . . . .  The 
growth of property is thus closely connected with the increase of inventions 
and discoveries, and the improvements of social institutions which mark the 
several ethnical periods of human progress' '  (EN, p. 1 27 ;  translation mine where 
necessary) . Nevertheless, a significant unequal accumulation of perso nal property 
occurred primarily at the stage of "barbarism ," to use Morgan 's terminology,  which 
was adopted by Marx and Engels. Concerning the decay of the Greek gens , Engels 
shows how changes in inheritance patterns led to unequal accumulation on the p art 
of individuals. The fact that specific individuals of a household rather than the com­
munity of gentiles inherited  the possessions of individuals after the death of in­
dividuals (see EN, p .  1 28) was crucial for the future of communism b ased on gens. 
Engels writes: 
Thus in the Greek constitution of the heroic age we see the old gentile order 
as still a living force . But we also see the beginnings of its disintegration :  
father-right, with transmission of the property to  the children ,  by  which ac­
cumulation of wealth within the family was favored and the family itself be­
came a power as against the gens ;  reaction of the inequality of wealth on the 
constitution by the formation of the first rudiments of hereditary nobility 
and monarchy ; slavery, at first only of prisoners of war , but already p reparing 
the way for the enslavement of fellow-members of the tribe and even of the 
gens; the old wars between tribe and tribe already degenerating into systematic 
pillage by land and sea for the acqu isition of cattle , slaves and treasure, and be­
coming a regular source of wealth ; in short, riches praised and respected as 
the highest good and the old gentile order misused to justify the violent seizure 
of riches ( O F, pp. 96-9 7 ;  MEW, 2 1 ,  p. 1 05) . 
Similarly ,  Engels comments at the end of his chapter on the I roquois :  
[T )he power of this primitive community had to be broken ,  and i t  was broken. 
But it was broken by influences which from the very start appear as a degrada­
tion , a fall from the simple moral greatness of the old gentile society . The 
lowest interests-base greed,  brutal appetites, sordid avarice, selfish robbery 
of the common wealth-inaugurate the new, civilised, class society . It is by 
the vilest means, theft, violence , fraud,  treason -that the old classless gentile 
society is undermined and overthrown (OF,  p. 88; MEW, 2 1 ,  p .  9 7 ) .  
Krader suggests that "in Marx's conception the office o f  the chief had been op­
posed to t he col lectivity within it not only in the period of the dissolution of the 
gens and tribe , but before, since , contrary to Morgan,  the chief was elected only 
in theory" (EN, pp. 3 7 ,  42) .  Krader cites Marx 's excerpts on Maine as evidence: 
[T i o  Maine, . . .  the quite natural function of the chief of the gens, furthermore 
of tribe, natural just because he is their chief (and theoretically  always "elected") , 
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appears as "artificial " and "mere administrative authority , "  whereby , from 
the archaic point of view ,  it is exactly the arbitrariness of the modern pater 
familias, as the private family ,  which is "artificial " (EN,  p. 309 ;  translation 
mine where necessary) .  
Marx 's remark "theoretically always 'elected' " does not warrant the conclusion 
that the chief was "elected only (my emphasis) in theory " and that Marx perceived 
the office of the chief to be in opposition to the collectivity . To be certain about 
this, one would need additional information ,  but such evidence was not found in 
Engels or Marx , nor does Krader cite additional evidence. Moreover, in the quoted 
excerpt on Maine ,  Marx does n.ot seem to directly evaluate whether the office of 
the chief was in opposition to the collectivity. He merely states that theoretically 
the chief was always elected .  However, he indirectly evaluates the extent to which 
the chief's position was not arbitrary when he asserts that the position of the modern 
paterfamil ias was artificial . Marx seems to make the point , against Ma ine , that , 
since the chief is in theory always elected, his position , contrary to that of the 
paterfamilias, was not arbitrary and artificial . I f  anything can be concluded ,  it  
would be the opposite of what Krader concluded,  namely ,  that the office of the 
chief was not necessarily in opposition to the collectivity . 
Krader may also put a somewhat misplaced emphasis on Marx 's thinking on 
right and obligation : 
Hegel had conceived the political relation as the balance of right and obl iga­
tion ; in this matter ,  Marx had followed him . . . .  In the community the balance 
of right and obligation is a traditional development, whereas in the pol ity 
the balance must be redeveloped by appeal to force , to reason , to sentiment 
on disposition , and the l ike ; in the latter case the balance becomes artificial , 
as a device of civil ization ( EN, p .  67) . 
However,  Engels writes that for the community , that is, the gentile communistic 
organization before it reached the threshold  of civil ization ,  the distinction between 
rights and duties cannot be made . 
This simple organization suffices completely for the social conditions out of 
which it sprang. It is nothing more than the grouping natural to those condi­
tions ,  and it is capable of settl ing all confl icts that can arise within a society 
so organized. War settles external confl icts; it may end with the annihilation 
of the tribe , but never with its subjugation .  It is the greatness, but also the 
l imitation ,  of the gentile constitution that it has no place for ruler and ruled .  
Within the  tribe there i s  as  yet  no difference between rights and duties; the 
question whether participation in public affairs, in blood revenge or atone­
ment,  is a right or a duty , does not exist for the Indian ; it would seem to him 
just as absurd as the question whether it was a right or a duty to sleep , eat ,  
o r  hunt (OF, p .  1 44; MEW, 2 1 ,  pp .  1 3 2-1 3 3 ) .  
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The question ,  then , is not one of a balance of right and obligation as Krader, without 
citing Marx , suggests. Rather, it is one of the existence or nonexistence of the no­
tions of right and obligation .  If, in the absence of other evidence, we can take 
Engels' view as a proper reflection of what Marx th inks on this top ic ,  i t  must be 
concluded that Marx did not think of life in the gentile communistic organization 
as one in which rights and obligations are balanced ,  be it through traditional de­
velopment or not. One woul d  have to perceive of life in such a society as subject 
to no other means of social control than public opinion ,  and also outside the realm 
of any definition of what is right and what is obligation . Hence , the question of 
balance between right and obligation woul d  not even enter into the p icture . It is  
Engels'  view that public opinion was the only means of coercion . For him , "the 
gentile organization had grown out of a society which knew no internal contra­
dictions, and it was only adapted to such a society. It possessed no means of 
coercion except public opinion " (OF, p. 1 54; MEW, 2 1 ,  p. 1 64) . 

6 
THE DIVISION OF LABOR 
AND I TS CENTRALITY FOR MARX'S 
THEORY OF ESTRANGEMENT 
According to Marx , the division of labor under the communism of primitive 
society was based on age ,  sex , and physical strength (MEW, 2 3 ,  p .  3 72 ) .  
This division was , therefore , not yet a true division of labor. "Division of 
labour only becomes truly such from the moment when a division of 
material and mental labour appears" (CW, 5 ,  pp. 44-4 5 ; MEW, 3 ,  p. 3 1 ) .  
At this point , however ,  private property has also arisen . "Division o f  labour 
and private property are , after all , identical expressions :  in the one the 
same thing is affirmed with reference to activity as is affirmed in the other 
with reference to the product of the activity " ( CW,  5, p .  46 ; M EW, 3 ,  
p .  3 2) .  
Marx's treatment of the  emergence of the  division of  labor is similar 
to that of the emergence of private property . Although there was personal 
property at earlier stages of development , it was not private property as 
Marx tends to use the term ; and although there had been a division of 
labor ,  it became truly one only with the emergence of private property­
with the emergence of a division between mental and material labor.  In  
Capital, Marx also postulates that true division of labor goes beyond a 
physiologically based one and is accompanied by exchange . It is based 
on exchange and on the trend that products have become commodities 
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(MEW, 2 3 ,  pp. 3 72-3 7 3 ) .  Thus private property , commodity exchange , 
and a society-wi de division of labor that is not  based on physiology oc­
cur simultaneously , at least for analytical purposes, in the Ethnological 
Notebooks; however Marx very well realizes that there may be some 
"grey areas ."  
The division of labor occurs on two different levels :  on the  level of  
a society as  a whole , and on the level of a firm , for example ,  among in­
dividual workers . In  precapitalist society ,  the division of labor on the 
level of the whole society emerged from the "material conditions of 
production" and was legally formalized much later. Marx believes that 
this was the case under patriarchal regimes as well as under the feudal 
and caste systems. Under these forms of social organization ,  the division 
of labor of the whole society was based on distinct rules of authority , 
while in capitalist society there is no such distinct rule (MEW, 4 ,  p .  1 5 1 ) :  
" [M]odern society knows n o  other rule, no other authority for the dis­
tribution of labor than free competition "  (MEW, 4, p .  1 5 1 ;  translation 
mine) . 1 Marx postulates that since, on the level of society , the only other 
authori ty that determines the division of labor is free competition , the 
more the division of labor is determined by the entrepreneur 's authority 
on the level of the firm. As long as the societal division of labor was based 
on legally formalized rules ,  the division of labor in the various production 
sho ps was little developed (MEW, 4 ,  p. 1 5 1 ) .  The following rule can be 
established :  
The less the division o f  labor within a society i s  determined b y  an 
authority , the more is the division of labor developed within a work­
shop and the more it is subject to the authority of a single individual . 
Accordingly ,  with respect to the division of labor, the authority in 
the workshop and the one in the society are in an inverse relationship 
to each other (MEW, 4 ,  p .  1 5 1 ;  translation mine ? see also MEW, 2 3 ,  
p .  3 7 8  and C l ,  p .  3 3 7 where Marx reiterates this idea) . 
At this point Marx compares the division of labor under capitalist and 
precapitalist societies .  
If ,  in a society with capitalist production , anarchy in the social division 
of labour and despotism in that of the workshop are mutual conditions 
the one of the other, we find ,  on the contrary , in those earlier forms of 
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society in which the separation of trades has been spontaneously de­
veloped, then crystall ized, and finally made permanent by law, on the 
one hand ,  a specimen of the organisation of the labour of society , in 
accordance with an approved and authoritative plan , and on the other, 
the entire exclusion of division of labour in the workshop ,  or at all 
events a mere dwarflike or sporadic and accidental development of 
the same (C l ,  p. 3 3 7 ;  MEW, 2 3 ,  pp .  3 77-3 78) . 
The division of labor on the shop level is enhanced by the fact that the 
workers in a particular workshop become more numerous (MEW, 4 ,  p. 1 5 2 ) ,  
and b y  the increased concentration of the means of production a n d  the 
introduction of machinery that tended to accompany this concentration 
(MEW, 4,  p .  1 5 3 ;  see also MEW, EB l .T . ,  p. 4 7 3 ) .  Marx suggests that , on 
the whole , machinery increased the division of labor in society , simplified 
work in the shop ,  concentrated capital , and fractionalized man (CW, 6 ,  
p .  1 8 8 ; MEW, 4,  p .  1 5 5 ) .  Since the  division of labor increases with the 
concentration of the tools of production ,  he proposes that e ach sign ificant 
invention in mechanical technique results in an increased division of labor. 
In itself, this division calls for new mechanical inventions (M EW, 4 ,  p. 1 54) ,  
producing a trend toward ever simpler, unskilled labor (MEW, 1 3 ,  p .  1 8 ) .  
Although the worker a s  a worker loses i n  general productive ability because 
his level of skill fa lls , the productive power of capital increases.  "The divi­
sion of labour develops the social productive power of so cial labour, but 
at the expense of the general productive ability of the worker " (TS 2 ,  p. 2 3 4 ;  
MEW, 2 6 . 2 ,  p .  2 3 2 ) .  In this respect, Marx follows Adam Smith who held 
that "the farmer practices a trade requiring more intelligence than the manu­
facturing worker ,  who is subject to the division of labour" (TS2 ,  p. 2 34 ) .  
The increased social productive power-brought about by  an  increase in 
the division of labor-however, "confronts the worker . . .  as an increased 
productive power, not of his labour, but of capital, the force that dominates 
his labour" (TS 2 ,  p .  2 34) . 
The capitalist mode of production is not the only case in which an in­
crease in the division of labor can be said to have consequences that are 
beyond the control of individuals and that can affect their l ives in ways 
not necessarily expected originally . An economy with trade relations exceed­
ing those of a barter economy ,  but not reaching the magnitude of capital-
ist exchange relations,  may be taken as an example . 
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[ T ] hc circulation of commodities differs from the direct exchange of 
products (barter) , not only in form, but in substance . . .  B 's com­
modity replaces that of A, but A and B do not mutually exchange 
those commodities. It may , of course , happen that A and B make 
simultaneous purchases ,  the one from the other; but such exceptional 
transactions are by no means the necessary result of the general 
conditions of the circulation of commodities . We see here , on the one 
hand, how the exchange of commo dities breaks through all local and 
personal bounds inseparable from direct barter ,  and develops the 
circulation of the products of social labour ;  and on the other h and ,  
now it develo ps a whole network of social relations spontaneous in 
their growth and entirely beyond the control of the actors (C l ,  
pp .  1 1 3- 1 1 4 ;  MEW, 2 3 ,  p .  1 2 6 ;  see also MEW, 2 3 ,  p .  1 2 1 ) .  
Although the barter-type of exchange differs i n  form and substance from 
an economy involving a currency ,  still Marx believes that an established 
barter economy tends to enhance commodity production .  The enhancement 
of commodity production ,  however, is likely to lead to forms of exchange 
involving a currency an d enhancing the further division of labor on the basis 
that a greater number of transactions can take place in or between given 
societies .  Therefore , 
circulation bursts through all restrictions as to time , place , and individuals , 
imposed by direct barter, and this it effects by splitting up ,  into the anti­
thesis of a sale and a purchase , the direct i dentity that in barter does 
exist between the alienation of one 's own and the acquisition of some 
other man 's product ( C l ,  p. 1 1 5 ;  MEW, 2 3 ,  p. 1 2 7 ) .  
Since circulation bursts through all restrictions a s  t o  time , place , and indi­
viduals, Marx concludes that the division of labor in manufacture , for 
example , excluding modern industry based on machinery , 
acquires the best adapted  form at first by experience , as it were behind 
the backs of the actors , and then , like the guild handicrafts , strives to 
hold fast that form when once found ,  and here and there succeeds in 
keeping it for centuries .  Any alteration in this  form , except in trivial 
matters , i s  solely owing to a revolution in the instruments of labour 
(C l ,  p. 343 ; MEW, 2 3 ,  p .  3 8 5 ) .  
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Under capital , the division of labor is determined by free competi tion , which 
itself is the result of a further increase in the number of exchange relation­
ships.  With free competition as the sole "authority . . .  determining the 
division of  labor"-and thus replacing any former authority determining 
the division of labor-it becomes easy to see why Marx names this state of 
affairs "anarchy in the social division of labor ."  
Marx describes how the  development of commodity production proceeds 
until it beco mes the general form of production :  
[T ]he same conditions which give rise t o  the basic condition o f  capitalist 
production ,  the existence of a class of wage-workers , facilitate the 
transition of all co mmo dity production to capitalist commodity pro­
duction. As cap italist production develops,  it has a disintegrating, resol­
vent effect on all older forms of production, which, designed mostly 
to meet the direct needs of the producer, transform only the excess 
produced into commodities. Captailist production makes the sale of 
products the main interest , at first apparently without  affecting the 
mode of  pro duction itself. Such was for instance the first effect  of 
capitalist world commerce on such nations as the Chinese , Indians, 
Arabs, etc. But, secondly ,  wherever it takes root capitalist production 
destroys all forms of commodity production which are based either on 
the self-e mployment of the producers, or merely on the sale of the 
excess product as commodities . Capitalist production first makes the 
production of commodities general and then , by degrees,  transforms 
all commo dity _production into capitalist commodity pro duction 
(CZ, p .  3 6 ;  MEW, Z4,  pp. 4 1 -4Z ) . 
Once commodity production becomes capitalist commodity productio n ,  
the division of labor i s  totally uprooted  from the traditionally set pat­
terns and develo ps in a thoroughly unchecked manner :  
When production by means of wage-labour becomes universal , com­
modity pro duction is bound to be the general form of pro duction .  
This mode of production ,  once i t  i s  assumed to be  general ,  carries in  
its wake an ever increasing division of  social labour,  that i s  to  say an 
ever growing differentiation of the articles which are produced in the 
form of commo dities by a definite capitalist , ever greater division of 
complementary process of production into independent p rocesses 
(CZ ,  pp .  3 5 - 3 6 ;  MEW, Z4, p. 4 1 ) .  
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INVOLUNTARY DIVISION OF LABOR 
Although the division of labor in precapitalist societies that exchanged 
commo dities rested upon a formal authority , and was therefore not subject 
to the anarchic conditions created by free competition ,  it cannot be said 
that it was not based on coercion . This division of labor as well as that 
under capital is an involuntary division .  
The division o f  labor and private property are two sides of the same 
coin for Marx . One does not exist without the other. The division of 
labor between the city and the countryside , for example , can rest only on 
private property . 
[T ]he  contradiction between town and country can only exist within 
the framework of private property . I t  is the most crass expression of 
the subjection of the individual under the division of labour, under a 
definite activity forced upon him-a subjugation which makes one 
man into a restricted town-animal , another into a restricted country ­
animal , an d daily creates anew the conflict between their interests . 
Labour is here again the chief thing, power over individuals, and as 
long as this power exists ,  private property must exist (CW , 5 ,  p .  64 ;  
MEW, 3 ,  p .  5 0) . 3 
Clearly ,  private property is accompanied by an involuntary division of 
labor which, along with private property , is to be abolished . Marx main­
tains that the involuntary division of labor created the possibil ity of 
contradictions within a society 
because the division of labour implies the possibility , nay the fact,  that 
intellectual and material activity , that enjoyment and labour, produc­
tion and consumption , devolve on different individuals ,  and that the 
only possibility of their not coming into contradiction lies in negat­
ing in its turn the division of labour (CW, 5 ,  p. 45 ; MEW, 3 ,  p. 3 2 ) .  
Man i s  subsumed n o t  only under a division o f  labor which is  imposed 
on him, but also under a class. Being subsumed predestines his  life-con­
dition .  These two conditions can be eliminated only by the abolition of 
private property and the involuntary division of labor (MEW , 3 ,  p .  54) .  
Marx argues that the communist revolution will differ from previous 
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revolutions insofar as it will not merely create a new distribution of 
labor leaving the kind of activity untouched . I nstead,  it will be directed 
against the hitherto existing kind of productive activity and the involun­
tary division of labor4 (MEW, 3, pp .  6 9-70) . 
I t would seem that individuals under capital are freer than they were 
earlier because their l ife circumstances are more subject to chance . Exactly 
the opposite is the case , however , since they are more subject to impersonal 
forces (MEW, 3 ,  p .  7 6) .  This point of view is in agreement with the pos­
tulate that, under capital , the division of labor is based only on the authority 
of free competition and not,  as earlier, on a formal-legal authority . Accord­
ingly , labor ,  too , competes under capital and is considered to be free .  The 
individual is nevertheless subsumed under the division of labor and is 
coerced by the authority of free competition which also determines the 
division of labor. For the individual this division is involuntary . 
[T ]he a priori system on which the division of labour, within the work­
shop, is regularly carried out, becomes in the division of l abour within 
the society , an a posteriori, nature-imposed necessity , con trolling the 
lawless caprice of the producers , and perceptible in the barometrical 
fluctuations of the market-prices . Division of labour within the work­
shop implies the undisputed authority of  the capitalist over men ,  that 
are but parts of a mechanism that belongs to him. The division of 
labour within the society brings into contact independent commodity­
producers, who acknowledge no other authority but that of competi­
tion , of the coercion exerted by the pressure of their mutual interests 
(C l ,  p. 3 3 6 ;  MEW, 2 3 ,  p .  3 7 7 ;  see also MEW, G, p. 484) . 
A logical conse quence of this is that "Labour is free in all civilised countries ;  
it is not a matter of freeing labour but of abolishing it " (CW ,  S ,  p . 20 5 ;  
MEW, 3 ,  p .  1 86) . 
In the origin of private property and commodity exchange , Marx also 
saw the origin of an involuntary division of labor. The involuntary division 
of labor spans all human history past the point at which the division of 
labor was based merely on sex ,  age , and physical strength .  His writings in 
the Grundrisse (MEW, G, pp. 3 69-3 74,  484) , as elsewhere (for example , 
MEW, 2 3 ,  pp .  9 3-94) , illustrate this with regard to precapitalist societies .  
This emphasis on the involuntary nature of the division of labor is 
directly juxtaposed to the need to have a voluntary division of labor. 
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And finally , the division of labour offers us the first example of the 
fact that , as long as man remains in naturally evolved society , that is ,  
as long as a cleavage exists between the particular and the common 
interest , as long, therefore as activity is not voluntarily , but naturally , 
divided, man 's own deed becomes an alien power opposed to him, 
which enslaves him instead of being controlled by him. For as soon 
as the division of labour comes into being, each man has a particular , 
exclusive sphere of activity , which is forced upon him and from which 
he cannot escape (CW, 5 ,  p. 47 ; MEW, 3 ,  p. 3 3 ) . 5 
This emphasis on the involuntary nature of the division of labor is one 
of our main criteria for interpreting Marx 's theory of estrangement .  The 
next section shows the absolute centrality of Marx 's emphasis on the in­
voluntary nature of the division of labor in his theory of estrangement .  
INVOLUNTARY DIVISION O F  LABOR AND 
ITS CENTRALITY TO THE THEORY OF ESTRANGEMENT 
As discussed in Chapter 2, Marx has two conceptions of human 
nature . First , those characteristics that distingu ish man from animals 
biologically can be said to constitute the unchanging aspects of human 
nature . Man is a conscious being and can relate to others in ways that 
animals cannot.  Second ,  there is for Marx that type of human nature that 
is historically conditioned. Although man has always been distinct from 
the animals on immutable biological grounds,  his specific human nature , 
as contrasted with his general human nature , has undergone changes in 
history . Marx's theory of estrangement derives only from his biological 
definition of human nature , however.  Man , according to Marx , is estranged 
because he is prevented from living according to his nature . Specifically , 
the worker is estranged  from the product of his labor and the act of pro­
duction because he is prevented from subjecting either of the two to his 
will ; nonetheless, he does have a natural ability to do so ; this ability 
distinguishes him biologically from animals and makes him specifically 
human . Being prevented from subjecting both the product of one 's labor 
and the act of  production to one's own will results directly in man 's 
estrangement from himself, from nature , from his species-be ing , and from 
other men . 
The worker 's inability to subject both the act of production and the 
product of his labor to his own will indicates the presence of a coercive 
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con dition . I n deed,  capital controls labor ,  and the worker is forced to sell 
his labor power if he wants to maintain his physical existence.  Under 
capital , "labour is therefore not voluntary , but coerced ;  it is forced 
labour" (CW, 3, p. 274) .  The coercion is not simply a matter of one 
individual coercing another.  The capitalist is only the personal agent of 
capital and is himself constrained by factors that lie outside his influence . 
Co mpetition is one case in point . That work is coerced and not voluntary 
depends on factors that are beyond the control of any particular in­
dividual ; these factors have become independent ,  alien forces .  Work is 
coerced because the societal division of labor as such is involuntary . 
I n  the previous sections ,  we have shown that Marx believes that the 
division of labor in society has been involuntary ever since the destruc­
tion of primitive communism. Under capital , competition became the 
regulator ,  but the involuntary nature of the division of labor was not 
abolished.  Competition in the marketplace determines the nature of 
the division of labor in a society or among nations as well as in a par­
ticular industry . Although the capitalist determines what to produce 
and subjects the labor power and the product of labor to his will , he 
does so for reasons outside his control . Nevertheless , it is an al ien will 
to which the worker is subjected and to which he must , contrary to his 
natural ability , subject his labor power. As a result, he, in agreement with 
others, cannot determine what is to be produced ,  how products are to 
be produced,  and for what purposes .  Man , unlike the animals ,  is by 
nature capable of doing so . Therefore , production under cap ital can 
exist only at the expense of the workers' estrangement. 6 
The involuntary nature of the division of labor is central to Marx 's 
theory of estrangement.  The common denominator of all forms of 
estrangement can be found in the involuntary nature of the d ivision of 
labor .  Because of it the worker is coerced into subjecting his labor 
power to an alien wil l .  The capitalist himself must be viewed as merely 
an agent of capital , an actor who , although enj oying his social position , 
is himself constrained by the laws of the market .  The division of labor ,  
however,  although the  result of the actions of individuals (exchange) is 
generated involuntarily , thus leading to the subjection of man to an 
alien wil l .  
NOTES 
1. Kennt is translated h e re as " knows" rather than as "has . "  ( See CW , 6 ,  p .  1 84 . )  
2 .  For the translation given in the Collected Works , see  CW, 6,  p.  1 8 5 .  
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3 .  See also MEW, 3, p. 3 2 for a similar statement, namely ,  that the division of 
l abor is involuntary . In addition,  see MEW, 3, p. 66.  
4. Here Marx, as in MEW, 3 ,  pp .  54, 77,  mentions that Arbeit (l abor) must be 
abolished. This does not mean that Marx envisions a leisure society without labor. 
On close inspection , it becomes evident that the word Arbeit can be substituted 
by "involuntary division of labor" or "involuntary labor."  If man is subsumed under 
a division of labor, it cannot be said that h is p ro du ctive activity is  volun tary, t h at 
is, that his labor is voluntary . 
5. I n  the Manuscripts, M arx says that if man relates to h i s  "own act ivity as 
an unfree activity , then he relates to it as an activity performed in the service, under 
the dominion, the coercion ,  and the yoke of another man " (CW, 3, p p .  278-279 ;  
MEW, E B  1 .T., p. 5 1 9 ; translation mine ; [ the German verbalten i s  no t  optimal ly 
transl ated by "to treat," since "to treat" refers to the subject's perception , while 
"to relate" does not exclusively so . ]  
6 .  The  question a s  to  whether Marx's theory of estrangement i s  also applicable 
to pre capitalist societies, in which the division of labor was also involuntary , is 
discussed in Chapter 8.  
7 
TRUE COMMUNISM AND I TS 
BASIS ON A VoLUNTARY 
DIVISION OF LABOR 
Thus far,  it has been argued that Marx's  theory of estrangement rests 
on his observation that productive activity is based on an involuntary 
division of labor. This emphasis is examined further on the basis of  
Marx 's views on communism, since he  suggested that communism was 
a desirable goal , through which man would be free from estrangement 
(MEW, E .  1 .T . ,  pp.  5 3 6- 5 3 7 ) .  However,  if communism is the desired 
form of social organization in which man is not estranged , we would 
expect-if our emphasis on the centrality of the involuntary division 
of labor to Marx's  theory of estrangement is correct-that Marx views 
communism as a form of social organization based on a voluntary division 
of labor. When discussing the ways in which Marx envisioned communism, 
we will consider only those writings that .deal directly with the division 
of labor under communism, and that might imply a form of social or­
ganization based on an involuntary division of labor .  If Marx 's writings 
reveal substantial evidence that he envisioned communism as a form of 
social organization based on a voluntary division of labor ,  our emphasis 
on the centrality of the involuntary division of labor to Marx 's theory 
of estrangement will be considerably strengthened . 
Whenever we refer to communism here , we do not mean that transi­
tional form of society which Marx in his Man uscripts called " crude com-
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munism. " Rather, we mean "true communism , "  or that form of social 
organization which Marx perceived to be the most ideal . At this point ,  
it is immaterial whether Marx 's communism is realizable or whether it  
remains a utopia .  This is a totally different question . Marx 's vision 
of communism is of importance here because it helps isolate the basis 
and properties of his theory of estrangement . The reader is therefore 
advised to suspend his questions concerning the realizability of Marx 's 
vision of communism and to take what Marx has to say on the subject 
of communism as an aid in deciphering Marx 's thought in general and his 
theory of estrangement in particular. 
TRUE COMMUNISM 
In  the German Ideology, Marx proclaims that the communist revolu­
tion "removes the division of labor" (CW, 5 ,  p. 380 ;  MEW, 3 ,  p. 3 64) . 
What he means,  of course , is that the involuntary division of labor, and 
not the division of labor as such ,  will be abolished. Ne ither does Marx 
envision communism as a society of isolated individual producers who 
are not subject to the coercion of the division of labor.  Rather, his 
vision is of man cooperating freely , and voluntarily . 
Let us now picture to ourselves ,  by way of change , a community of 
free individuals ,  carrying on their work with the means of production 
in common,  in which the labour-power of all the different individuals 
is consciously applied as the combined labour-power of the community . 
All the characteristics of Robinson's  labour are here repeated ,  but with 
this difference , that they are social , instead of individual (C l ,  pp .  82 -
8 3 ;  MEW,  2 3 ,  p .  92 ) .  
This theme is reiterated in the  Critique of the  Gotha Program me in which 
Marx again focuses not on the division of labor as such , but on that divi­
sion of labor which subjugates man . 
[ I ] n  a higher phase of communist society , after the enslaving subordina­
tion of individuals under the division of labour, and therewith also 
the antithesis between mental and physical labour,  has vanished ; 
after labour, from a mere means of life , has itself become the prime 
necessity of life ; after the productive forces have also increased with 
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the  all-round development of the  individual , and all the  sp rings of co­
operative wealth flow more abundantly-only then can the narrow 
horizon of bourgeois right be fully left behind and society inscribe 
on its banners : from each according to his ability , to each according 
to his needs ! (CGP,  p. 1 0 ;  MEW, 1 9 ,  p. 2 1 ) .  
Marx does not always make an explicit connection to communism when 
mentioning the voluntary division of labor and juxtaposing, as well as 
preferring, it to the involuntary one . Nevertheless , the message seems to 
be the same , namely , that the ideal condition is one in which the d ivision 
of labor is based on voluntary cooperation rather than a forced one (see 
also MEW, 3, p. 7 2 ) .  For example , in the German Ideology (MEW, 3 ,  p. 74) 
Marx mentions that the alien forces under which the individual is sub­
sumed can be abolished only if individuals directly subsume the division 
of labor. He adds that this can be done only through the collectivity , wh ich 
will in turn allow the development of one's  talents. Only through the col­
lectivity or community of individuals can personal liberty be gained . 
In the German Ideology, we encounter the famous passage on the society 
with an involuntary division of labor in which man is 
a hunter, a fisherman , a shepherd , or a critical critic ,  and must remain 
so if he does not want to lose his means of livelihood ; whereas in com­
munist society , where nobody has one exclusive sphere of  activity but 
each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes ,  society regu lates 
the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one 
thing today and another tomorrow,  to hunt in the morning, fish in 
the afternoon , rear cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner, just as 
I have in mind ,  without ever becoming hunter, fisherman , shepherd 
or critic (MEW, 3, p. 3 3 ;  translation mine . ) 1 
Marx 's point of view is even carried over and applied to the arts . Here , too , 
Marx critic izes the coercive nature of the involuntary division of labor and 
its un desirable consequences, consequences that do not arise if the division 
of labor is voluntary . 
[ T]he exclusive concentration of artistic talent in particular individuals, 
and its suppression in the broad mass which is bound up with this , is 
a consequence of division of labour . . . .  In  any case , with a communist 
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organisation of society , there disappears the subordination of the artist 
to local and national narrowness, which arises entirely from the division 
of labour, and also the subordination of the individual to some defin ite 
art , making him exclusively a painter, sculptor, etc . ;  the very name amply 
expresses the narrowness of his professional development and his depen­
dence on division of labour. In a communist society there are no painters 
but only people who engage in painting among other activities" (CW, 5 ,  
p. 3 94 ;  MEW, 3 ,  pp .  3 78-3 7 9) . 
It can be said ,  then , that Marx does not only believe that under communism 
the division of labor will be a voluntary one and that there will be a full and 
free development of each individual (MEW, 2 3 ,  p. 6 1 8 ) .  In a logically con­
sistent manner, he concludes that " [ c ]  ommunism deprives no man of the 
power to appropriate the pro ducts of society ; all that it does is to deprive 
him of the power to subjugate the labour of others by means of such ap­
propriation" (CW, 6 ,  p .  5 00 ;  MEW, 4 ,  p. 477 ) .  Hence , what distingu ishes 
communism is "not the abolition of property generally , but the abolition 
of bourgeois property " (CW, 6, p .  498 ; MEW, 4, p. 47 5 ) .  Again ,  Marx 
objects not to the private appropriation of products but to that kind of 
private appropriation of products which leads to the creation of an involun­
tary division of labor, that is , to the subjugation of the labor of others. 
Later in his life , he took the same theoretical position when analyzing the 
reasons why the communism of early primitive societies broke down . 
When the labor of others is no longer subjugated ,  the exploitation of 
man will also be terminated .  The question that arises then is  how pro­
duction will occur. In  The Poverty of Philosophy, Marx suggests that 
pro duction will be organized on the basis of consensus ,  thus making 
coercion superfluous . 
What is today the result of capital and the competition of workers 
among themselves will be tomorrow, if you sever the relation between 
labour and capital , an actual agreement based upon the relation be­
tween the sum of productive forces and the sum of existing needs" 
(CW, 6 ,  p.  1 4 3 ;  MEW, 4 ,  p .  1 04) . 
Not only is such free cooperation based on consensus devoid of coercion , 
"the social relations of the individual producers , with regard both to the ir 
labour and to its products, are in this case perfectly simple and intelligible , 
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and that with regard not only to production but also to distribution " 
(C l ,  p. 8 3 ;  MEW, 2 3 ,  p .  9 3 ) .  This could not be said for the bourgeois 
form of social organization which is based on an involuntary division of 
labor. In  bourgeois society , as in earlier epochs,  the division of labor de­
veloped behind the back , as it were , of individuals , thus preventing the 
social relations of the individual producers from becoming "perfectly 
simple an d intelligible . "  
The exchange of products a s  i t  occurred under capitalist a n d  precapital­
ist social formations will also cease to exist under communism:  
Within the  co-o perative society based on common ownership of the 
means of production ,  the producers do not exchange their products; 
just as little does the labour employed on the products appear here 
as the value of these products , as a material quality possessed by 
them,  since now, in contrast to capitalist society , individual labour 
no longer exists in an indirect fashion but directly as a component 
part of the total labour" (CGP, p. 8; MEW, 1 9 , p. 1 9) . 
Earlier, in The Poverty of Philosophy, Marx made the same point when 
referring to communism: " [ I ] n  principle, there is no exchange of prod­
ucts-but there is the exchange of the labour which co-operates in pro­
duction" (CW , 6, p. 1 4 3 ;  MEW, 4, p. 1 04) . The emphasis is on coopera­
tion , and the fact that individuals are freely engaged in cooperation .  In 
contrast, under production based on an involuntary division of labor ,  
they are brought together by force.  Again with communism as a point 
of reference , Marx states : 
[ I ] f  it is assumed that all members of society are immediate workers, 
the exchange of equal quantities of hours of labour is possible only 
on conclusion that the number of hours to be spent on material pro­
duction is agreed on beforehand .  But such an agreement negates in­
dividual exchange (MEW, 4 ,  p .  1 04) .2 
Under communism, then , individuals distribute their products but do 
not exchange them. Distribution occurs on the basis of need , however . 
According to Marx , under communism products do not become com­
modities through the act of exchange , nor is there any commodity pro ­
duction in the sense that products are specifically produced for exchange .  
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Without commodity production , the separation of a product 's use value 
from its exchange value will also cease . And since exchange value-which 
is determined by the relative amount of labor time embodied in a given 
product-will be nonexistent as a category , production decisions will no 
longer be made on the basis of whether the relative amount of embodied 
labor is  low enough as to realize a surplus value upon being exchanged .  
The production of use  values will no longer depend on a product's ex­
change value since products will not  be produced for exchange , but  will 
be produced directly for use instead. Marx makes this point in The Poverty 
of Philosophy :  
" [ I ] n  a future society, in which class antagonism will have ceased, in 
which there will no longer be any classes , use will no longer be deter- · 
mined by the minimum time of production ; but the time of produc­
tion devoted to an article will be determined by the degree of its social 
utility" (CW, 6 ,  p .  1 3 4 ;  MEW, 4 ,  p. 9 3 ) .  
And i n  the Grundrisse h e  writes that 
as soon as labour in the direct form has ceased to be the great well­
spring of wealth ,  labour time ceases and must cease to be its measure , 
and hence exchange value [must cease to be the measure ] of use value 
. . . .  With that ,  production based on exchange value breaks down 
(G ,  p .  705 ; MEW, G, p .  5 9 3 ) .  
Thus far, i t  has been shown that , for Marx, communism i s  a society 
based on a voluntary division of labor. This voluntary division of labor 
can be guaranteed  only if property that could be used to subjugate o thers 
is held in common.  In addition ,  the division of labor under communism 
can be voluntary only if products are not exchanged ,  although distributed 
differentially on the basis of need ,  and production is regulated on the basis 
of consensus with everyone freely cooperating. Since Marx 's theory of 
estrangement comes directly from h is observation that man under capital 
is coerced into a l ife-situation in which he is prevented from living accord­
ing to his nature , it can be concluded that communism eliminates estrange­
ment. Communism is the solution to estrangement because it is based on a 
voluntary division of labor and thus lacks the coercion responsible for 
man 's estrangement. 
TRUE COMMUNISM 1 05 
There is yet another way in which Marx considers the voluntary division 
of labor to be crucial . I f  throughout the history of social life under an in­
voluntary division of labor ,  man has been coerced in various ways ,  history , 
too ,  has not been made consciously. The conscious making of h istory is for 
Marx a logical outcome of a society based on a voluntary division of 
labor. 
[ I ] n  history up to the present, it is certainly l ikewise an empirical 
fact that separate individuals have , with the broadening of their 
activity into world-historical activity , become more and more en­
slaved under a power alien to them (a  pressure which they have con­
ceived of as a dirty trick on the part of the so-called world spirit, 
etc . ) ,  a power which has become more and more enormous and , 
in the last instance ,  turns out to be the world market . . . . All­
round dependence , this primary natural form of the world-historical 
co-o peration of individuals ,  will be transformed by this communist 
revolution into the control and conscious mastery of these powers, 
which,  born of the action of men on one another , have till now over­
awed and ruled men as powers completely alien to them (CW, 5 ,  
pp .  5 1 -5 2 ;  MEW, 3 ,  p .  3 7 ) .  
Similarly , Marx mentions that the communistic social organization 
will end the subjection of production to the forces of supply and de­
mand,  since man will directly control exchange and production (MEW, 
3 ,  p .  3 5 ) .  "The reality which communism creates is precisely the true 
basis for rendering it impossible that anything should exist independently 
of individuals, insofar as reality is nevertheless only a product of the pre­
ceding intercourse of individuals" (CW,  5 ,  p .  8 1 ;  MEW, 3 ,  p .  70) . Thus, 
for Marx, 
communism differs from all previous movements in that it overturns 
the basis of all earlier relations of production and intercourse , and 
for the first time consciously treats all naturally evolved premises as 
the creations of hitherto existing men ,  strips them of their natural 
character and subjugates them to the power of the united individuals 
(CW,  5 ,  p. 8 1 ;  MEW, 3, p .  70) . 
And in the German Ideology he writes that 
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with the community of revolutionary proletarians . . .  who take their 
conditions of existence and those of all members of society under 
their control . . .  it i s  as individuals that the individuals participate 
in it. For it is the association of individuals (assuming the advanced 
stage of modern productive forces ,  of course) which puts the condi­
tions of the free development and movement of individuals under 
their control-conditions which were previously left to chance and 
had acquired  an independent existence over against the separate in­
dividuals precisely because of their separation as individuals and be­
cause their inevitable association , which determined the division of 
labour, had, as a result of their separation ,  become for them an alien 
bond (CW, 5 ,  p .  80 ;  MEW, 3 ,  pp .  74-7 5 ) .  
We have been investigating the various ways i n  which Marx views 
social organization under communism. Not only has it become apparent 
that Marx directly views communism to be founded on a voluntary divi­
sion of labor, it is also the case that Marx 's overall vision of life under 
communism does not contradict the thesis that ,  for Marx, the voluntary 
division of labor is central when it comes to communism. Thus ,  Marx 's 
views of the distribution and ownership of products under communism, 
as well as his theory of history , are directly derived from the postulate 
that communism is based on a voluntary division of labor. What has 
emerged is that as the involuntary division of labor is central to Marx's 
theory of estrangement, the voluntary division of labor envisioned under 
communism is central to Marx's vision of a world without estrangement . 
Therefore , we find that our emphasis on the centrality of the involuntary 
division of labor to Marx 's theory of estrangement is justified and that 
our argument is considerably strengthened .  
COMMUNISM AS THE ELIMINATION OF THE CONFLICT 
BETWEEN THE I NDIVIDUAL AND THE GROUP 
Marx 's vision of the ideal life as one in which there is a voluntary 
division of labor implies that individuals are coerced neither by other 
individuals nor groups of individuals . This is not to say that individuals 
will not have conflicts of interest under communism . Marx e xplicitly 
states that individuals will cooperate on the basis of consensus ;  pro­
duction and distribution will occur u pon agreement .  What is p articular 
to Marx 's vision of communism is the fact that , although differences 
TRUE COMMUNISM 1 07 
of interest may occur, they are overcome by consensus free o f  coercion .  
He argues against those who , following Max Stimer, see social life in 
general as a struggle between general and personal interests (CW, 5 ,  p. 245 ; 
MEW, 3 ,  p. 2 2 8) .  Marx says that "the communists by no means want , as 
Saint Max believes ,  . . .  to do away with the 'private individual ' for the 
sake of the 'general ' ,  selfless man" (CW, 5 ,  p .  247 ; MEW, 3 ,  p .  229 ) .  
[ c ) ommunist theoreticians, the only communists who have time to 
devote to the study of history , are distinguished precisely by the 
fact that they alone have discovered that throughout history the 
"general interest" is  created by individuals who are defined  as 
"private persons " .  They know that this contradiction is only a 
see ming one because one side of it ,  what is called the "general 
interest" ,  is constantly being produced by the other side , private 
interest,  an d in relation to the latter it is  by no means an independent 
force with an independent history-so that this contradiction is  in 
practice constantly destroyed and reproduced .  Hence it is not a 
question of the Hegelian "negative unity " of two sides of a contra­
diction ,  but of the materially determined destruction of the pre­
ceding materially determined mode of l ife of individuals , with the 
disappearance of whi ch this contradiction together with its unity 
also disappears (CW, 5 ,  p .  247 ; MEW, 3 ,  p .  229) .3 
Accordingly , those who view the subject of private versus general in­
terest as not determined by history have great difficulty in understand­
ing the communists. 
{C]o mmunism is quite incomprehensible to our saint because the com­
munists do not oppose egoism to selflessness or selflessness to ego­
ism, nor do they express this contradiction theoretically e ither in 
its sentimental or in its highflown ideologi cal form; they rather 
demonstrate its material source , with which it disappears of itself 
(CW, 5 ,  p. 247 ; MEW, 3 ,  p. 229 ) .  
This material force consists of  the  continuous development of  the 
human forces of production. This development of "the capacities of 
the human species takes place at the cost of the majority of human in­
dividuals and even classes ,  in the end it breaks through this contradiction 
and coincides with the development of the individual " (TS 2, p. 1 1 8 ;  
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MEW, 26.2, p. 1 1 1 ) .4 Hence , for Marx, communism can be founded only 
after productivity has reached a certain level .  Productivity , defined as the 
time needed to produce a given pro duct,  facilitates the creation  of a society 
in which individuals freely cooperate and in which there is no longer any 
struggle between personal and general interests . Histori cally speaking, then,  
Marx's vision of a society based on a voluntary division of labor can be re­
alized only if the foundations for it have been laid in man's  increased alterna· 
tives through increased productivity . This increase in alternatives is for 
Marx a necessary condition for the existence of a society in which the 
development of "the capacities of the human species . . .  coincides with 
the development of the individual . "  
For Marx , another condition must be  present for the abol ition of  the 
conflict between personal and general interests . Marx sees communism 
accompanied by a change in the consciousness of individuals . I n  the 
German Ideology, he writes that in communism 
we are . . .  concerned with individuals at a defin ite historical stage 
of development and by no means merely with individuals chosen 
at random,  even disregarding the indispensable communist revolu ­
tion ,  which itself is a general condition for their free development .  
The individuals ' consciousness of their mutual relations will , of 
course , l ikewise be completely changed ,  and ,  therefore , will no more 
be the "principle of love" or devo ument than it will be egoism (CW, 
5, p. 4 3 9 ;  MEW, 3, p. 4 2 5 ) . 5 
Since the "principle of love" or devoument will exist as little as the no­
tion of egoism, it must be inferred that under communism individuals 
will no longer perceive such dichotomies as personal versus general in­
terest which are so characteristic of societies with private property , 
that is ,  with an involuntary division of labor. I n  contrast ,  it can now be 
reiterated what communism, for Marx , is not .  
Although communism enables individuals to associate freely , it can­
not be conceived of as providing the social environment conducive to 
the pecul iarities of an individual . Thus, individuals cannot be compared 
with a plant which ,  in order to grow,  must be provided by nature with 
water, soil , sunshine , and the like . Communism must not be envisioned 
as a society in which each individual has a claim to be nurtured according 
to the peculiarity of his person .  Marx gives the following criticism of the 
group who called themselves the true socialist : 
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The demand for a true socialist society is based on the imaginary 
demand of a coco-nut palm that the "totality of life "  should furnish 
it with "soil , warmth ,  sun ,  air and rain" at the North Pole . This claim 
of the individual on society is not deduced from the real development 
of society but from the alleged relationship of the metaphysical 
characters-individuality and universality . You have only to inter-
pret single individuals as representatives , embodiments of individuality , 
and society as the embodiment of universal ity , and the whole trick 
is done. And at the same time Saint-Simon 's statement about the 
free development of the capacities has been correctly expressed and 
placed upon its true foundation . This correct expression consists in 
the ab.surd statement that the individuals forming society want to 
preserve their "peculiarity" ,  want to remain as they are , while they 
demand of society a transformation which can only proceed from a 
transformation of themselves" (CW, 5 ,  p .  476 ;  MEW, 3 ,  pp .  464-465 ) .  
THE DEVELOPMENT O F  THE INDIVI D UAL 
Not only an analysis of Marx's vision of communism can show that 
Marx considered estrangement to be the result of an involuntary division 
of labor ; the postulate that the involuntary nature of the divis ion of 
labor is central to his theory of estrangement can also be shown to be 
val id with regard to his views on the development of the ind ividual . The 
individual is seen to be at his highest level of development when the 
dichotomy between necessary labor and disposable time , that is free 
time, no longer exists. 
Marx pointed out t he imponance of in creased spare time in several 
works . He agrees with Ricardo 's postulate that "wealth is disposable 
time,  an d nothing more" (MEW, 26 . 3 ,  p. 2 5 2 ) .  For Marx,  disposable 
time is time for the free development of the individual (MEW , G ,  p .  5 2 7 ) .  
The individual can spend free time i n  such a way as t o  b e  free from any 
coercion that normally accompanies necessary labor time , that is, the 
time necessarily spent in the service of a capitalist in order to make a 
livelihood .  Under capital , however, as a result of the capitalist 's appropria­
tion of surplus value , disposable time is unequally distributed .  The work­
er works more hours than he is compensated for,  thus allowing the capital­
ist to lead a l ife of leisure . The capitalist does not need to spend necessary 
time in order to have a livelihood (MEW, G, p. 5 2 7 ) .  He i s ,  however, in­
terested in reducing the worker's disposable time because of his need to 
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increase the surplus value ,  that is, the time for which the wo rker receives 
no compensation .  
[A ]  part from extremely elastic bounds, the nature of  the exchange 
of commodities itself imposes no limit to the working-day , no 
l imit to surplus-labour. The capitalist maintains his rights as a 
purchaser when he tries to make the working-day as long as pos­
sible , and to make , whenever possible ,  two working-days out of 
one . On the other hand ,  the peculiar nature of the commodity sold 
implies a l imit to its consumption by the purchaser ,  and the labourer 
maintains his right as seller when he wishes to reduce the working­
day to one of definite normal duration .  There is here ,  therefore, an 
antinomy ,  right against right ,  both equally bearing the seal of the law 
of exchanges. Between equal rights force decides .  Hence is it that in 
the history of capital ist produ ction ,  the determination of what is a 
working-day presents itself as the result of a struggle,  a struggle be­
tween collective capital , i .e . ,  the class of capitalists , and collective 
labour,  i . e . ,  the working-class (C l ,  p .  2 2 5 ; MEW, 2 3 ,  p .  249) . 
Marx considers the outcome of this struggle important : 
Time is the roo m  of human development . A man who has no free 
t ime to dispose of ,  whose whole lifetime , apart from the mere physi cal 
interruptions by sleep , meals , and so forth , is absorbed by h is labour 
for the capitalist , is less than a beast of burden (WPP,  p p .  67-6 8 ;  
MEW, 1 6 , p .  144) .  
As a consequence ,  Marx approves o f  the legally l imited working-day since 
it "shall make clear 'when the time which the worker sells is  ended , and 
when his own begins ' . " He exclaims " Quantum mutatus ab illo ! "  (C l ,  
p .  286 ;  MEW, 2 3 ,  p .  3 20) .  For Marx the working-day should be clearly 
l imited because it increases , or at least makes possible ,  the planned use 
of one's disposable time for one's own purposes . In this regard Marx 
cites Engels who writes that the Ten Hours Act the worker "is enabled 
to prearrange his own minutes for his own purposes ."  He shares Engels '  
hope that s ince the factory acts have made the workers masters of their 
own time, they have been given "a  moral energy which is  dire cting them 
to the eventual possession of political power" (Cl , p. 286 ;  MEW, 2 3 ,  p. 3 2 0) .  
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The importance of the struggle for disposable time can be summed u p  by 
a passage from Capital : 
The intensity and productiveness of labour being given , the time 
which society is bound to devote to material production is shorter , 
and as a conse quence , the time at its disposal for the free develop­
ment ,  intellectual and social , of the individual is greater, in propor­
tion as the work is more and more evenly divided among all the able­
bodied members of society , and as a particular class is more and more 
deprived of the power to shift the natural burden of labour from its 
own shoulders to those of another layer of society . In this  direction,  
the shortening of the working-day finds at last a l imit in the general­
isation of labour. In capitalist society spare time is acquired for one 
class by converting the whole l ife-time of the masses into labour­
time (C l ,  p .  496 ;  MEW, 2 3 ,  p. 5 5 2) . 6 
The increase of spare time is important because , for at least a part of the 
day , the worker is not subject to direct domination .  Marx , therefore ,  
sees the struggle for disposable time as  one that enhances the condition 
in which man will be free from do mination by other men , in cluding 
by social forces alien to him.  It is a struggle in which Marx sees an at­
tempt to escape the involuntary division of labor .  In its place should 
co me a society base d on a voluntary division of labo r an d devoid of the 
dichotomy between free time and necessary labor time . For this to occur, 
Marx postulates the necessity of historical development .  I t  will be recalled 
that Marx considered the individual in primitive communistic societies to 
be still "tied" to the community as an unborn infant is tied to  the mother 
through the umbilical cord. Of the Asian social formations , based on 
property held in common he says that they remained stable because ,  
among other things ,  " the individual does no t  become independent vis­
a-vis the commune. " For this reason, even though individuals may have 
spare time at their disposal , the availability of free time to individuals is 
merely a necessary but not sufficient condition .  
Suppose now such an eastern bread-cutter requires 12  working-hours 
a week for the satisfaction of all his wants. Nature 's direct gift to 
him is plenty of leisure time . Before he can apply this le isure time 
pro ductively for himself, a whole series of historical events is required 
(C l ,  p. 482 ;  MEW, 2 3 ,  p. 5 3 8 ) . 7 
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The historical events of which Marx speaks are those events that will in­
crease man 's productive powers, although they may occur at the expense 
of his spare time .  Marx makes the assumption that as long as man does 
not adequately control nature , the options for his individual develop­
ment ,  a s  well a s  that of society , are limited ,  although spare time may be 
relatively abundant. While the productive powers are being developed , 
the foundations are laid not only to bring nature increasingly under man 's 
control , but also to enable the individual to cooperate freely .  The goal is 
both to sever the umbilical cord by which primitive man is tied to society 
and to shake loose all forms of social domination that have accompanied 
man as the development of the productive powers has proceeded through­
out history. Again ,  as with communism, the true development of the in­
dividual is possible only if the productive powers of man are developed 
sufficiently and the involuntary division of labor is abol ished ;  if man is 
less subject to the blind forces of nature ; and if he can l ive free from the 
coercion of other men .  For example : 
In fact, the realm of freedom actually begins only where labour which 
is determined by necessity (Not) and by external expediency (iiussere 
Zweckmiissigkeit) ceases ;  thus in the very nature of things it lies beyond 
the sphere of actual material production . J ust as the savage must wrestle 
with nature to satisfy his wants, to maintain and reproduce life , so must 
civilised man , and he must do so in all social formations an d under all 
possible modes of production .  With his development this realm of 
physical necessity expands as a result of his wants ; but,  at the same 
time , the forces of production which satisfy these wants also increase . 
Freedom in this fiel d can only consist in socialised man , the associated 
producers, rationally regulating their interchange with nature , bring-
ing it under their common control ,  instead of being ruled by it as by 
a blind force (als von einer blinden Macht) ; and achieving this with 
the least expenditure of energy and under conditions most favorable 
to , and worthy of,  their human nature . But it nonet�eless still remains 
a realm of necessity . Beyond it  begins that development of human 
energy which is an end in itself, the true realm of freedom ,  which , how­
ever,  can . blossom forth only with this realm of necessity as its basis. 
The shortening of the working-day is its basic prerequisite (MEW, 2 5 ,  
p .  828 ;  translation mine) . 8 
Clearly , as is pointed out above , Marx sees the shortened wo rking-day as 
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an important step  in the struggle for a society devoid of an involuntary 
division of labor .  The struggle is aided9 by the tendency in the capitalist 
mode of pro duction to reduce the labor time needed to produce com­
modities and thus increase the productivity . Under capital , this tendency 
is desirable because i t  results in a greater surplus which the capitalist can 
appropriate . With the abolition of the capitalist mode of production , 
production is no longer based on "the reduction of necessary labour time 
so as to posit surplus labour" (G, p. 706) . Rather , there will be a "general 
reduction of the necessary labour of society to a minimum,  which then 
corresponds to the artistic ,  scientific etc. development of the individuals 
in the time set free , and with the means created ,  for all of them"  ( G ,  
p .  706 ;  MEW, G ,  p .  5 9 3 ) .  
I t  must not therefore b e  concluded that a dichoto my between neces­
sary labor an d disposable time will persist in a society based on a voluntary 
division of labour, a society in which labor time ceases to be the measure 
of wealth an d hence , in which "exchange value [must cease to be the 
measure ] of  use value" (G, p .  705 ) .  Neither must it  be assumed that, if 
capital ism is no longer a real ity , productivity gains could no longer be 
realized. The facts are quite the contrary . For Marx, the reduction in 
necessary labor time to a minimum will in itself lead to an increased level 
of productivity . 
[T ]he saving of labour time [ is ]  equal to an increase of free time, i . e . ,  
t ime for the  full development of  the individual , which in turn reacts 
back upon the productive power of labour as itself the greatest pro­
ductive power. From the standpoint of the direct production process 
it  can be regarded as the production of fixed capital, this fixed capital 
being man himself (G ,  pp .  7 1 1 -7 1 2 ;  MEW, G ,  p .  599 ) .  
Similarly , a maximum of disposable time feeds back upon the individuals 
insofar as they become transformed :  " Free-time-which is both idle time 
and time for higher activity-has naturally transformed its possessor into 
a different subject , and he then enters into the direct pro duction process 
as this different subject" (G, p. 7 1 2 ;  MEW, G, p. 5 99) . Marx suggests that 
"it goes without saying . . .  that direct labour time itself can not remain 
in the abstract antithesis to free time in which it appears fro m the perspec­
tive of bourgeois economy" (G, p. 7 1 2) .  
This theme i s  reiterated i n  Theories of Surplus-Value. 
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[ l i t  is  self-evident that if labour-time is reduced to a normal length 
and ,  funhermore , labour is no longer performed for someone else , but 
for myself . . .  it acquires a quite different,  a free character ,  it becomes 
real social labor . . .  -the labour of a man who has also disposable time 
must be of a much higher quality than that of the beast of  burden 
(TS 3 ,  p .  2 5 7 ;  MEW, 26 . 3 ,  p. 2 5 3 ) . 
Marx cautions, however, that "labour cannot become play , as Fourier would 
l ike, although it remains his great contribution to have expressed the sus­
pension not of distribution ,  but of the mode of production itself" (G ,  
p.  7 1 2) .  Instead,  Marx describes the production process under communism as 
a process that is 
both discipl ine, as regards the human being in the process of becoming 
and ,  at the same t ime ,  practice [ Ausiibung] , experimental science , 
materially creative and objectifying science, as regards the human being 
who has become, in whose head exists the accumulated knowledge of 
society" (G, p.  7 1 2 ;  MEW, G,  pp.  5 99-600) . 
In this discussion of Marx's vision of communism, it became evident that , 
for Marx , communism is a society based on a voluntary division of labor. 
This confirmed our postulate that the involuntary division of labor 
Marx observed in  capital ist and many precapitalist societies is central 
to his theory of estrangement ,  since communism, for Marx , is above 
all a society devoid of estrangement . The centrality of the involuntary 
division of labor in Marx 's theory of estrangement is also clear with 
regard to Marx 's views of the development of the individual . For Marx , 
the true development of the individual cannot come about until the 
whole society is freed from the involuntary division of labor and the 
forces of pro duction have been developed sufficiently . This is so even 
for the class which in a given society may not be forced to work for a 
living. Thus, just as much as the capitalist is estranged ,  he and society 
are also prevented from ful l  and free development as long as the involun­
tary division of labor prevails. Marx's views on the development of the 
individual are, therefore, intricately related to his assessment of  the con­
sequences of the involuntary division of labor. Insofar as these views call 
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for a voluntary division of labor such that the individual may fully and 
freely develop ,  the full development of the individual coincides with 
and depends on the establishment of communism. And insofar as this 
development can occur only in a society devoid of estrangement ,  it 
can be concluded that the centrality of the involuntary division  of 
labor to Marx's theory of estrangement indirectly also derives from his 
views on the development of the individual . 
DISCUSSSION 
As we have seen ,  Marx believes that communism wil l  be founded on 
and wil l  depend on the productivity gains realized under capital . The in­
herent capitalist tendency to lower the amount of labor time used in the 
production of commodities does in fact result in a greater level of pro ­
ductivity . Thus, the  necessary labor time can  be  set to  a minimum while 
maximizing the amount of free time. However, this very maximization of 
free time will lead to further productivity increases. 1 0  An increase in pro­
ductivity therefore represents a step in the direction of eliminating 
scarcity , particularly in Marx 's vision of a communist society in which 
exploitation ceases to exist. The question that arises is whether com­
munist society wil l  be free from scarcity . There is no evidence showing 
that Marx believed communist society will be , or even could be , devoid 
of any scarcity . Even under communism, man will have to work for h is 
maintenance as wel l  as for that of his offspring. 
Scarcity is a major  point of discussion in Knecht's work .  In his com­
parison of Sartre 's and Marx's theory of estrangement ,  Kne cht ( 1 97 5 )  
points out that Sartre 's theory o f  estrangement is more broadly con­
ceived than Marx 's . 1 1  Sartre deliberately set out  to establish a theory of 
estrangement that would not be bound to and derived from specific 
historical con ditions.  His theory rests on the assumption that scarcity 
does exist and that it exists independent of any socioeconomic organiza­
tion .  Because of this scarcity , with which individuals must cope ,  in­
dividuals become estranged in the process. As a consequence , Sartre also 
tends to view social organ ization as a means of cop ing with scarcity which 
results in the estrangement of the individual . Thus , because of  scarcity one 
man appears to the other as a coercive "anti-man , "  in any hi storical period 
and in all human relationships, including the family and the community 
of friends ( Knecht , 1 97 5 :  87) . According to Sartre , estrangement can be 
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eliminated only if scarcity is overcome. However, while Sartre does not 
state that scarcity will never be overcome , he does maintain that estrange­
ment can slowly be reduced even under scarcity (Knecht , 1 9 7 5 :  98 ) . 
Although Marx does not assume the end of scarcity under communism , 
he is not as concerned about it as Sartre and does not cite it as the basic 
cause of past or future estrangement. Sartre incessantly pursues the problem 
of estrangement from the point of view of how the individual will directly 
or indirectly experience interference from other individuals, because of 
the underlying phenomenon of scarcity . Marx , however, assumes that com­
munism will be accompanied by a change in consciousness . "We are . . .  
concerned with individuals at a definite historical stage of development 
and by no means merely with in dividuals chosen at random,"  he says .  
Thus ,  Marx, while not assuming the absence of scarcity , is able to say 
that under communism the development of the forces of production "coin­
cides with the development of the individual ." Since "the individuals '  
consciousness of their  mutual relations will . . .  be completely changed, " 
and production and distribution will be based on agreement with every­
one participating freely , Marx does not believe scarcity results in renewed 
estrangement. He thinks that the consciousness of individuals under com­
munism will constantly identify the development of individuals with that 
of society .  Sartre sees this unity as unstable , although he does envision 
situations in which a group  of individuals cooperate freely without the 
coercion of anyone. Such a group,  Sartre argues, can be a co llectivity of 
individuals involved in storming the Bastil le ,  or any other gro up with 
homogeneous goals ( Knecht ,  1 97 5 :  2 1 0) .  However, as a result of the 
persisting scarcity , such groups are unstable and tend to become coercive . 
Thus, Knecht ( 1 97 5 :  274) writes that scarcity is the direct cause of the 
failure of associations previously free from estrangement.  
Sartre can visualize situations in which the consciousness of individuals 
would be so change d  that a group could achieve homogeneity with respect 
to its members' goal-directedness . All the same , he is certain that this 
change is not likely to persist in the long run .  I t  may therefore be con­
cluded that Sartre , although admitting some historical influences on in­
dividuals , excludes others. For example , the associated individuals in­
volved in the storming of the Bastille were subj ect to definite h istorical 
influences bringing about that change in consciousness leading to the un­
coerced cooperation in storming the Bastille .  Unlike Marx,  Sartre would 
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not postulate that the establishment of communist society would bring 
about a change in consciousness so persistent that ,  despite the continuous 
presence of scarcity , estrangement would never reappear. Sartre may there­
fore be accused of basing his theory of estrangement on a concept of the 
individual that is not sufficiently historic .  Such a claim could be substantiated 
by the fact that his theory of estrangement is derived not from historical 
categories but from the principle of scarcity , which in itself is assumed to 
be independent of h istorical conditions. For Sartre , scarc ity is a reality of 
life transcending historical periods (Knecht,  1 97 5 ) .  Accordingly , contrary 
to Marx, estrangement is not seen as a phenomenon associated with dis-
tinct historical phases. Although estrangement may be overcome , once 
overco me it is not assumed that this overcoming, while in itself an event 
of history , will receive history 's "seal of guarantee " as Marx tended to 
postulate . As one example of the way in which Marx l inks the abolition 
of estrangement to a definite historical period ,  the following pronounce-
ment from the Manifesto may be cited :  " I n  place of the old bourgeois 
society , with its classes and class antagonisms , we shall have an associa-
tion ,  in which the free development of each is the condition for the free 
development of all " (CW, 6, p. 506 ;  MEW, 4, p .  482) . 
For Marx , this can only be the consequence of a revolution introducing 
a new historical epoch.  By means of a revolution ,  the proletariat "makes 
itself the ruling class , and ,  as such , sweeps away by force the old condi­
tions of production , then it wil l ,  along with these conditions , have swept 
away the conditions for the existence of class antagonisms and of classes 
generally , and will thereby have abolished its own supremacy as a class" 
(CW, 6, p. 506 ;  MEW, 4, p. 482) . 
Unlike Sartre , Marx envisions communist society as stable inasmuch 
as estrangement will  not reoccur. History will have changed both the con­
sciousness of individuals and the form of social organ ization so as to 
"guarantee" nonestrangement.  According to this view, the re lation ship 
of the individual to society is "deduced from the real development of 
society ," and not the alleged relationship of the metaphysical characters­
individuality an d universality " (CW, 5, p. 476 ;  MEW, 3 ,  p. 464 ) .  
Marx also refuses to  neglect the historical context . Because Marx sees 
the relationship of the individual to society within primitive societies in 
historical terms, it is incorrect to assume , as Hobbes tended to do , that a 
strong individual will begin to dominate weaker ones. To make such an 
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assumption , says Marx,  is to start with a notion of isolated individuals, 
and not with the individual that is historically linked to othe r individuals 
in specific ways.  
Marx admits that "there is no natural obstacle absolutely preventing 
one man from disburdening himself of the labour requisite fo r h is own 
existence , and burdening another with it ,  any more , for in stance, than 
uncon querable natural obstacles prevent one man from eating the flesh 
of another" (C l ,  p.  479) .  A general pattern of domination will occur 
only with an initial development of the productiveness of labor: 
It is only after men have raised themselves above the rank of animals ,  
when therefore their labour has  been to  some extent socialised ,  that 
a state of things arises in which the surplus-labour of the one becomes 
a condition of existence for the other (C l ,  p. 479 ;  MEW, 2 3 ,  pp. 5 3 4-
5 3 5 ) .  
The historical conditions are , therefore , extremely important i n  explain­
ing the behavior of individuals . J ust as social relat ions change in h istory , 
so does consciousness . According to Marx , the perception of an antimony 
between the private and the general interest is also historically conditioned 
and is directly linked to the institution of private property . Hence , it is 
only natural that he assu mes that different historical conditions (for example , 
those of primitive society or communism) will produce different social rela­
tions and a different consciousness of mutual relations in the individuals .  
Just  as the do mination of some over others was unlikely in primitive society , 
Marx thinks it unlikely that estrangement will recur under communism and 
that some will again begin to dominate others. The condition of nonestrange­
ment under communism is for Marx-and in contrast to Sartre-stable .  
That Marx views communism as a society with no reemergence of estrange· 
ment can be illustrated in yet another way . As has been shown , Marx sees 
communism as a type of society in which products are distributed on the 
basis of need. The unequal accumulation of personal pro perty and the sub­
sequent exchange of such accumulated property brought about the down-
fall of primitive communism as exemplified by the Iroquois Indians. As 
Engels remarked ,  this process brought the I ro quois to the threshold of 
civil ization .  On the basis of this initial regular exchange , the division of 
labor and private property arose . The division of labor developed and grew 
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without the consent of the individuals involved .  Under communism, how­
ever, there is no room for the exchange of products and commodity pro­
duction .  Marx believes that the "mechanisms" that transformed primitive 
communist society and propelled history ever since will cease to exist 
and will not reemerge sin ce production will no longer be based on exchange 
value but on agreement with products being collectively appropriated and 
distributed on the basis of need .  Hence, history will be consciously directed 
history , and the division of labor will cease to be formed independently of 
the will of individuals : 
The reality which communism creates is precisely the true basis for 
rendering it impossible that anything should exist independently of 
individuals ,  insofar as real ity is nevertheless only a product of the pre­
ceding intercourse of individuals (CW, 5 ,  p. 8 1 ;  MEW, 3 ,  p .  70) . 
In history u p  to the present it is certainly l ikewise an empirical fact 
that separate individuals have . . . beco me more and more enslaved 
under a power al ien to them . . .  a power which has become more and 
more enormous and, in the last instance , turns out to be the world 
market . . .  All-ro und dependence, this primary natural form of the 
world-historical co-operation of individuals , will be transformed by 
this co mmunist revolution into the control and conscious mastery 
of these powers, which , born of the action of men on one another, 
have ti l l  now overawed and ruled men as powers completely alien to 
them (CW, 5 ,  p. 5 1 ;  MEW, 3 ,  p. 3 7 ;  see also MEW, 3 ,  p. 3 5 ) .  
For Marx communism i s  not the end o f  history . Rather, i t  i s  the begin­
ning of  a new type of history-consciously directed history 1 2 . It is made 
possible by the elimination of "mecahnisms" such as exchange , com­
modity production ,  and the resulting involuntary division of labor which 
hitherto propelle d it .  As long as these "mechanisms" are absent ,  Marx 
sees no reason to believe that communism will be an unstable social con­
dition despite the presence of some scarcity . In this respect, Marx differs 
from Sartre . 
The question may be asked now whether Marx also perce ived man 
under the communism of  primitive societies to be free from estrangement. 
It may be recalled that Marx and Engels thought these individuals were free 
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from coercion by others and were therefore not subject to the involuntary 
division of labor to be introduced only after exchange relationships have 
emerged .  Consequently , Marx does not speak of estrangement or alien 
social forces dominating man in primitive communistic societies. If estrange­
ment results from an involuntary division of labor, which in itself is a 
product of society , it must be concluded that , for Marx , man in primitive 
communistic societies is not estranged. Nonetheless , he does not consider 
this condition , primitive communism, to be desirable because man is still 
severely under the domination of nature and tied to his community as if 
through an umbilical cord. Only with the introduction of regular exchange 
does man first sever his symbiotic ties to the community and develop 
the forces of production that will eventually allow the realization of com­
munism. Thus , while man cannot be said to be estranged under primitive 
communism, he is incapable of that type of life envisioned under com­
munism since neither society nor the individual have yet become developed . 
The development of man 's productive powers and the individual has re­
sulted in estrangement. Until a certain level of development has occurred , 
increases in the productive powers of man are for Marx only possible 
through estrangement.  If, therefore , the development of the forces of 
production helps man bring nature under greater control (although result­
ing in estrangement) , scarcity is in part overcome at the price of estrange­
ment, at least for certain historical periods. 1 3 At the price of estrangement, 
man increases his alternatives vis-a-vis nature and ,  therefore , develops him­
self  as well as diminishes scarcity . 14 
Scarcity must not be seen primarily as an independent variable definable 
in ahistorical terms. For Marx , scarcity also seems to be closely linked with 
the level of individual development. Historically , as the individual develops,  
new needs are created ,  and what is considered to be scarce may change be­
cause of certain histori cal developments. This cannot be said of animals 
whose needs are physiologically derivable and ,  therefore , not subject to 
historical change .  Needs are ahistorically determinable with animals :  
The different forms of material life are , of course , in every case 
dependent on the needs which are already developed,  and the produc­
tion ,  as well as the satisfaction , of these needs in an historical process , 
which is not found in the case of a sheep or a dog.(CW ,  5 ,  p .  82 ; 
MEW, 3 ,  p. 7 1 ) .  
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In  Capital Marx points out  that "at the dawn of civilization the  productive­
ness acquired by labour is small , but so too are the wants which develop 
with and by the means of satisfying them" (Cl , p .  4 7 9 ;  MEW, 2 3 , p. 5 3 5 1 5 ; 
see also quote in note 9 ;  MEW, 2 5 ,  p .  828 ) .  
For  Marx , then ,  the  development of man 's productive powers is initially 
accompanied by estrangement. This development proceeds under com­
munism in the absence of estrangement . However, only if necessary labor 
time can sufficiently be reduced by the development of productive forces 
is communism perceived to be realizable . 
[The] development of productive forces . . .  is an absolutely necessary 
practical premise , because without it privation , want is merely made 
general, and with want the struggle for necessities would begin again , 
and all the old filthy business would necessarily be restored  (CW, 5 ,  
p .  49 ; MEW, 3 , pp .  34-3 5 ) . 1 6  
The reduction of necessary labor time can be equated with a reduction 
in scarcity or an increased satisfaction of needs. However, because new 
needs are created as the forces of production develop ,  scarcity remains a 
relative concept not solely definable according to physiological premises .  
Scarcity, along with needs,  can therefore be said to  be  created as  the  pro­
ductive powers of man develop .  On the whole , the productive forces are 
thought to develop faster so that under communism man can minimize 
the necessary labor time and establish a society based on a voluntary 
division of labor. Some scarcity will still be present , even if only because 
nature can never be fully controlled . 
"Just as the savage must wrestle with Nature to satisfy his wants, to 
maintain and reproduce life ,  so must civil ized man , and he must do so in 
all social formations and under a l l  possible modes of production"  (C3 , 
p. 820 ;  MEW, 2 5 ,  p. 828) .  Here Marx apparently contradicts a position 
he took earlier. In the Manuscripts, he says that man , in con trast to animals ,  
"produces even when he is free from physical need and only truly pro­
duces in freedo m  therefrom" (CW, 3, p. 2 7 6 ;  MEW, EB 1 .T . ,  p. 5 1 7 ) .  
Considering his work a s  a whole , i t  seems that Marx did not equate "true 
productive activity" with that activity which occurs free fro m physical 
nee d. Rather, he envisioned a society in which production would occur 
on the basis of freely cooperating individuals regardless of the basis for 
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this cooperation .  Thus, as long as man is able to satisfy his physical needs 
without being dominated by an alien wil l ,  he is not estranged and the 
division of labor is a voluntary one . 
Marx does accept the fact that man is "determined , forced ,"  by h is 
needs , but he is quick to add that in this case "it is only my own nature 
. . .  which exerts force u pon me ; it is nothing alien . "  Only if production 
is determined on the basis of exchange do my needs become a coercive 
force for others as well (G ,  p. 245 ; MEW, G ,  p. 1 5 7 ) .  Again , it can be 
seen that Marx's main emphasis is on the way needs are satisfied ,  not 
on the idea that man must produce in order to satisfy his needs. For 
Marx , communism is that form of social organization in which man is 
capable of producing, without coercion ,  the products required to satisfy 
his needs, since neither production nor distribution rests on exchange 
and the division of labor is voluntary . 
MARX'S DEFINITION OF HUMAN NATU RE RECONSIDERED 
According to Marx, communism is not a society in which the individuals 
forming that society "want to preserve their 'peculiarity ' , while they de­
mand of society a transformation which can only proceed from a trans­
formation of themselves . " Marx docs not outline what human nature will 
be under communism. He is not concerned with human nature as it mani­
fests itself in the various types of behavior and characters of individuals 
living under communism. He often criticizes those who , by extrapolating 
fro m  behavior under capital , claimed to have found the ingre dients of 
human nature . This criticism was intended to relativize statements about 
human nature which others thought to be absolute , and not to explicitly 
outline human nature under communism.  
Marx was very concerned about human nature in another way . Earlier , 
we stated that Marx's theory of estrangement was derived from a biological , 
and not an historical ,  conception of human nature . Thus, man, unlike the 
animals, was found to be a producer capable of producing according to his 
will ,  and insofar as man is forced to subject his labor power and the prod­
uct of his labor to an alien will he can be said to be estranged.  Marx 
depicts communism as society without estrangement , a society in which 
neither one 's labor power nor the product of one's labor is subject to an 
alien will . Cooperation is free and the division of labor voluntary . Com-
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munism therefore permits man to l ive according to his nature , a nature 
based not on characteristics that may change in history but o ne that is 
biologically unique to man . 
NOTES 
1. The translation is mine insofar as wie icb gerade Lust babe is translated 
by "as I have in mind" rather than by "as I have a mind," as it appears in CW, 
5, p.  47.  
2 .  Marx uses the term immediat (travailleurs immediats ) ,  which can be trans­
lated by "immediate ."  However, immediat designates the condition of someone 
qui agit, qui pro duit sans intermediaire. (See Walther v. Wartburg, Franzosiscbes 
Etymologiscbes Worterbucb, Basel :  Helbing & Lichtenbahn,  1 9 5 2 ,  p .  5 7 1 ) .  
3 .  Marx criticizes not only those who see a conflict between the private 
and the �neral interest from a historical perspective , but also those who see no 
such diver�nce as long as the individuals in an exchan� society are allowed to 
pursue their private interests. 
The economists express this as follows: Each pursues his private interest 
and only his private interest ; and thereby serves the private interests of all , 
the �neral inte rest, without willing or knowing it. The real point is not that 
each individual's pursuit of his private interests promotes the totality of 
private interests, the �neral interest. One could just as well deduce from this 
abstract phrase that each individual reciprocally blocks the assertion of the 
others' interests, so that , instead of a general affirmation , this war of all 
against all pro duces a �neral negation. The point is rather that private in­
terest is itself already a socially determined in terest, which can be achieved 
only within the conditions laid down by society and with the means pro­
vided by society ; hence it is bound to the reproduction of these conditions 
and means. I t  is the interest of private persons; but its content as well as the 
form and means of its realization is given by social conditions independent of 
all (G ,  p.  1 56 ;  MEW, G, p.  74) . 
4. Marx elaborates on this theme elsewhere . When discussing the nature of 
the capitalist, he says that 
fanatically bent on making value expand itself, he ruthlessly forces the 
human race to produce for production's sake ; he thus forces the develop­
ment of  the productive powers of society , and creates those material con­
ditions, which alone can form the real basis of a higher form of society , a 
society in which the full and free development of every individual  forms the 
ruling principle (C l ,  p. 5 5 5 ;  MEW, 2 3 ,  p. 6 1 8 ;  see also MEW, 1 9 ,  p. 1 7 ; MEW, 
G, p .  7 1 6,  and M EW, 3 ,  p .  424) . 
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5.  In  the Grundrisse, Marx uses the same argument when discussing the 
reasons why in primitive society a strong individual did not dominate weaker 
ones and thus forcefully extract labor from them. 
It is of course very simple to imagine that some powerful , physically dominant 
individual , after first having caught the animal , then catches humans in order 
to have them catch animals ;  in a word, uses human beings as another naturally 
occurring condition for his reproduction (whereby his own labour reduces 
itself to ruling) l ike any other natural creature . But such a notion is stupid­
correct as it may be from the standpoint of some particular given clan or 
commune-because it proceeds from the development of isolated Individuals. 
But human beings become individuals (vereinzelt) through the process of 
history (G, p .  496 ; MEW, G,  p. 3 9 5 ) .  
Implicit i n  this statement i s  the postulate that i t  is inconceivable for a "primitive" 
individual even to consider perceiving his interest to be prior to the one of others, 
that is ,  to subordinate others to his will i n  such a manner that he benefits from the 
subordination . At this  point ,  we should a lso recal l  that Marx did not explain the de­
cay of primitive communism by the fact that some began to dominate others by 
virtue of personal physical strength. Rather, he explained it on the basis that 
personal property was unequally appropriated leading to social processes, as a 
result of which some became the subordinates of others. 
6. In Theories of Surplus- Value, Marx maintains the same theme in a some­
what more arithmetic form: 
Assume that the productivity of industry is so advanced that whereas earlier 
two-thirds of the population were directly engaged in material production,  
now it i s  only one-third. Previously 2/3 produced means of subsistence for 
3/ 3 ;  now 1/3  pro duce for 3 / 3 .  Previously 1/3  was net revenue (as  distinct 
from the revenue of the labourers) , now 2 / 3 .  Leaving (class) contradictions 
out of account, the nation would now use 1 / 3  of its time for direct produc­
tion,  where previously it needed  2 / 3 .  E qually distributed, the whole 2/3 
woul d have more time for unproductive labour and l eisure (MEW, 26 . 1 ,  
p .  1 89 ;  translation mine) .  
The Progress Publishers' translation ( TS l ,  p .  2 1 8 ) translates the l ast sen tence in 
the fol lowing way : " Eq u al l y  distr ibuted,  all ( th a t  is ,  the whole populat ion)  would 
have 2/ 3  more time for unproductive labour and leisure ." This translation can­
not be correct because of the arithmetic . If  a population previously  spent one­
third of its time as spare time (while two-thirds were needed to produce sub­
sistence ) ,  it now has two-thirds in the form of spare time , while only one-third 
of the time is used for the direct production of subsistence . The spare time in­
creased by 1 00 percent and not, as the translation implies, by 66-1 / 3  percent. 
The German "Gleichmassig verteilt, h:itten alle 2/3 mehr Zeit" is therefore best 
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translated as " Equally distributed, the whole 2/3 would have more time."  
Furthermore, i f  e qually distributed ,  the  capitalist class would have less-not more­
spare time than previously, since it, too ,  must now spend one-third of its time 
producing means of subsistence. 
7. Marx continues by saying that "before he spends it  in surplus-labour for 
strangers, compulsion is necessary. If capitalist production were introduced ,  the 
honest fel low would perhaps have to work six days a week ,  in  order to appropriate 
to himself the produ ct of  one working-day" (C l ,  p. 482;  MEW, 2 3 ,  p .  5 3 8) . 
8. A ussere Zweck massigkeit is not optimally translated by "mundane 
considerations" (C 3 ,  p. 820) .  I t implies that the worker who is uncoerced by 
necessity (No t) or by "external expediency" (�
·
ussere Zweckm�ssigkeit )  
has no mundane considerations. Marx 's emphasis rather is on  coercion brought  
about by  Not or  aussere Zweck massigkeit and not on whether considerations 
are mundane or not. 
The phrase als von einer blinden Macht is misleadingly translated in the Pro­
gress Publishers' e dition by "as by the blind forces of Nature" ( C 3 ,  p .  820) . 
In Roman society, which was based on slavery, the ties between the in­
dividual and the community were severed. While "the individuals may appear 
great, " Marx maintains that "there can be no conception here of a free and full 
development either of the individual or of the society , since such development 
stands in contradiction to the original relation"  (G, p .  487; MEW, G, pp. 3 86-
387) .  Impl icit here is the notion that the free and full development of  the in­
dividual cannot come about unless the productive forces are sufficiently de­
veloped. Although slavery brought about a certain development , it was limited. 
The free and full development of the individual and society was impossible 
since the options, though increased, were still too limited. Also implicit here is 
the idea that , unless all men are free from coercion (involuntary division of 
labor), neither the individuals nor society can develop free ly and fully even 
though some individuals have the spare time for their development through 
which in turn they may appear great. 
9. 
[Capital ) diminishes labour time in the necessary form so as to increase 
it in the superfluous form; hence posits the superfluous in growing measure 
as a condition-question of life or death-for the necessary. On the one 
side , then,  it calls to l ife all the powers of science and of nature , as  of social 
combination and of social intercourse , in order to make the creation of wealth 
independent (relatively) of the labour time employed on it. On the other side , 
it wants to use labour time as the measuring rod for the giant social forces 
thereby created, and to confine them within the limits required to maintain 
the already created value as value. Forces of production  and social relations­
two different sides of the development of  the social individual-
appear to capital as mere means, and are merely means for it to p ro-
duce on its  l imited foundation. In  fact,  however, they are the material 
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conditions to blow this foundation sky-high .  "Truly wealthy a nation ,  
when the  working day is 6 rather than 1 2  hours" (G,  p .  7 06 ;  MEW, G,  p p .  
59 3-594).  
1 0. In Anti-Diihring (MEW, 20,  pp .  274,  276} ,  Engels also maintains that a 
society that is freed from the l imits of capitalist production will be able to ad­
vance further because it creates new forces of production . This advance wil l  be 
possible because abandonment of the previous division of labor and its replace­
ment by a division of labor will allow for the education of many-sided individuals 
who will also understand the scientific basis of all industrial production .  Quoting 
Marx, he points to the fact that under capital the factory system itself is already 
moving in such a direction :  
[ T ] he employment of machinery d o e s  away w i t h  the necessit y  of cryst all iz­
ing this distribution after the manner of Manufacture ,  by the con stant annexa­
tion of a particular man to a particular function .  S ince the motion of the 
whole system does not proceed from the workman , but from the machinery , 
a change of persons can take place at any time without an interruption of the 
work (C l ,  p.  397 ; MEW, 2 3 ,  pp. 44 3-444) . 
Engels states that once the economy no longer suffers under recurrent crises 
and the means of production are no longer privately owned, a practically limit­
less increase in production will occur. In  contrast to the development postulated 
above, the one postulated here is seen only as a function of a reduction of losses 
(MEW, 20, p. 263) .  
1 1 .  Schaff ( 1 964: 1 1 0) maintains that it is impossible ,  as  Sartre did, to  merge 
ex istentialism with Marxism. Schaff considers Sartre 's attempt a failure because 
of the resulting in herent philosophical contradictions. (See also Schaff, 1 964: 
22, 26, 76, 78,  1 09.) 
1 2. " For it is the association of individuals (assuming the advance d stage of 
modern productive forces, of course )  which puts the conditions of the free de­
velopment and movement of individuals under their control-condition s which 
were previously left to chance and had acquired an independent existence over 
against the separate individuals ."  (CW, 5, p. 80; MEW, 3, p. 7 5 ) .  
1 3 . As pointed out  earlier, Marx envisions the  further development  of the 
forces of production also under communism but not at the expense of estrange­
ment. 
1 4. Here " diminishing scarcity" means that , through the development of the 
forces of production ,  a society 's necessary labor time is dimin ished. However, 
necessary labor time is in itself historically determined ; what is necessary can­
not be seen  as invariable .  
1 5. We note that BedUrfnis is translated by "want" rather than by "need." 
In l ight of Marx 's use of the term BediJ
0
rfnis, it is difficult to j ustify one transla­
tion exclusively over another, although I prefer the translation "need ."  For a 
further treatment , see Agnes Heller, 1 976 .  
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1 6. Criticizing Max Stimer, Marx says in the German Ideology: 
In real ity, of course , what happened was that people won freedom for them­
selves each time to the extent that was dictated and permitted not by their 
ideal of man , but by the existing productive forces. All emancipation carried 
through hitherto has been based, however, on restricted productive forces. 
The production which these productive forces could provide was insufficient 
for the whole of society and made development possible only if some persons 
satisfied their needs at the expense of others, and therefore some-the minority­
obtained the  monopoly of development, while others-the majority-owing to 
the constant struggle to satisfy their most essential needs, were for the time 
being ( i.e . ,  until the creation of new revolutionary productive forces) excluded 
from any development. Thus, society has hitherto always developed within 
the framework of a contradiction-in antiquity the contradiction between free 
men an d slaves, in the Middle Ages that between nobility and serfs, in modem 
times that between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat (CW, 5, p. 4 3 1 -4 3 2 ;  
MEW, 3 ,  p .  4 1 7 ) .  

8 
Is ESTRANGEMENT LIMITED 
TO CAPITALIST SocIETIES? 
If the foregoing interpretation of Marx, with its emphasis on the in­
voluntary nature of the division of labor ,  is correct , i t  would have to 
be concluded  that man is estranged whenever an involuntary division 
of labor exists. Such a conclusion would be the logical consequence of 
a theory that postulates estrangement to result from the involuntary 
nature of the division of labor and that assumes the lack of any estrange­
ment under communism because of the absence of such a division of 
labor. In  this chapter, instead of merely drawing the logical consequences, 
the attempt is made to investigate Marx 's views on precapital ist , non­
communistic societies in order to determine whether such a conclusion 
holds up and how the conclusion can be termed valid.  
ESTRANGEMENT AND PRECAPITALISTIC ,  
NONPRIMITIVE SOCI ETI ES 
Marx thinks the division of labor became involuntary following the 
destruction of the communism of primitive societies. This belief is more 
concretely expressed in Marx's discussion of the nature of the master­
servant relation (Herrscbaftsverh'iiltnis) : 
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Basically the appropriation of animals , land etc. cannot take place 
in a master-servant relation ,  although the animal provides service . 
The presupposition of the master-servant relation is the appropria­
tion of an alien will (G ,  pp.  500-5 0 1 ; MEW, G ,  p .  400) . 
In the master-servant relation , the same condition is given as under 
capital ; namely , that labor power is subject to an alien will and is no 
longer directed by the will of the individual who exerts this power. The 
master can appropriate an alien will because of his ownership of the 
land1 and the resulting dependency of others on him: 
[ F ]eudal landed property is already by its very nature huckstered 
land-the earth which is estranged from man and hence confronts 
him in the shape of a few great lords. The domination of the land 
as an alien power over men is already inherent in feudal landed 
property . The serf is the adjunct of the land (CW,  3 ,  p. 2 6 6 ;  MEW, 
EB  l .T . ,  p .  5 0 5 ) .  
Under precapitalist servitude , just a s  u nder capital , the serf a n d  h i s  labor 
power are subject to an alien will , and at least a portion of the product 
of labor is appropriated by the master. This action can be seen as a viola­
tion of human nature since , for Marx , man is by nature capable of con­
sciously directing productive activity with his will and also of subjecting 
the product of his labor to his volition .  Under servitude , as under capital , 
this condition is not given ,  and man is prevented from living according to 
his nature .  Man must therefore emancipate himself from all servitude 
(Knechtschaftsverhiiltnisse) ,  the most recent of which is that of capital : 
From the relationship of estranged labour to private property it fol­
lows further that the emancipation of society from private property , 
etc . ,  from servitude , is expressed in the political form of the emancipa­
tio n of the workers; not that their emancipation alone is at stake , but 
because the emancipation of the workers contains universal human 
emancipation-and it contains this, because the whole of human servi­
tude is involved in the relation of the worker to production , and all 
relations of servitude are but modifications and consequences of this 
relation (CW, 3 ,  p .  280 ;  MEW, EB l .T . ,  p. 5 2 1 ) .  
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Marx's analysis o f  precapitalist economic formations goes beyond the 
narrowest definition of the master-servant relationship . Nevertheless , the 
individuals who are in any way dependent remain unfree for him:  
I t  is furthermore evident that in a l l  forms in which the dire ct labourer 
remains the "possessor" of the means of production and labour con­
ditions necessary for the production of his own means of subsistence , 
the property relationship must simultaneously appear as a direct rela­
tion of lordship and servitude , so that the direct producer is not free ; 
a lack of freedo m  which may be reduced from serfdom with enforced 
labour to a mere tributary relationship .  The direct producer, according 
to our assumption , is to be found here in possession of his own means of 
pro duction ,  the necessary material labour conditions required for the 
realisation of his labour and the production of his means of subsistence 
. . . .  Under such conditions the surplus-Jabour for the nominal owner 
of the land can only be extorted from them by other than economic 
pressure , whatever the form may be . This differs from slave or planta­
tion economy in  that the slave works under alien conditions  of pro­
duction and not independently . Thus, conditions of perso nal dependence 
are requisite ,  a lack of personal freedom ,  no matter to what extent ,  and 
being tied to the soil as its accessory , bondage in the true sense of the 
word (C 3 ,  pp. 790-7 9 1 ; MEW, 2 5 ,  pp .  798-799 ) .  
Even though the tributary relationship implies freedom from enforced 
labor in which labor power is directly subsumed under an alien will , our 
thesis still holds. Because of an alien will , the individual is forced to expend 
labor power, in the form of surplus labor, for the nominal owner of the 
land.  Against his wil l ,  he is compelled to produce a surplus he cannot ap­
pro priate . In addition ,  although his labor power is not directly subjected to 
an alien will , he is not free to produce any type of surplus . Thus, as under 
capital , he is free neither in deciding what total surplus is to be produced 
nor in appropriating all of the surplus and disposing over it . Marx describes 
the nature of coercion existing in this case : 
Rent in kind presupposes a higher stage of civilization for the direct 
producer, i .e . ,  a higher level of development of his labour and of 
society in general . And it is distinct from the preceding form in that 
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surplus-labour needs no longer be performed in its natural form , thus 
no longer under the direct supervision and compulsion of the land­
lord or his representatives ;  the direct producer is driven rather by force 
of circumstances than by direct coercion ,  through legal enactment 
rather than the whip ,  to perform it on his own responsibility . Surplus­
production ,  in the sense of production beyond the indispensable needs 
of the direct producer, and within the field of pro duction actually 
belonging to him, upon the land exploited by himself instead of, as 
earlier, upon the nearby lord's estate beyond his own land , has already 
become a self-understood rule here . In this relation the direct producer 
more or less disposes of his entire labour-time , although , as previously , 
a part of this labour-time , at first practically the entire surplus portion 
of it ,  belongs to the landlord without compensation ; except that the 
landlord no longer directly receives this surplus-labour in its natural 
form, but rather in the products' natural form in which it is realised 
( C 3 ,  pp. 7 94-7 9 5 ;  MEW, 2 5 , p. 8 0 3 ) .  
Speaking o f  the source of value and the appropriation o f  surplus value , 
Marx compares  the coercion under precapitalist social formations to wage 
labor :  
The substance of value is and remains nothing but  expended labour­
power . . . . A serf for instance expends his labour-power for six days ,  
and the fact of  th is  expenditure as such is not altered by the circum­
stance that he may be working three days for himself , on his own 
fiel d ,  and three days for his lord , on the field of the latter .  Both his 
voluntary labour for himself and his forced labour for his lord are 
equally labour ;  so far as this labour is considered with reference to the 
values, or  to the useful articles created by it , there is no difference in 
his six days of labour. The difference refers merely to the different 
conditions by which the expenditure of his labour-power during both 
halves of his labour-time of  six days is called forth . The same applies 
to the necessary an d surplus-labour of the wage-labourer (C2 , p. 3 90 ; 
MEW, 24, p .  3 8 5 ) .  
In  Theories of Surplus-Value , h e  states :  "Serf-labour (just as slave-labour) 
has this in common with wage-labour, in respect to rent , that the latter is 
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paid in labo ur not in pro ducts, still less in money "  (TS 3 ,  p .  40 1 ;  MEW, 
26 . 3 ,  p .  3 92) . 
In general , other comments of Marx on precapitalist economic forma­
tions may be noted, particularly as they address the nature of coercion : 
Hence , the historical movement which changes the producers into wage­
workers , appears ,  on the one hand ,  as their emancipations  from serf­
dom and fro m the fetters of the guilds, . . . .  But , on the other hand ,  
these new freedmen became sellers of themselves on ly  after they had 
been robbed of all their own means of production , and of all the guar­
antees of existence afforded by the old feudal arrangements . . . .  The 
starting-point of the development that gave rise to the wage labourer 
as well as to the capitalist , was the servitude of the labourer. The ad­
vance consisted in a change of form of this servitude , in the transforma­
tion of feudal exploitation into capitalist exploitation (C l ,  p. 669 ; 
MEW, 2 3 ,  p .  743 ) .  
And although Marx often points to the Asiatic precapitalist social forma­
tion as an example of a stable , persisting organization , resistant to the 
undermining forces of  exchange ,  he is very critical of the way some surplus 
is appropriated through coercion : 
Rent (as the Physiocrats conceive it by reminiscence of feudal conditions) 
appears historically (and still on the largest scale among the Asiatic 
peoples) as the general form of surplus labour, of labour performed 
without payment in return . The appropriation of this surplus labour 
is here not mediated by exchange ,  as is the case in capitalist society , 
but its basis is the forcible domination of one section of society over 
the other. (There is, accordingly , direct slavery , serfdom or political 
depen dence) (TS 3 ,  p. 400; MEW, 26 . 3 ,  p. 3 9 1 ) .  
Although man i s  subject t o  an alien will under precapitalist economic 
formations,  the manner in which this subjection occurs diffe rs from capital , 
the main distinction being the absence of exchange as the basis of all pro­
duction .  In  precapitalist social formations ,  the estranged elements of life 
are still bound by man and are not subject to exchange relations and the 
resulting competitio n :  
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Precisely the slavery of civil so ciety is in appearance the greatest 
freedo m because it is in appearance the fully developed independence 
of the individual , who considers as his o wn freedom the uncurbed 
movement , no longer bound by a common bond or by man ,  of the 
est ranged elements of his l ife , such as property , industry ,  religion , etc . ,  
whereas actually this i s  his fully developed slavery and inhumanity . 
Law has here taken the place of privilege (CW, 4, p .  1 1 6 ;  MEW, 2 ,  
p .  1 2 3 ) .  
Similarly , i n  the German Ideology, Marx writes that 
in imagination ,  individuals seem freer under the dominan ce of the 
bourgeoisie than before , because their conditions of l ife seem accidental ; 
in reality , of course , they are less free , because they are to a greater ex­
tent governed by material forces"  (CW, 5 ,  pp .  78-7 9 ;  MEW, 3 ,  p .  76) .2 
Clearly ,  although coercion is a fact in precapitalist societies , it increases 
with increased exchange relationships. I t  would be a mistake , however,  to 
think that coercion was based only on personal dominance,  that the estranged 
elements of l ife were bound only by man . Marx's emphasis rather is on the 
degree to which either personal or impersonal forces were the source of 
coercion which resulted in the subjection of man to an alien will : 
When we look at social relations which create an undeveloped system 
of exchange ,  of exchange values and of money , or which correspond 
to an undeveloped degree of these , then it is clear from the outset that 
the individuals in such a society , although their relations appear to be 
more personal , enter into connection with one another only as individ­
uals imprisoned within a certain definition ,  as feudal lord and vassal , 
landlord and serf ,  etc . , or as members of a caste etc . or as members of 
an estate etc . . . .  (As regards the illusion of the "purely personal rela­
tions" in feudal times ,  etc . ,  it is of course not to be forgotten for a 
moment ( 1 )  that these relations ,  in a certain phase , also took on an 
objective character within their own sphere , as for example the develop­
ment of landed proprietorship out of purely military relations of sub­
ordinatio n ;  but (2) the objective relation on which they founder has 
still a l imited ,  primitive character and therefore seems personal , while , 
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in the modern world ,  personal relations flow purely out of relations 
of production and exchange (G,  pp .  1 6 3 -1 6 5 ;  MEW, G ,  pp .  80-8 2 ) .3 
The extent to which the estranged elements of life were still controlled 
by man , at the expense of having exchange relations ,  allows Marx to con­
clude that feudal institutions provided certain guarantees of  existence . For 
example , even serfs tended to own some land and were allowed a share in 
common lands (MEW, 2 3 ,  pp .  743-745 ) .  Although coercion was a fact,  
under precapital ist social formations i t  tended to affect individuals quite 
differently than did the type of coercion encountered under capital : 
The bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper hand ,  has put an end 
to all feu dal , patriarchal, idyllic re lations .  I t  has pitilessly torn asunder 
the motley feudal ties that bound man to his "natural superiors" ,  and 
has left remaining no other nexus between man and man than naked 
self-interest, than callous "cash payment" .  It has drowned the most 
heavenly ecstasies of religious fervour, of chivalrous enthusiasm , of 
philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of egotistical cal culation .  
I t  has resolved personal worth into exchange value, and i n  place of 
the numberless indefeasible chartered freedoms, has set up  that single , 
unconscionable freedom-Free Trade . In one word , for exploitation , 
veiled by religious and political illusions, it has substituted naked,  
shameless, dire ct ,  brutal explo itation (CW, 6 ,  p p .  48 6-48 7 ; M E W ,  4 ,  
pp.  464-465 ) .  
Thus far, the following has been established .  O n  the one h and ,  individ­
uals and their labor power were subject to an alien will even under pre­
capitalist social formations .  The product of labor, too , was only in part 
appropriated by the producers themselves. On the other hand ,  although 
the alien will appears to have been asso ciated primarily with individuals ,  
since the estranged life elements were still predominantly bound by man , 
impersonal , objective relations were also present. Marx 's thesis that the 
division of labor has been an involuntary one ever since the emergence of 
private property , which i tself is the result of estranged labor and exchange ,  
i s  therefore n o t  contradicted .  For i n  precapitalist society , t h e  producers 
could not organize all production on the basis of agreement,  nor was ex­
change , which in itself causes division of labor , nonexistent.  
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DISC USSI ON 
Given the above assessment of  the nature of pre capitalist society , it  
must logically be concluded that ,  s ince Marx thought the division of labor 
was involuntary , indivi duals are estranged .  This purely logical argument 
is not contradicted when we consider Marx 's account of concrete l ife­
situations under precapital ist social formations . Thus , it was possible to 
show how, according to Marx, individuals and their labor power are subject 
to an alien will .  This subjection ,  as under capital , prevents man from living 
according to his nature , with the consequence that he is estranged.  Man is 
estranged by virtue of the same evidence and reasoning Marx himself ap­
plied in his analysis of estrangement under capital . The conditions under 
which man is estranged may be different from those of capitalist produc­
tion ,  but estrangement nevertheless exists . Man is not free as is the case 
under communism where estrangement is nonexistent (see also MEW, 
26. 3 ,  p .  5 14 ;  MEW, 4 ,  p .  462) .  
Marx illustrated his theory of estrangement with examples from ,  and 
an analysis of, capitalist society . Therefore , in conne ction with precapital­
ist social formations ,  he only infrequently uses the term "estrangement" or 
"estranged ."  He does mention that under feudalism the earth is estranged 
from man and "confronts him in the shape of a few great lords. " 
He also speaks of landed property as being "alienated (entiiussert) 
man" and of precapitalist private property as being "man's 
actual externalisation (Entausserung) " and "external to oneself (Sicb­
iiusserlichsein ) "  (CW, 3 ,  pp .  2 9 1 -29 3 ;  MEW, EB  1 .T . ,  pp .  5 3 1 -5 3 2 ) .4 
On the whole, however, there is little use of the vocabulary that ac­
companied Marx's early analysis of capitalist society . Of course , it must 
also be pointed out that most of Marx's efforts were not devoted to the 
analysis of precapitalist society but primarily to capitalist society , thus 
further influencing our judgment that he made only scant use of such 
terms as Entfremdung and Entiiusserung in his analysis of precapital ist 
society . I t  would be a mistake, however, to conclude that Marx's theory 
of estrangement has no validity when it concerns precapitalist society . 
This theory should not be assessed on the basis of purely semantic criteria. 
Rather, vocabulary should merely be seen as a "tool" in conveying a par­
ticular theory ,  implying that to some extent at least a theory can be con­
veyed with different sets of vocabulary . 
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I t  follows that once the  postulates of Marx 's theory of estrangement­
as he illustrates with reference to capitalist society-can clearly be defined 
and isolated ,  it is also possible to investigate whether the same postulates 
are being used in the analysis of precapitalist social formations.  This i s  the 
way we proceeded in this work . First ,  the postulates of Marx 's theory of 
estrangement, as he used it in his analysis of capitalist society , were identi­
fied. Then,  in the first part of this chapter, it was found that Marx uses 
the same postulates when analyzing precapitalist social formations. The 
conclusion was drawn that , although the vocabulary Marx used  seldom in­
cluded the words "estrangement" and "alienation ,"  man can still be said 
to be estranged  even under precapitalist social formations (excluding 
primitive communistic societies) . The major elements of Marx's theory 
of estrangement are not the words "estrangement" or "alienation " or 
derivatives thereof, but the notion of the involuntary division of l abor. 
This notion also guides Marx's analysis of precapital ist social forma-
tions ( see also MEW, 3, pp. 68-7 7) .  
IS  MARX AN ANTI-I NDUSTRIALIST ROMANTICI ST? 
Dawydow ( 1 964: 5 0) maintains that Marx had a preconceived ideal of 
the "nature" of work and the "normal" relationship of the worker to his 
work according to which he analyzed work under capital . Marx did not 
hold such an ideal , however. This is not to say that he did not envision 
work as different under communism or that he did not admit that pre­
capitalist and capitalist work differed .  More important for Marx is the 
necessity that man be able to subject his labor power and its product to 
his own will and be able to l ive according to his nature . This necessity i s  
the sine qua non of any society in which man is not estrange d ,  regard-
less of the "nature " of work or the worker's relationship to it. In a society 
devoid of estrangement ,  man can be envisioned to have many dimensions. 
Such a vision of man may al�o be justified for communism. However, 
Marx never maintains that man in a society devoid of estrangement must 
be many-sided an d that work must be of a certain nature . Neither estrange­
ment nor nonestrangement is seen to depend on a definition of the ideal 
nature of work. I t  does ,  however, fully depend on whether one 's labor 
power and product of labor are subject to an alien will . Following Daw­
ydow's suggestion that Marx has a preconceived ideal of the nature of 
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work when analyzing work under capital , I srael ( 1 97 1 : 26 3 )  asserts that 
this ideal was influenced by the romanticist criticism of industrial society : 
The ideas concerning self-realization appear now to have been in­
fluenced by the existing conditions in preindustrialized ,  pre-capitalist 
society , being a part of the romanticist criticism of industrialized 
society . Among other things this criticism contained nostalgic ,  though 
probably not very realistic ,  views as to the work situation of the artisan , 
whose situation probably influenced Marx's ideal . The artisan could 
perhaps be seen as able to realize himself in his work activity . 5 
A closer look at the writings of Marx reveals that Israel 's suggestion is not 
very convincing. I t  i s ,  of course , true that Marx thought precapitalist society 
was less ruled than capitalist society by forces not controlled by man . He 
also admits that feudal society , for example , offered certain guarantees 
and degrees of freedom that were afterwards lost .  It is also true that Marx 
believed that labor under the guild-corporation system was "still half 
artistic , half end-in-itself etc. Mastery , "  and that the capitalist was him-
self still a master-journeyman6 ( G ,  p. 497 ; MEW, G ,  p. 3 9 7 ) : 
His position as master rests not only on his ownership of the condi­
tions of pro duction , but also on his own skill in the particular work . 
With the pro duction of capital and from the very outset , the point is 
not this half-artistic relation to labour-which corresponds generally 
with the development of the use value of labour, the development of 
particular abilities of direct manual work , the formation of the human 
hand etc. The point from the outset is mass , because the point is ex­
change value and surplus value . The principle of developed capital is 
precisely to make special skill superfluous , and to make manual work 
directly physical labour, generally superfluous both as skill and as 
muscular exertion (G ,  p. 5 8 7 ;  MEW, G, pp. 48 1 -482 ) . 7 
Even the guild-corporation system,  which was not tied to the landholding 
class, made some material guarantees for the workers and human bonds 
that were lost under capital .  " As j ourneyman (a genuine one) there is a 
certain communality in the consumption fund possessed by the master . 
While it is not the journeyman 's property either, still , through the laws 
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of the guild,  tradition etc . ,  at least co-possession etc . "  (G ,  p .  498 ; MEW, 
G ,  p .  3 97 ) .  
We  may therefore conclude that precapital ist, preindustrial society of­
fered conditions that in some ways were more dignifying than the wage 
slavery by which it was replaced. The estranged elements of life were still 
predominantly controlled by man rather than man being controlled by 
the forces of exchange which escaped the control of the part icipants. 
While Marx recognized these comparative differences, it would be a mis­
take to think he was idealizing preindustrial , pre capitalist society . 8 For 
example , when discussing primitive accumulation ,  the early accumula­
tion of capital , Marx suggests that it  could occur only by transforming 
serfs and slaves into wage laborers and by means of "the expropria-
tion of the immediate producers , i . e . ,  the dissolution of private property 
based on the labour of its owner" (C l ,  p. 7 1 3 ) .  This means ,  of course , 
that the immediate producers also became wage laborers . Historically , 
private property of the labourer in his means of production is the 
foundation of petty industry , whether agricultural , manufacturing , 
or both ;  petty industry , again , is an essential condition for the de­
velopment of social production and of the free individual ity of the 
labourer himself. Of course , this petty mode of production exists 
also under slavery , serfdom, and other states of dependen ce . But it 
flourishes, it lets loose its whole energy , it attains its adequate classical 
form, only where the labourer is the private owner of his own means 
of labour set in action by himself: the peasant of the land which he 
cultivates ,  the artisan of the tool which he handles as a virtuoso (C 1 ,  
p .  7 1 3 ;  MEW, 2 3 ,  p .  789) . 
Again ,  Marx alludes to the fact that the artisan 's work was half  artistic .  
However, he immediately points out the historical limits of this mode 
of pro duction in both agriculture and industry : 
This mode of pro duction pre-supposes parcelling of the soil , and 
scattering of the other means of production .  As it excludes the con­
centration of these means of production , so it also excludes co­
o peration , division of labour within each seperate process of pro­
duction,  the control over, and the productive application of the forces 
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of Nature by society , and  the free development of the social pro­
ductive powers . I t  is co mpatible only with a system of pro duction , 
and a society , moving within narrow and more or less primitive bounds . 
To perpetuate it would be , as Pecqueur rightly says ,  "to decree uni­
versal mediocrity . "  At a certain stage of development it brings forth 
the material agencies for its own dissolution .  From that moment new 
forces and new passions spring up in the bosom of society ; but the 
old social organisation fetters them and keeps them down . It must 
be annihilated ;  it is annihilated .  I ts annihilation ,  the transformation 
of the individualised and scattered means of production into socially 
concentrated ones, of the pigmy property of the many into the huge 
property of the few . . . .  Self-earned private property , that is based ,  
so  to say on the fusing together of the isolated ,  independent labour­
ing-individual with the conditions of his labour, is supplanted by 
capitalist private property , which rests on exploitation of the nominal­
ly free labour of others, i .e . ,  on wage-labour (C l ,  pp.  7 1 3 -7 14 ;  MEW, 
2 3 ,  pp .  7 89-790) . 
Marx writes these words without any sign of regret for what was "lost" 
as a result of the advance of the capitalist mode of production . In this 
respect , he differs remarkably from the romanticists who mourn the old 
social order disappearing in the face of rising capital. 
I n  earlier stages of development the single individual seems to be 
developed more fully , because he has not yet worked out his relation­
ships in their fullness , or erected them as independent social powers 
and relations opposite himself. It is as ridiculous to yearn for a return 
to that original fullness as it is to believe that with this complete empti­
ness history has come to a standstill . The bourgeois viewpoint has never 
advanced beyond this antithesis between itself and this romantic view­
point , and therefore the latter will accompany it as legitimate antithesis 
up to its blessed end (G, p. 1 6 2 ;  MEW, G, p. 80) . 
In summary , Marx recognizes the differences between the capitalist and 
precapitalist mode of production and the individual 's fuller development 
in precapitalist society . Even though for him work in precapitalist society 
often assumes half-artistic proportions ,  he does not endorse it as an ideal 
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to be  pursued or regained. There are two reasons for this . First , h i s  ideal 
is communism, which is based on the development of the productive forces 
of man .  Precapitalist production is little developed , however, and pre­
cludes further development . Thus , it effectively excludes itself as  an ex­
ample of production under communism as envisioned by Marx .9 And since 
the precapitalist artisan with his half-artistic work cannot be separated 
from the mode of pro duction in which he was active , he , too , is effectively 
excluded  as an example of productive activity under communism. On this 
basis ,  Marx can say that it is ridiculous to yearn for a return to that o riginal 
fullness of the individual at earlier stages of development . He would there­
fore agree with those who maintain that it is unrealistic to desire the re­
emergence of a society of artisans. However, those who hold such views 
often wrongly assert that Marx's view of the ideal society en tails such an 
unrealistic desire . 
That Marx cannot legitimately be criticized ,  as Israel does , for having 
been influenced by romanticist , unrealistic , and nostalgic  criticism of in­
dustrialized society is evident through yet another example . In The Poverty 
of Philosophy, he criticizes Proudhon in the following way : 
M. Proudhon , not having understood even this one revolutionary side 
of the automatic workshop,  takes a step backward and proposes to the 
worker that he make not only the twelfth part of a p in ,  but successively 
all twelve parts of it. The worker would thus come to know and realise 
the pin. This is M. Proudhon 's synthetic labour . . . .  
To sum up ,  M.  Proudhon has not gone further than the petty­
bourgeois ideal . And to realise this ideal , he can think of nothing bet­
ter than to take us back to the j ourneyman or ,  at most, to the master 
craftsman of the Middle Ages. It is enough , he says somewhere in his 
book ,  to have created a masterpiece once in one 's life ,  to have felt  
oneself just once to be a man . Is  not this ,  in form as in content , the 
masterpiece demanded by the craft guild of the Middle Ages (CW6 , 
p .  1 90 ;  MEW, 4, p .  1 5 7 ) . 10 
Here we see that Marx 's vision of the future does not exclude techniques 
of production that are generally associated with industrial society , the 
automatic factory being a case in point.  In addition ,  Marx 's observation 
that "the automatic workshop wipes out specialists and craft-idiocy " (CW6 , 
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p. 1 90) and is revolutionary must be taken seriously . On the basis of a 
higher level of productivity , Marx foresees a new type of fullness of in­
dividual development , a fullness that is not modeled after that of earlier 
stages of development :  
What characterises the division of labour inside modem society is that 
it engenders specialities ,  specialists , and with them craft-idiocy . . . .  
What characterises the division of labour in the automatic work­
shop is that labour has there completely lost its specialised character . 
But the moment every special development stops,  the need for uni­
versality , the tendency towards an integral development of  the indi­
vidual begins to be felt (CW6,  p .  1 90 ;  MEW, 4 ,  p. 1 5 7 ) .  
Marx does not  envision the  ideal society a s  one  in which labor productivity 
is low and in which the individual develops that type of fullness associated 
with the precapitalist artisan . Rather, he sees the productive power of man 
to be high , enabling the individual under communism to develop in ways 
hitherto unknown .  
This brings u s  t o  the second reason why Marx does not endorse the  quasi­
artistic nature of the precapitalist mode of production as an ideal to be pur­
sued. He does not picture communism as a society in which the means of 
production are split and held by many individuals , since "it i s  the associa­
tion of in dividuals (assuming the advanced stage of modern productive 
forces, of course) which puts the conditions of the free development and 
movement of individuals under their control " (CW 5 ,  p .  80 ;  MEW, 3 ,  p .  7 5 ) .  
Yet ,  precapitalist production was based on the fact that many owned the 
means of production necessary to maintain themselves through their in­
dividual and isolated labor (Selbstbetiitigung, or self-activity ) .  Marx calls 
this type of activity "one-sided" (CW5 , p. 8 2 ) ,  and he maintains that "al­
though isolated labour (its material conditions presupposed) can also create 
use values ,  it can create neither wealth nor culture" (CGP, p. 5 ;  MEW, 1 9 ,  
p .  1 7) .  
Again ,  Marx hands down a strong indictment o f  the type of work found 
in precapitalist, preindustrial society . But there is another basis for the re­
jection of this type of work which relates to Marx's notion of  the develop­
ment of the individual . This development is still incomplete in precapitalist 
societies .  (See also the discussion on the development of the individual in 
chapter 7 . )  Although the artisans owned the means for their self-activity , 
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"they themselves remained subordinate to the division of labour and their 
o wn instrument of production"  (CW5 , p .  8 8 ;  MEW,  3, p.  68 ) .  Under com­
munism, however, man will no longer be subject to the involuntary division 
of labor, thus enabling "the development of a totality of capacities" (CW5 , 
p. 8 7 ;  MEW, 3 ,  p .  68) . 
These two factors then-lack of productivity and the concomitant lack 
of development of the individual in precapitalist society-show why Marx 
is not an anti-industrial romanticist . Communist society , after capital has 
"laid the appropriate foundations ,"  is seen as the only society in which the 
fullest possible development of the individual can occur. This development 
cannot be understood to mean that individuals will become latter-day 
artisans ,  since the mode of production will vary greatly from that of pre­
capitalist societies. However, this in itself does not preclude that individuals 
will not also be artists. 
NOTES 
1 .  For Marx, "estranged labour is the  direct cause of private property" ( C W ,  3 ,  
p. 2 8 0 ;  MEW, EB  1 .T.,  p. 5 2 1 ). This does not contradict his postulate that the in­
voluntary division of l abor and private property occurred simultaneously ,  since 
the immediate consequence of the appropriation of the l abor power of  others by 
some is private property. 
2. Similarly in MEW, G, p.  8 1 .  
3.  I t  could b e  said that Marx contradicts himself in Capital. There he says that , 
since personal dependence characterizes the social relations of produ ction in the 
Middle Ages and 
personal dependence forms the ground-work of society , there is no necessity 
for labour and its products to assume a fantastic form different from their 
real ity. They take the shape , in the transactions of society , of services in kind 
and payments in kind. Here the particular and natural form of labour, and not , 
as in a society based on production of commodities, its general abstract form 
is the immediate social form of labour (C l ,  pp .  8 1 -8 2 ;  MEW, 2 3 ,  p .  9 1 ) .  
While h e  admits i n  the Grundrisse that objective re lations exist under the feudal 
order, the above statement could be considered contradictory . A closer look at 
another passage in Capital may resolve this apparent contradiction :  
[ F ) ro m  the moment there is a free sale , b y  the l abourer h i mself,  of labour­
power as a commodity . . .  that commodity production is general ised and 
becomes the typical form of production . . . .  Only when and where wage­
labour is its basis does commodity production impose itself upon society 
as a whole. (C l ,  pp .  5 50-5 5 1 ;  MEW, 2 3 ,  p . 6 1 3 ) .  
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Hence, commo dity production did exist u n der feu dalism, which in itself coul d  
represent one form o f  objective rel ations in addition t o  military subordination . 
Rather, the commo dity production remains limited as long as personal dependence 
persists. The matter is one of emphasis. 
4. In the Manuscripts, Marx writes that "all human activity hitherto h as been 
labour-that is, indu stry-activity estranged from itself" (CW, 3, p. 3 0 3 ;  MEW, E B  
1 .T. ,  pp .  542-543) .  
Commenting on the  economic theory of the  P hysiocrats, Marx points out  that 
"Physiocracy represents directly the decomposition of feu dal property in  eco­
nomic terms, but it therefore just as directly represents its economic metamor­
phosis and restoration,  save that now its language is no longer feudal but eco­
nomic ."  However, with the P hysiocrats "labour is not yet grasped in  its generality 
and abstraction :  it is still bound to a particular natural element as its matter, and 
it is therefore only recognise d in  a particular mode of existence determined by 
nature. It is therefore still only a specific,  particular alien ation of man . "  (CW, 
3 ,  p. 2 9 2 ;  MEW, EB 1 .T. ,  pp. 5 3 1-5 3 2 ) .  
5 .  I srael seems t o  have su perimposed the notion o f  self-real ization o n  the 
though t  of Marx. To my knowledge, Marx docs not use a notion of self-real ization 
to analyze the worker 's situation. If this notion has any place in Marx 's thought,  
it is  in conjunction with the notion that man should be able to subject his labor 
power to his own will an d to appropriate the product of his l abor. It is inappropriate , 
however, for I srael to view self-realization as a negative function of industrial society 
and as a positive function of preindustrial society. It would be equally inappropriate 
to view the notion of self-real ization in psychological terms. Shoul d one want to de­
fine self-realization in terms of labor as a manifestation an d development of human 
capacities, Marx would reply by saying: " How could l abour ever be anything but 
a 'manifestation of human capacities' ? "  (CW, 5, p. 482; MEW, 3, p. 4 7 1 ) . 
6. "Capitalist himself still master-journeyman " (G, p .  497).  Here the word 
"capitalist" is used in the figurative sense , indicating that the master does own the 
consumption fund, a great part, if not all ,  of the means of pro duction (see also 
MEW, G, p. 397) , an d does extract a surplus from his workers. However, neither 
wage labor nor exchange has yet developed fully. C apital is therefore not truly 
capital and the master is not a capitalist as Marx generally uses the term .  
7.  At another place in t h e  Grundrisse, Marx states: 
For example ,  in guild and craft labour, where capital itself still has a limited 
form, an d is still entirely immersed in a p articular substance, hence is not yet 
capital as such, Jabou r, too, appears as still immersed in its particular sp ecificity : 
not in the totality an d abstraction of labour as such, in which it confronts 
capital . That is to say that l abour is of course in each single  case a specific 
labour,  but cap ital can come in to relation with every specific labour (G,  pp.  
296-297 ; MEW, G, p. 204) . 
8. Th is is just as much a mistake as it would be to label Marx a mere t rade un ion­
ist on the basis that he supports the attempts of workers to  obtain a higher wage 
at the expense of the capital ists' profi t  (WPP, pp .  77-78 ; MEW, 1 6, pp .  1 5 1 - 1 5 2 ) .  
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9.  Only through capital , at the expense of the laborer's private ownership 
of his means of  production , does further development occur. 
10. Referring to the modern farmer, the capitalist and the worker , he asserts 
that 
they feel an attachment only for the price of their pro ductio n ,  the monetary 
product. Hence the jere miads of the reactionary parties, who offer up all 
their prayers for the return of feu dalism, of the good old patriarchal l ife , of 
the simple manners and the virtues of our forefathers. The subjection of the 
soil to the laws which dominate all other in dustries is an d always will be the 
subject of intereste d condolences (CW6, p. 202 ;  MEW, 4,  p. 1 70) .  
Note that Marx calls  those who envision or call for a return of the precapitalist 
mode of production reactionaries. Thus, he politically rejects those values which 
some claim are present in his thought. A similar rej ection occurs in the Manifesto 
when petty-bourgeois socialism is being discussed :  
I n  its positive aims, however, this form of social ism aspires e ither to  restoring the 
old means of pro du ction and of exchange, and with them the old property rela­
tions, and the old society, or to cramping the modern means of produ ction and 
of exchange,  within the framework of the ol d  property relations that have been , 
and were bound to be , exploded by those means. In e ither case , it is both reaction­
ary and Utopian (CW6, pp. 509- 5 1 0; MEW, 4, p. 48 5) .  

9 
THE SCOPE AND APPLICABILITY 
OF MARX'S THEORY OF ESTRANGEMENT 
Before anything can be said about the scope and applicability of Marx's 
theory of estrangement,  we must clarify whether it is legitimate to speak 
of only one theory of estrangement. If it is not legitimate to speak of only 
one theory , it will have to be specified which theory of estrangement is 
referred to when addressing the applicability of Marx's theory of estrange­
ment. 
Some stu dents of Marx maintain that he abandoned the terms "estrange­
ment" and "alienation"  in his  later work , and based on this  assertion ,  they 
argue that Marx also abandoned or changed his theory of estrangement. 
This argument is weak on at least two counts. First , the content of a theory 
should not, and cannot, be evaluated solely on the basis of whether a certain 
vocabulary is present.  Thus, by investigating the properties of Marx 's theory 
of estrangement in the foregoing analysis ,  it was possible to show that these 
properties do not change ,  although the vocabulary may undergo some 
changes .  It was shown that Marx's theory of estrangement is derived from 
his definition of human nature, a definition that is present in b oth his early 
and later work. Man is said to be estranged if, contrary to his nature , he is 
prevented from subjecting his labor power,  as well as the product of his 
labor, to his own will . If one is so prevented ,  the existence of an involun­
tary division of labor can be implied .  If, therefore , it can be shown that 
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Marx, throughout his work, maintained the same definition of human na­
ture as well as his search for a society with a voluntary division  of labor, 
it can be concluded that his theory of estrangement remained the same 
throughout his work , regardless of any changes in his vocabulary from the 
early to the later writings .  As shown above , Marx adhered to an unaltered 
definition of human nature , and the notion of an involuntary division of 
labor is absolutely central to his theory of estrangement.  Throughout his 
work , he viewed the desirable society as one with a voluntary division of 
labor and ,  therefore, free from estrangement. As a consequence ,  we can 
conclude that Marx's theory of estrangement remained the same . 
Second,  those who maintain that Marx abandoned or changed his theory 
of estrangement on t he basis that he abandoned the terms "alienation " and 
"estrangement , "  are at least partially incorrect in their assertions .  In an 
excellent treatment of the subject ,  Meszaros ( 1 972 )  shows that in many in­
stances Marx continued to use the above terms in his later works and did 
not abandon them at all. 1 As can be seen from the quotes given so far, 
this study confirms Mesza'.ros '  assessment. Marx did , indeed make use of 
the terms in his later writings ,  though not as frequently as in his Manu­
scripts , and h i s  theory of  estrangement remains unchanged throughout his 
works since the theory 's  properties were never abandoned or altered .  
Israel ( 1 97 1 ,  1 97 6 )  suggests that Marx abandoned his theory of estrange­
ment for a theory of reification .  He bases this argument on the assertion 
that Marx changed his theory of human nature . Before the Theses on  
Feuerbacb, I srael claims , Marx adhered to a philosophical anthropological 
position which claims 
a general abstract human nature which contrasts with the idea that 
human nature i s  a historically determined product that changed as 
societal conditions change .  In the sixth of his "Theses on Feuerbach " 
Marx explicitly rejects this anthropological position by asserting that 
man 's nature is the totality of his societal relations .  By doing so he 
also removed one of the essential preconditions for his theory of aliena­
tion.  I t  was abandoned ,  but reappeared in a new form as the theory 
of reification ( I srael , 1 976 : 47) .  2 
I srael ' s  position ,  shared by LeoGrande, ( 1 977 )  is fundamentally in­
correct, however. While Marx undisputably took Feuerbach to task for 
not seeing man in an historical light, h is theory of estrangement was never 
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based on a theory of human nature that did not take h istory into account. 
Rather ,  as shown in Chapter 2, this theory was derived from a biological 
definition of  human nature. This definition is not subj ect to the historical 
relativism argument ,  an argument with which Marx not only criticizes 
Feuerbach's understanding of human nature but also Bentham's and 
others ' .  The biological definition is empirically arrived at by comparing 
man with animals. This becomes in the thought of Marx "human nature 
in general ,"  while those aspects of human nature that are subject to his­
torical change signify "human nature as modified in each h istorical period ."  
As pointed out  earlier in a different context , I srael does not note th i s  very 
important distinction. Thus, he reaches some wrong conclusions concern­
ing Marx's adherence to his theory of estrangement as formulated in the 
Manuscripts. That I srael does not appreciate this distinction fully can be 
observed in the following passage which , consequently , is very unclear. 
Israel says that Marx differentiates between " ( 1 )  ' human nature at a given 
historical period'  being a consequence of man 's existing social relations 
and ( 2 )  man 's 'general human nature as it is changed in the historical 
process' ,  though always being a consequence of the social relations he 
has created himself" (I srael 1 97 1 : 5 7 ) . 3 
Israel ' s  and LeoGrande 's  thesis presents some additional problems. First, 
as shown in Chapter 2, those who argue that Marx did not conceive human 
nature to be socially conditioned until he wrote the Theses o n  Feuerbacb 
are factually incorrect.4 Second,  it is not meaningful to argue that Marx 
abandoned his early theory of estrangement in favor of a theory of reifica­
tion, since even his early and only theory of estrangement is a theory of 
reification. The present study shows abundant evidence5 that in his early 
work Marx already perceived man under capital to be dominated by an 
alien will and alien forces, by the products of his own labor. Precisely 
this element of reification has always distinguished Marx 's concept of 
estrangement from Hegel 's ,  in which estrangement is seen to result from 
the mere objectification of labor. 6 We do not argue here that Marx paid 
the same attention to the processes of reification in his Manuscrip ts as 
he did in his later works starting with the German Ideology. However,  
a distinction between his theory of estrangement and his theory of reifica­
tion is not only arbitrary but also unjustified. The differential attention 
he paid to processes of reification is quite a different matter ,  since Marx 's 
theory of estrangement is categorically also a theory of reification . Man 
is estranged because both his labor power and the product of h is labor 
1 50 ESTRANGEMENT 
are subject to an alien will ,  that is, because man is subject to an involuntary 
division of labor, a division that he controls neither at his place of work 
nor in the society at large . Under communism, this would not be so and 
estrangement would be abolished.  
THE QUESTION OF BEING MORE OR LESS ESTRANGED 
The secondary literature dealing with Marx 's theory of estrangement 
often asserts that estrangement can have different magnitudes .  That is, 
Marx's theory of estrangement is viewed in such a way that estrange-
ment as such is seen to exist to a greater or lesser extent . 7 For example , 
Ollman ( 1 976 : 1 3 2 ,  245-246,  2 5 2 ,  3 08) generally speaks of degrees of 
estrangement, as does Meszaros ( 1 97 2 :  249) and Petrovic ( 1 967 : 149- 1 5 0) ,  
while Mandel and Novack ( 1 9 7 3 : 4 3 )  and Meszaros ( 1 972 : 249) speak of 
progressive de-estrangement, or a .Qecreasing trend of estrangement .  Archi­
bald ( 1 97 6: 69-70) speaks of differences of estrangement among classes ,  
"between capitalist and non-capitalist societies" and between "currently 
capitalist societies and their own histories . "  
According t o  Marx , all estrangement i s  essentially reducible t o  the 
fact that man is subject to an alien will , that is ,  an involuntary division 
of labor. Moreover, man under precapitalist social formations can also be 
said to be estranged  as long as the division of labor can be shown to be an 
involuntary one. Whether it be the involuntary division of labor under 
feudalism or capitalism, estrangement remains estrangement .  Estrange­
ment,  which for Marx is the byproduct of any involuntary division of 
labor, is therefore a qualitative and not a quantitative phenomenon .  If  
Marx is not to be misinterpreted, estrangement must be viewed as a di ­
chotomous phenomenon. It exists wherever man is prevented from liv­
ing according to his nature, as a result of the subjection of his labor 
power and the product of his labor to an alien will . I t  ceases to exist 
under communism where man is free from the domination of other 
men and where the division of labor is therefore a voluntary one. Marx 's 
concept of estrangement cannot therefore be interpreted as a phenom­
enon of different magnitudes. Man either is or is not estranged ; estrange­
ment either exists or it does not exist. This position is the direct logical 
consequence of Marx 's  theory of estrangement as interpreted here . I f  
it is correct, then no evidence to  the contrary should be found in the 
writings of Marx , and indeed ,  this seems to be the case . 
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Marx does, of course , mention that the alien forces that control man 
have become more powerful ,  and increasingly so , ever since the emergence 
of private property and the involuntary division of labor. 
In  the present epoch , the domination of material relations over in­
dividuals ,  and the suppression of individuality by fortuitous circum­
stances ,  has assumed its sharpest and most universal form , thereby 
setting existing individuals a very definite task . It has set them the 
task of replacing the domination of circumstances and of chance 
over individuals by the domination of individuals over ch ance and 
circumstances . . . .  This task, dictated by present-day relations,  coin­
cides with the task of organising society in a communist way (CW5 , 
p. 4 3 8 ;  MEW, 3 ,  p. 424) .  
In the Holy Family ,  he writes : 
All co mmunist and socialist writers proceeded from the observation 
that . . .  all progress of the Spirit had so far been progress against the 
mass of mankind, driving it into an ever more dehumanised situation . 
They therefore declared "progress" (see Fourier) to be an inadequate , 
abstract phrase; they assumed (see Owen among others) a fundamental 
flaw in the civilized world ( CW ,  4 ,  p. 84 ; MEW, 2, p. 8 8 ;  see also MEW, 
EB 1 .T. , p .  54 3 ) .  
When Marx says that the al ien forces that control man are becoming 
more and more powerful ,  he is referring to the consequences of estrange­
ment and not of estrangement as such . While the consequences of estrange­
ment can be viewed as more or less severe (that is ,  they can be viewed in 
terms of magnitude) ,  this is quite different from viewing estrangement as 
such in terms of a magnitude. Even when Marx uses the term "estrange­
ment" (Entfremdung) in th i s  context , it designates the alien force that in­
creasingly dominates man in the form of  the objective conditions of pro­
duction ,  that is ,  capital . The conversion of surplus labor into capital or 
accumulation "reveals that . . .  unpaid labour of the worker confronts 
his as the to tality of the o bjective conditions of lab o ur. In this form it con­
fronts him as an alien property with the result that the capital which is 
antecedent to his labour, appears to be independent of it" (TS 3 ,  p .  3 5 2 ;  
1 52 ESTRANGEMENT 
MEW, 26 . 3 , p. 3 44) .  At another place, the same theme is further elaborated 
in the following way : 
With the advance in the productivity of social labour, accompanied 
as it is by the growth of constant capital , a relatively ever increasing 
part of the annual product of labour will , therefore , fall to the share 
of capital as such , and thus property in the form of capital (apart from 
revenue) will be constantly increasing and proportionately that part of 
value which the individual worker and even the working class creates ,  
will be  steadily decreasing, compared with the product of their past 
labour that confronts them as capital. The alienation and the antagonism 
between labour-power and the objective conditions of labour which 
have become independent in the form of capital , thereby grow con­
tinuously (TS 2 ,  p .  4 1 6 ;  MEW, 26 . 2 ,  pp. 4 1 7-4 1 8) .8 
Clearly , in the context in which the term Entfremdung is used here , it does 
not designate categoric estrangement , that is, that man is estranged because 
his labor power and the product of his labor are subject to an alien will . 
Rather, it signifies that , given categoric estrangement , the consequences 
thereof become more and more overpowering. The alien property con­
fron ting the worker is increasingly powerful .  The categorically estranged 
product of man 's labor confronts him in ever more "estranging" ways ,  
being ever more drastic to his existence and survival as  a human being. 
During feudalism, the estranged elements of l ife tended to be bound by 
man ( see Chapter 8), thus producing conditions that were often more digni­
fying. This is not the case under capital . In both cases ,  however,  man is 
estranged because of his subjection to an involuntary division of labor. 
I t  must therefore be concluded that Marx clearly distingu ishes between 
estrangement as such and the consequences of estrangement .  The con­
sequences of estrangement do not reflect on the magnitude of  estrange­
ment as such ,  inasmuch as estrangement as such is a qualitative and not a 
quantitative phenomenon.  Indeed ,  the Marxian system of thought allows 
for only a separation between estrangement as such and the consequences 
of estrangement . It can be shown in many ways that a distinction must be 
made between the two if Marx 's theory of estrangement is not to be vio­
lated .  Several of these ways will be discussed here. 
If estrangement were thought to have a magnitude , it would logically 
have to be concluded that man 's estrangement is greater or less because 
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his subjection to an alien will is greater or less . As can immediately be 
seen ,  however,  this is an absurd conclusion inasmuch as an alien will re­
mains an alien will , for "al ien wil l"  or " involuntary division of labor" 
are qualitiative and not quantitat ive phenomena. 
The objection may be made that subjection to an alien will may o ccur 
only part of the time , or  for some people not at all . Hence , i t  could be 
maintained that under feudalism, the serf was forced to work  the land of 
the lord only during some days of the week,  while on the other days of 
the week he was allowed to care for his own subsistence by working his 
own land .  In addition ,  the example of the capitalist may be given ,  who 
is forced neither to sell his labor power nor to p roduce a product that 
could become subject to an alien will . The answer to this objection lies 
first in the recognition that Marx himself does not distinguish between 
the estrangement of the capitalist and that of the worker in quantitative 
terms. He believes they are both estranged ,  although he considers the con­
sequences of the capitalist 's estrangement to be different from those of 
the worker.9 For the capitalist , estrangement at least has consequences 
that entail the "semblance of a human existence . "  
The capitalist i s  also subject t o  the involuntary division of  labor .  As 
has already been pointed out , he is merely the human agent of capital , 
and as a human being he is subject to forces that he does not contro l .  
An example of th i s  control is competition which regulates the  capitalist 's 
activities in terms of investment and exchange of products. In fact , his 
class status as a capitalist designates his involvement in an involuntary 
division of labor . 1 0  
From the vantage point  of Marx 's theory of the  development of the 
indivi dual , the capitalist cannot develop  freely and fully , even if he 
manages to live in luxury . Marx's pronouncement on the Roman nobility 
may be applied in this context . Although in ancient Rome "the in­
dividuals may appear great , . . .  "there can be no conception here of a 
free and full development either of the individual or of the society , since 
such development stands in contradiction to the original relation" (see 
chapter 7, footnote 8). As a consequence, unless all are free from domina­
tion of man by man , the development of individuals remains limited even 
for those whose life has "the semblance of a human existence . "  We there­
fore agree with Oilman ( 1 97 6 :  1 5 6) when he says that the capitalist 's 
estrangement also "stands out not only in all  he is but in all he is not .  
Communist fulfillment is equally unavailable to both classes . "  This  relates 
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to our discussion of the estrangement from the species and from man . 
Since the interaction among human beings in situations where man 
dominates man is not in accord with the nature of the species ,  man is said 
to be estranged from the species and from one another . Although the 
capitalist , like the Roman , may have abundant time and resources, his 
individual development remains stunted .  The reason is that he is not 
interacting with others according to the natural ability of the species, 
that is ,  in such a way that the "need on the part of one can be satisfied 
by the product of the other ." (See also Chapter 2 . )  
From various points of view, then , Marx's concept of  estrangement 
cannot be viewed as a quantity rather than as a quality . Estrangement 
as such , which i s  a qualitative phenomenon , must be strictly distinguished 
from the conse quences of estrangement , which is a quantitat ive phenom­
enon .  Stu dents of Marx have too often failed to make this important 
distinction .  As a result , even if unknowingly , Marx is interpreted from a 
reformist perspective . Regardless of the consequences of estrangement, 
the only society Marx advocated was one free from estrangement-free 
from any domination of man by man . It is therefore impossible to 
measure estrangement without misinterpreting Marx in the process . 
Consequently , Archibald's ( 1 97 6 : 6 9-70) suggestion that we measure 
what Marx called estrangement, in order to determine differences in 
estrangement among classes and societies ,  is very misleading. 
Seeman bases his rationale for his work on estrangement on  the 
same misleading attempt to measure what Marx calls estrangement . 
Seeman says that his work represents an attempt to "make more or­
ganize d  sense of one of the great traditions in sociological thought ;  and 
to make the traditional interest in alienation more amenable to sharp 
empirical statement" (Seeman , 1 9 5 9 :  5 1 1 ) .  He reiterates this rationale 
in his paper "The Urban Alienation : Some Dubious Theses from Marx 
to Marcuse" :  
T o  speak o f  dubious theses about alienation i s  t o  suggest an interest 
in secularizing this more or less "sacred"  concept ; it is to suggest 
that there is something here about which an empirical demonstration 
has to be made-the critical , evocative , and even romantic  spirit that 
has infused the literature on alienation , whatever its very valid uses 
in some respects , being no substitute for clarity and rigor (Seeman , 
1 97 la : l 3 5) .  
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As well intentioned as Seeman 's position may be , it misses the point.  
What Marx called estrangement is in need neither of "clarity and rigor ,"  
nor of a "sharp empirical " statement of the k ind Seeman intends to 
provide . I t  can simply not be measured ,  although Marx himself derived 
what he called estrangement empirically . Admittedly , the empiri cal 
categories Marx used are of a different empirical order than those See-
man has in min d. Nevertheless, they are empirical categories . By investigat­
ing the differences between man and animal , Marx determines what he 
calls human nature in general . As a result of being subject to an involuntary 
division of labor, however, man is prevented from living according to his 
nature and is estranged .  Marx's notion of estrangement is a s traightforward , 
logical procedure based on empirical data. Thus , man is estranged as long 
as his labor po wer an d the product of h is labor are subject to an alien will .  
However-and this point Seeman and others fail to re cognize-the subjec­
tion to an al ien will  is an occurrence of a dichotomous kind ; the subjec­
tion either exists or it does not exist, and it is therefore not measurable 
in terms of quantitities. 
WHAT MARX CALLS ESTRANGEMENT: A CAUSE OF 
C E RTAI N IDENTI FIABLE BEHAVI O R  O R  ATTITUDES ? 
Students of Marx in various disciplines have been mistaken not only 
in their attempt to measure estrangement , but also in viewing estrange­
ment as such as the cause of certain identifiable behavior or attitudes .  
This i s  true o f  those who are concerned with operationalizing and measur­
ing estrangement as well as of Schaff ( 1 970a : 107 ,  1 3  5 ,  22 3 ,  2 2 5 ,  227 ) , 
who implies that estrangement leads to "the arms race , "  "national ism , "  
"racial hatred ,"  "religious intolerance , "  "certain forms o f  family organiza­
tion , "  " depersonalization ," " impoverishment of human personality , "  
and  "discrepancies in artistic tastes and  opinions ."  Israel ( 1 97 1 : 8 3 -84) 
makes similar inferences .  He postulates that if individuals are unable to 
live according to their human nature , as Marx understands i t ,  they will 
experience estrangement. To assume that individuals can experience 
their estrangement presupposes that individuals can make causal inferences 
as to which feelings are caused by what Marx calls estrangement and which 
feelings are caused by so mething else . The emphasis here is not on whether 
the feelings can be identified perfectly.  Rather , it is on the implicit or 
explicit assu mption ,  which students of Marx often hold ,  that Marx's 
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theory of estrangement lends i tself to making causal inferences.  Accord­
ing to this assumption ,  it is postulated ,  for example , that estrangement 
causes certain identifiable feelings or "disl:repancies in artistic tastes 
and o pinions. " 1 1  The interpretation of Marx's theory of estrangement 
given in this study ,  however, shows this view to be incorrect . 
The reasons why behavior, feelings ,  or attitudes cannot meaningfully 
be said to be caused by estrangement lie in the lack of variance .  Thus , 
nothing is known about the state of nonestrangement (true communism) . 
Neither is estrangement under feudalism or capitalism seen to exist in 
greater or lesser quantities; rather, Marx views it as a dichotomous phenom­
enon .  As a result , variance can not be obtained from historical comparisons .  
The same holds true for inter or intrasocietal comparisons,  s ince there as 
well estrangement does not lend itself to measurement .  
Hence , man is  estranged, because he is subject to an involuntary divi-
sion of labor, but it is impossible to determine how estrangement causes 
certain identifiable behavior, feelings ,  or attitudes. Theoretically , such a 
determination could be made only if it was possible to observe behavior,  
feelings, or attitudes under conditions of nonestrangement or various degrees 
of estrangement . Therefore , any hypothesis or claim imply ing that estrange­
ment ,  as  defined by Marx, is the cause of certain identifiable kinds of be­
havior ,  feelings , or attitudes in the present society must be termed specula­
tive and cannot be verified empirically because of a lack of variance . 12 Of 
course , we maintain that what Marx calls estrangement is not  manifest in 
certain types of behavior,  attitudes ,  or feelings ; this would clearly be an 
untenable position .  According to Marx's theory of estrangement,  it is im­
possible to i dentify which particular behavior,  attitudes, or feelings are 
caused by the fact that man is estranged and therefore would not exist 
under nonestrangement. I srael and Schaff are not the only scholars who 
point to estrangement as the cause of certain identifiable behavior, feel-
ings ,  or attitudes. Others (Strmiska, 1 974 :  1 1 2  and Rousset ,  1 974 : 2 5 1 ,  
for example ) are also mistaken o n  this point, although some , for example, 
Israel ( 1 97 1 )  and Gabel , et al . ( 1 974) are very critical of previous attempts 
to measure estrangement. 
Numerous social scientists whose intention it is to measure estrangement 
also view estrangement as a cause and often theoretically link their enter­
prise with Marx 's theory of estrangement (Dean , 1 9 6 1 ;  Barakat , 1 969 ;  
Seeman , 1 9 5 9, 1 97 la ,  1 9 7 1b ) .  With the help of some theoretical reason­
ing, estrangement is seen to cause particular and identifiable social or  
SCOPE AND APPLICABILITY OF MARX'S TIIEORY OF ESTRANGEMENT 1 57 
psychological phenomena which then serve as indicators o r  dimensions of 
estrange ment. Social scientists postulate that , when measured ,  these in­
dicators or  dimensions will directly reflect the degree and nature of estrange­
ment .  As we already pointed out in this chapter, estrangement cannot be 
measured if Marx is not to be misinterpreted . What is of particular interest 
right now, however, is the widespread notion that estrangement can be seen 
to cause identifiable behavior,  feelings ,  or attitudes ,  and how this notion 
manifests itsel f with those social scientists whose attempt it is to measure 
estrangement. 
Seeman has pioneered in the attempt to measure estrangement, and 
many have followed in his footsteps (Fischer, 1 97 3 ;  Neal and Rettig, 
1 967 ; Dean , 1 96 1 ; an d Middleton,  1 96 3 ) . 1 3 Seeman ( 1 972a :  3 87 )  assumes 
that estrangement causes identifiable and particular feelings or attitudes. 
He defines his measures as follows: 
1. Powerlessness-There is not much that I can do about most of  the 
important problems that we face today . 
2 .  Meaninglessness-Things have become so compli cated in the world 
today that I really don't  understand just what is going on . 
3 .  Normlessness-In order to get ahead in the world today , you are 
almost forced to do some things which are not right. 
4. Cultural estrangement-I am not much interested in the TV programs , 
movies ,  and magazines that most people seem to like . 
5 .  Social isolation-I often feel lonely . 
6. Self-estrangement in work-I really don't  enjoy most of the work that 
I do , but I feel that I must do it in order to have other things that I 
need and want .  
I f  the subject who is confronted with these measures discove rs in her/him­
self the same feelings or perceives his surroundings in the same way , he is 
said to be estranged.  Thus, estrangement as Marx understands it is postulated 
to cause identifiable and particular feelings which in turn , if measure d ,  are 
seen to confirm the existence of estrangement.  
Did Marx himself believe that particular and identifiable attitudes or 
feelings resulted from what he called estrangement?
-
For this answer, our 
analysis wil l  focus on certain passages in his early work . 
It has been shown (Wallimann ,  1 9 7 5 :  2 80) that translations of a particular 
passage fro m Marx wrongly imply that he saw estrangement as the cause of 
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certain feelings, attitudes, or behavior. These misleading translations appear 
at least in Tucker ( 1 9 7 2 :  1 0 5 )  and Israel ( 1 97 1 : 5 2 ) . 14 Tucker 's text says 
that the propertied class "experiences the alienation as a sign of its own 
power ," while Israel's states that the proletariat "feels itself crushed by 
t his  self-alienation"  (emphasis mine ) .  In both instances, estrangement is 
postulated to generate certain identifiable feelings or  experiences, while in 
fact Marx did not imply this at all :  
[T ]he propertied class and the  proletariat present the  same human 
self-estrangement. But the former class feels at ease and strengthened 
in this self-estrangement, it recognises estrangement as its o wn power 
and has the semblance of a human existence . The latter feels annihilated 
in estrangement ;  it sees in it its own powerlessness and the reality of an 
inhuman existence (CW, 2, p .  3 6 ;  MEW, 2, p. 3 7 ) . 1 5 
The consequences of estrangement, as the above passage indicates ,  differ 
according to one 's social position and in ways that can be contradictory . 
Thus, the propertied class feels at ease and strengthened ,  while the pro­
letariat feels annihilated in its estrangement . 16 Under these c ircumstances , 
it would not make any sense to postulate , for example , that estrangement 
causes a feeling of annihilation ,  since it could equally be maintained that 
estrangement also causes the opposite feeling. Yet, Seeman proceeds on 
the assumption that estrangement causes specific and identifiable feel­
ings or attitudes . If  these feelings or  attitudes can be found to be present 
in individuals , estrangement is considered to be present. According to 
our interpretation , however , estrangement is not defined by the feelings 
or attitudes it causes, but by the fact that man is subject to an involuntary 
division of labor and is unable to live according to his nature . 
In this context , the following passage must also be considered :  
What, then , constitutes the alienation of labour? First ,  the fact that 
labour is external to the worker , i . e . ,  it does not belong to his in­
trinsic nature ; that in his work , therefore , he does not affirm him­
self but denies himself, does not feel content but unhappy , does not 
develop freely his physical and mental energy but mortifies his body 
and ruins his mind.  The worker therefore only feels himself outside 
his work, and in his work feels outside himself. He feels at home 
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when he is not working, and when he is working he does not  feel at 
home. His labour is therefore not voluntary , but coerced ; it is forced 
labour (CW, 3 ,  p. 274 ;  MEW, EB 1 .T . ,  p. 5 14) . 1 7 
It would be wrong to conclude from this quotation that Marx saw certain 
feelings or attitudes result from estrangement ,  and that estrangement can 
be identified with such feelings or  attitudes. Rather, this passage must be 
interpreted within a framework that distingu ishes estrangement as such 
from its consequences. Since the worker is forced to sell his labor power 
"labor is external to the worker" ; it is "forced labour . " Hence the worker 
is estranged. In very general terms, his and the estrangement of all other 
individuals allows for a world which they do not fully control , which they 
do not fully subject to their own will . It allows for a world in which , un­
like under co mmunism, man is dominated and subject to an involuntary 
division of labor affecting all . However, not all are equally affected .  For 
example , the workers are forced to sell their labor power. The capitalist , 
although subject to an involuntary division of labor and therefore estranged ,  
is not  compelled to sell h i s  labor power. As  a result , he  is not subject to 
many of the consequences brought about by circumstances he does not 
control . For the worker, the world he does not control has quite d ifferent 
consequences. For him, it means that work is  external to him , that he 
feels unhappy , and so forth .  
The existence of estrangement in general (that is ,  the existence of any 
involuntary division of labor) allows for the emergence of societal structures 
and processes that are not under the conscious control of so cietal members 
and that have had different consequences in different historical epochs.  
These consequences may be perceived as "burdensome ," 1 8  although estrange­
ment remains a constant in view of the persistence of an invo luntary divi­
sion of labor. 
Here I disagree with Ollman ( 1 976 :  1 3 2)  who fails to make a clear dis­
tinction between estrangement as such and its various consequences. He 
maintains that the "forms of alienation differ for each class because 
their position and style of life differ, and , as expected ,  the proletariat 's 
affliction is the most severe . "  On the contrary , estrangement is a con­
stant since all are subject to an involuntary division of labor and are pre­
vented from living according to their nature . According to our opinion , 
only the consequences of estrangement vary . However ,  this  is not the 
same as saying that the forms of estrangement vary . 
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Within any particular historical period ,  these so-cietal structures and 
processes can also be seen to have agreeable consequences .  Although both 
the capitalists and the workers are estranged ,  being subject to an involuntary 
division of labor, the processes that arose because of estrangement affect 
both classes quite differently . 
It is therefore meaningful to speak of estrangement as that condition 
which brings about a social world that escapes full control by the partici­
pants. I t  is meaningless to view estrangement as a cause of particular, 
identifiable feelings ,  behavior, and attitudes. First ,  such a cause cannot 
be verified because of a lack of variance and ,  second,  such feelings, be­
havior ,  and attitudes can never be identified as the only ones resulting 
from estrangement. Third, Marx himself did not view estrangement as 
the cause of only a select number of identifiable feelings ,  attitudes ,  and 
behaviors .  Any attempt to do so would imply that estrangement con­
stitutes only certain phenomena perceived to be undesirable or arbitrarily 
selected by the so cial scientist. 
ESTRANGEMENT AS AN 
OBJ ECTIVELY DEFINED CONCEPT 
I t  is frequently debated whether Marx's concept of estrangement should 
be defined  according to objective or subjective criteria. ( See , for example , 
Israel , 1 97 1 ; Schacht , 1 97 1 ;  and Fischer, 1 976 . )  Subjective criteri a are 
seen to involve "a state of mind ,"  while a definition based on objective 
criteria "involves a condition of the whole or parts of society " (Mizruchi , 
1 964:46) .  
Based on our interpretation of Marx's theory of estrangement,  it can 
be concluded that Marx defines estrangement according to objective cri­
teria :  individuals are estranged because they are subject to an involuntary 
division of labor, and not  because they exhibit a certain "state of mind ."  
The rather fruitless debate on whether estrangement is objectively or 
subjectively defined is partially attributable to the fact that students of 
Marx have not separated estrangement as such from the consequences of 
estrangement . Thus, many have mistaken particular consequences for the 
elements defining estrangement .  Seeman 's social-psychological operation­
alizations are a case in point. However, as  has  already been established,  
estrange ment cannot be defined on the basis of certain manifestations, 
since the manifestations vary from one historical epoch to another as 
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well as in a given population at a given time . Accordingly , once a separa­
tion is made between estrangement as such and the consequences of 
estrangement , it immediately becomes obvious that estrangement cannot 
be defined on the basis of a "state of mind" which individuals exhibit, 
since any such "state of mind" must be seen as a consequence of estrange­
ment .  
NOTES 
L For details ,  the reader is advised to consult Milsz;ros ' study ( 1 97 2 :  2 1 7-27) 
directly.  
2 .  Apparently ,  without knowing of Israel 's work (see Israel , 1976 and 1 97 1 ) ,  
LeoGrande ( 1 97 7 )  advances the same thesis concerning Marx 's departure from his 
theory of estran gement outlined in the Manuscripts. 
3. It may also be pointed out that neither Milsz;ros ( 1 9 7 2 :  148,  1 6 3 ,  1 70) nor 
Oilman ( 1 976:  74, 80-81 , 8 5 , 92, 1 1 0) makes a well-define d distinction between the 
two definitions of human nature in Marx . 
4. See also Chapter 2, note 2. In the Manuscripts, Marx says that Feuerbach 's  
great achievement is "the establishment of true materialism and of  real science, by 
making the social relationship of 'man to man' the basic p rinciple of the theory ."  
And in a letter to Feuerbach in August 1 844, Marx wrote :  
In these writings you have-whether intentionally I do not  know-given a 
p hilosophical basis to socialism, and the commu nists, too ,  have similarly 
understood these works in that sense. The unity of man with man based on 
the real differences between men , the concept of human species transferred 
from the heaven of abstraction to the real earth, what is this other than the 
concept of society ! (McLellan,  1 9 7 1 :  1 84) . 
Marx had apparently revised his appraisal of Feuerbach by the time he wrote the 
Theses on Feuerbach; nevertheless, his concept of man was one of social man . 
Yet, I srael writes that "in the sixth of his 'Theses on Feuerbach' Marx explicitly 
rejects this anthropological position by asserting that man 's nature is the total ity 
of his social relations" (Israel , 1 976: 47) .  
5 .  See also Chapter 2, pp.  62- 7 1 .  
6 .  Similarly,  Luk;cs' identification o f  estrangement with objectification in 
his History and Class Consciousness may be mentioned. However , Luk;cs re­
treated from this position later in his l ife by admitting that th e interpretation 
in this book was too Hegelian (Luk;cs, 1 970:  2 5 ) . 
7. Since no distinction is usually made between Marx 's use of the terms 
"estrangement" and "alienation ,"  stu dents of Marx speak of alienation as exist­
ing to a greater or lesser extent, referring to what is here called estrangement as 
existing to a greater or lesser extent. 
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8" Entfremdung (estrangement) is u se d  by Marx. As already indicate d 
Entfremdung should be translated estrangement, and not alienation.  
9 .  See chapter 2 ,  pp.  3 7- 3 8 . 
1 0" As earlier, " division of labor" also includes the division of labor in 
society as a whole "  
11 .  "Cause" is used here to designate even the mere association of specific 
behavior, feelings, or attitu des with estrangement. 
1 2. It is indeed ironical that, according to this analysis, those social scientists 
may be said to be speculative who, according to their own intentions, wish to 
avoid spec1 .tive statements. In this context, Seeman's ( 1 9 7 1 a : 1 3 5 ) p assage cited 
above may be recal led. 
1 3 . It is impossible to address and critically deal with all the literature that has 
been built up around the attempt to measure estrangement . Seeman is therefore 
selected here as a representative example of a whole group of scholars. 
1 4. The translation of the same passage in the Collected Works, which appeared 
after my paper (Wallimann ,  1 97 5) was in press, avoids the same mistakes. 
1 5. Note also that "estrangement" rather than "alienation" is correctly used 
here to translate Entfremdung. 
1 6. Similarly ,  the consequences of estrangement are distinguished from estrange­
ment as such (that is, from the inability to subject one 's labor power and produ ct 
of l abor to one's own will)  in other passages: 
• . •  the more objects the worker produces the less he can possess and the more 
he falls under the sway of his product, capital. 
All these consequences are implied in the statement that the worker is 
relate d to the pro duct of bis labour as to an alien object (CW, 3, p. 2 7 2 ;  MEW, 
EB 1 .T., p .  5 1 2) .  
(According t o  t h e  economic laws the estrangement o f  the worker i n  h i s  object 
is expressed thus: the more the worker produces, the less he has to consume ; 
the more values he creates, the more valueless, the more unworthy he becomes; 
the better formed his pro duct, the more deformed becomes the worker;  the 
more civilised his object, the more barbarous becomes the worke r ;  the more 
powerful l abour beco mes, the more powerless becomes the worker ; the more 
ingenious labour becomes, the less ingenious becomes the worker and the 
more he becomes nature's servant.) (CW, 3, p. 27 3 ;  MEW, EB 1 .T. ,  p. 5 1 3 ) .  
This estrangement manifests itself i n  part i n  that the sophisticati on o f  needs 
and of the means [of their satisfaction ] on the one side produces a bestial 
barbarism, a complete , crude, abstract simplicity of need, on the other ; or 
rather in that it merely reproduces itself in its opposite (CW, 3, p. 3 0 7 ;  MEW, 
EB 1 .T., p .  548).  
While these statements share the distinction between estrangement and its con­
sequences, they also show t hat the consequences of estrangement differ. The con­
sequences simultaneously represent wealth and poverty , refinement and barbarity , 
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sophistication and crude simplicity. In sum,  the consequences of estrangement en­
tail contradictions. 
1 7. Note that Marx talks in the above quote of "alienation" (Fnta.usserung) 
and not of "estran gement" (F.ntfremdung) , thus not implying that estrangement 
as such causes specific feelings. As is shown below, labor power mu st be sold ,  which 
is a type of coercion causing specific feelings. 
1 8. See also O iserman ( 1 96 5 : 79) .  

10 
CONCLUSIONS 
Marx distinguishes between two concepts of human nature : general 
human nature , which refers to those human qualities that are invariable , 
and specific human nature , which consists of qualities that may vary from 
society to society and in history . Marx derived his  concept  of human nature 
in general from a comparison of man with animals.  Estrangement results 
when man is prevented  from living according to his human nature , that is, 
general human nature . Unfortunately , students of Marx have not made a 
clear distinction between the two concepts of human nature embodied in 
his work, and as a result ,  his theory of estrangement has frequently been 
misunderstood and inadequately interpreted.  Our interpretation therefore 
stands in o pposition to Petrovic 's ( 1 967 :  1 46) . Translating Wesen with 
"essence "  instead of  "nature , "  and using, as does Oilman , "alienation " 
instead of "estrangement ,"  he says that "if alienation of man from his es­
sence is to be possible , his essence must not be conceived as something that 
all men have in common." We also find  Ollman's ( 1 97 6 : 1 3 5 ) view to be 
misleading and lacking in clarity , as is evident in the following statement:  
"If alienation is the splintering of human nature into a number of mis­
begotten parts, we would expect communism to be presented as a kind 
of reunification." By clearly making this distin ction,  we have laid the 
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foundation for a logically consistent and novel interpretation of Marx's 
theory of estrangement. 
Marx illustrated his theory in the context of his analysis of  capitalist 
society and with particular focus on that part of society which depends 
on selling labor power. Thus, it could be shown how the workers, for 
example , are prevented from living according to their human nature , and 
in which ways they can therefore be viewed as estranged.  Marx's theory 
of estrangement does not end with the estrangement of the worker, al­
though for various reasons he took sides with the workers and described 
their plight and misery in great detail . He specifically speaks also of the 
estrangement of the capitalist . What is it that prevents the capitalist from 
living according to his nature ,  since unlike the worker he is not forced to 
sell his labor power? 
To resolve this problem, Marx's  views on the division of labor are 
analyzed in detail in this book.  It has been found that throughout his 
work 1 Marx advocates a society with a voluntary division of labor and 
that in his early work he directly associates estrangement with the fact 
that the division of labor is an involuntary one. The nature of a society 's 
division of labor is therefore the overriding category determining whether 
individuals in this society are estranged.2 This interpretation is consistent 
with the writings of Marx , not only with respect to his view that the capital­
ist is also estranged,  but also with his vision of communism in  which he 
postulates that neither estrangement nor an involuntary division of labor 
will exist . To regard the nature of the division of labor in a society as the 
decisive criterion on  the basis of which man is said to be estranged must 
be considered a significant departure from existi ng interpretations of 
Marx 's theory of estrangement. 
I t  is maintained here that , according to Marx, the nature of  the division 
of labor must be the central criterion deciding the existence or nonexistence 
of estrangement. Thus, estrangement is a dichotomous phenomenon . I t  
exi sts in the absence of a voluntary division of  labor,  and i t  i s  no t  envisioned 
to exist under communism. Students of Marx have not tended to give central 
importance to the division of labor when interpreting his theory of estrange­
mento Rather, they generally treat the division of labor as only an aspect 
of estrangement, whereby it  has usually been emphasized that under capital 
the worker must perform minute , repetitive , and unchallenging tasks . While 
this statement may be factually correct and Marx himself may have given 
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similar illustrations, such an emphasis is highly misleading when we turn to 
an interpretation of Marx's theory of estrangement.  As is maintained here, 
the emphasis must be not on the kind  of involuntary division of labor , but 
on the very involuntariness of it .  Marx advocates that all involuntary division 
of labor be abolished.  Even though an involuntary division is made more 
"bearable" by humanizing work in various ways ,  the involuntary nature 
of the division of labor persists . Similarly , to envision communism as a 
society with a voluntary division of labor does not imply that individuals 
will not perform different tasks. Marx 's vision of the many-sided 
individual is not contradicted here .  There are good reasons to believe 
that the individual would be many-sided under communism. However, 
Marx's vision does not imply that there will be n o  "specialization" or 
"routinization" of work , on a voluntary basis , under communism. 
It only means that in dividuals are not socially coerced into performing 
certain tasks. Unfortunately , this is not made as clear as it should be. 
Ollman ( 1 97 6 :  2 1 1 ) ,  for example , makes the following unqualified state­
ment :  " . . .  the best known descriptions of communism-a 'classless 
society ' ,  a time when 'the division of labor has come to an end'  and 
when 'private property has been abolished'-are full alternatives ."  
Ollman ( 1 97 6 : 1 5 8-1 60) also fails to specify that the involuntariness 
of the division of labor is manifested by the fact not only that individuals 
are "locked" into one activity , but also that particularly under capital 
the producers never determine what is to be produced and fo r what purposes. 
Therefore , as long as there is commodity production , regardless of whether 
individuals are "locked" into one particular activity , the division of labor 
will be an involuntary one. That is ,  the market as such will as an impersonal 
force coerce individuals into certain p roductive activities as long as these 
individuals are dependent on commodity production for a livelihood.  Here 
lies the importance of Marx's insistence that production under communism 
will have to be based on agreement and not exchange . For Marx , the in­
voluntary division of labor can be abolished only by the abolition of pro­
duction based on exchange , regardless of whether pro duction  on exchange 
"locks" individuals into a single position .3 
Walter Kaufmann4 is particularly insensitive to this important issue .  
Referring to Marx 's vision of a society with a voluntary division of labor 
in which individuals will no longer be "locked" into an exclusive sphere 
of activity , he maintains that "one of the results of the social mobility in 
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the United States-lateral as wel l  as u pward-is that a waiter ,  for example , 
is much less likely to feel . . . that his  role defines him, freezes him . . . .  
Thus the alienation  implicit in the d ivision of labor is diminished significant­
ly ."  Kaufmann also states that Marx's dream, to a significant  degree,  "is 
realized in the United States of America.  I t  is not in the least unusual for 
the same person to have many different j obs before he is thirty . "  
Schacht ( 1 97 1 :  100) ,  on the  other hand ,  misunderstands Marx's theory 
of estrangement and concept of an involuntary division of labor in another 
way . He faults Marx for seeing estrangement as resulting from individuals 
being subject to an alien wil l :  
Consider, for example , a camera man in a film studio , or a member of 
an orchestra. The "labor" of both is not and cannot be "self-directed "  
and "spontaneous. " In each case i t  i s  directed b y  another man-the 
director or the conductor. 
As a consequence , Schacht suggests that "it would seem more fruitful to 
drop all reference to the mediation of an 'alien wil l ' . "  This conclusion is 
decidedly unjustified and neglects Marx's contention that 
all labour in which many individuals cooperate necessarily requires a 
commanding will to co-ordinate and unify the process , and functions 
which apply not to partial operations but to the total activity of the 
workshop ,  much as that of an orchestra conductor. This is a productive 
job ,  which must be performed in every combined mode of production 
( C 3 ,  p .  3 8 3 ;  MEW, 2 5 ,  p .  397 ) .  
Working under a commanding will i n  situations of  cooperation does not 
automatically imply that the division of labor is an involuntary one .  On 
the contrary , just as cooperation can be voluntary cooperation ,  accept­
ing "a commanding will to co-ordinate and unify the process" can also 
be a voluntary act. Therefore , Marx distinguishes between this case of 
cooperation and coordination and that in which coordinating activity 
also entails coercion :  
The labour of supervision and management, arising as i t  does out o f  an 
antithesis ,  out of the supremacy of capital over labour, and being 
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therefore common to all modes of production based on class contra­
dictions like the capitalist mode , is directly and inseparably connected ,  
also under the capitalist system, with productive functions which all 
combined social labour assigns to individuals as their special tasks (C 3 ,  
p .  3 8 6 ;  MEW, 2 5 ,  pp.  399-400 ;  see also C 3 ,  p .  3 8 5 ) .  
ESTRANGEMENT AND THE 
ABOLI TI O N  O F  PRIVATE PROPERTY 
When we maintain that according to Marx the division of labor must 
be the central criterion deciding the existence or nonexistence of estrange­
ment,  we are able to provide an answer to the long-standing debate on 
whether estrangement is abolished with the abolition of the private 
ownership of the means of production . In our view, Oiserman ( 1 96 5 : 
84-89) is incorrect when he maintains that estrangement necessarily 
disappears with any socialization of the means of production . Any 
socialization of the means of production does not in itself guarantee 
a voluntary division of labor. It does not in itself guarantee a condition 
in which there is no domination of man by man , that is , a condition in 
which man is allowed to live according to his nature and is not subject 
to an alien will. 
We need not engage in a detailed analysis of present-day socialist 
societies to observe that they are not the realization of Marx 's vision 
of communism, a society in which estrangement would be n onexistent 
and the division of labor voluntary . Engels ,  we might say , foresaw the 
problem of present-day socialist countries when he maintained that , 
the more productive forces the state takes over , 
the more citizens it exploits. The workers remain wage-earners , 
proletarians. The capitalist relationship is not abolished ; it is rather 
pushed to an extreme. But at this extreme it changes into its oppo­
site . State ownership of the productive forces is not the solution 
of the conflict , but it contains within itself the formal means ,  the 
handle to the solution (AD, pp. 3 1 2-3 1 3 ;  MEW, 20, p. 260) .5 
A few pages later, Engels points out how communism is to be achieved 
(note that he refrains from using the word "state" ) :  
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The seizure of the means of production by society puts an end to 
commodity production, and therewith to the domination of the pro­
duct over the producer . . . .  Men's own social organisation which has 
hitherto stood in opposition to them as if arbitrarily decreed by Nature 
and history, will then become the voluntary act of men themselves 
. . . .  It is humanity's leap from the realm of necessity into the realm 
of freedom. 
To carry through this world-emancipating act is the historical mis­
sion of the modern proletariat (AD, p. 3 1 8 ;  MEW, 20,  p. 264) .6 
One may hold the opinion that this world-emancipating act of which 
Engels speaks has not fully occurred in present-day socialist countries, 
although "the handle to the solution" is there.7 
As a consequence, it is the division of labor, and not the existence or 
nonexistence of private ownership of the means of production, which 
must serve as the criterion in deciding whether estrangement exists. Accord­
ing to our interpretation, then, Marx's theory of estrangement is directly 
extendable and applicable to socialist countries. Those who do not give 
central importance to the division of labor in interpreting Marx's theory 
of estrangement are necessarily led to other conclusions. Knecht ( 1 97  5 :  
2 1 7) ,  for example, asserts that Marx's theory of estrangement cannot be 
applied to societies in the "transitional stage" to communism. He believes 
that Marx's theory is only an instrument for the critique of capitalism. A 
critical analysis of the "transitional stage" requires first that the theory 
undergo a revision, and he thinks this revision is provided by Sartre. "With 
Sartre, the concept 'estrangement' does not only serve as an instrument in 
the critique of capitalism." 
Ollman ( 1 976 : 2 5 2-2 5 3 ) is compelled to maintain a similar position for 
similar reasons. He argues that because present-day socialist countries 
regulate production and consumption via a plan rather than the market, 
Marx's theory of estrangement "loses a full half of its meaning." He does 
not mean to 
imply that the alienation which is found in "communist" countries 
cannot or should not be studied or treated theoretically, but the inter­
action of these men and these particular societies can only be adequately 
grasped by a theory which focuses on the decisive role of the plan, the 
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party , the state and the bureaucracy generally . Marx's theory of aliena­
tion is not such a theory . 
However, Marx's theory of estrangement can very well serve as an instru­
ment for the critique of today's socialist countries ,  since , according to our 
interpretation , estrangement consists of the fact that man is prevente d  from 
living according to his nature because of the existence of an involuntary 
division of labor. 8 Moreover, we can do so without necessarily accepting 
an existentialist position ,9 implying, as Sartre does ,  that estrangement is 
basic to all human existence at all times. ( See also Chapter 7 and Schaff, 
1 964) . Marx's concept of estrangement remains a concept bound only to 
definite historical periods .  As Ludz ( 1 976 : 8) and Remmling ( 1 967 : 1 5 2 )  
indicate , estrange ment arises with the downfall of primitive c ommunism,  
and according to Marx, it ends  with communism.10 Estrangement comes 
into existence with the advent of an involuntary division of labor and is 
abolished not necessarily with the abolition of private property , but with 
the introduction of a voluntary division of  labor. Our interpretation of 
Marx's theory of estrangement is therefore also compatible with Marx's 
theory of history . 
A NOTE ON THE APPLICABI LITY O F  
MARX'S THEORY O F  E ST RANGEMENT 
I n  the preceding chapter, we show that , if Marx is not to be misinter­
preted "estrangement" cannot be measured or viewed in quantitative 
terms. 1 1  We also demonstrate that according to Marx estrangement as 
such  cannot meaningfully be viewe d  as a cause for specific behavior ,  
feelings , or attitudes. Since mainstream American sociology, however, 
has attempted both to quantify estrangement and to postulate it as a 
cause of certain behavior, feelings, or attitudes, the question arises as to 
the use of Marx's theory of estrangement . 
Essentially , the use of Marx 's theory of estrangement is of a qu ite 
different order than was commonly thought. Remmling ( 1 967)  already 
showed how Marx is an exponent of total suspicion .  I ndeed ,  his system 
of thought allows Marx to be an all-encompassing analyst and critic of 
society , and his theory of estrangement is the basic building block upon 
which the rest of his analysis rests. I t  consists of an empi?cal statement of 
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what man's nature is and a reason why ,  throughout much of history , man 
has been prevented fro m living according to his nature . This theory of 
estrangement, coupled with the demand that man be able to live accord­
ing to his nature , provides Marx with both the basic framework for inter­
preting the social world  and the goal the interpretation is to serve . Hence ,  
the demand that all involuntary division of labor must be  abolished if 
man is to live unestranged,  that is, according to his nature . As Marx's 
analysis is total , his demands are total demands. Nothing short of a total 
change 12 can rid man of his condition of estrangement. 
In attempting to measure what Marx calls estrangement and in postulat­
ing that only certain behavior, feelings ,  and attitudes are caused by estrange­
ment, mainstream sociology does not consider Marx 's thrust for total 
change . 1 3 However, the usefulness of Marx's theory of estrangement for 
sociology lies exactly in its power to critically conceptualize social reality 
and to employ it in the service of social change .  For this to occur , however, 
Marx's vision of a future society based on a voluntary division of labor must 
not be rejected as "utopian ."  At least the possibility must be accepted that 
society could indeed be organized such as to allow for a voluntary division 
of labor. However, only praxis will tell. 
NOTES 
1. We disagree with Mandel ( 1 9 7 1 : 1 6 1- 1 6 3 )  who says that only with German 
Ideology did Marx view estrangement in the context of the division of labor. 
2. We disagree with Plamenatz ( 1 97 5 :  1 50) who maintains that Marx " does 
not even make it plain what kind of division of labour it is that produ ces al ienation."  
Plamenatz's objections to Marx 's treatment of the  division of labor an d its central ity 
to "estrangement" can be overcome by making a distinction between a voluntary 
and involuntary (that is, "estrangement-producing") division of labor. 
3 .  Knecht ( 1 97 5 :  1 44-1 45) ap propriately remarks that under cap ital even the 
capitalist is subject to the independent and impersonal forces brought about by 
exchange, thus implying that the capitalist is also subject to an involuntary division 
of labor. This is in agreement with Marx's view that the capitalist is also estranged.  
To argue that Marx always thought estrangement would result from the in­
voluntary nature of the division of labor is to disagree with those (for example, 
Dawydow, 1 964: 58,  61) who maintain that only with the German Ideology did 
Marx view the voluntary division of l abor as a solution to estrangement. Similarly ,  
Tucker ( 1 96 5 :  1 8 5) i s  mistaken when he  claims that only with the  German Ideology 
was the "alienated self-relation . • •  transformed into a social relation of produc­
tion,  an d this was given the name ' division of labour' .  " 
4. See Schacht ( 1 9 7 1 : xli i i ,  xl-xliv). 
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5. We do not mean to say that Engels'  views accurately describe the p resent 
political and economic system of present-day socialist cou ntries. Rather,  we mean 
that Engds touches upon the main issue involved. Thus, the issue is n ot whether 
the Soviet Union is capitalistic , but whether the means of production in that country 
have been "socialized" in such a way as to maintain an involuntary division of 
labor, that is, ine qu ality and class relationships. For further discussions, see 
Bettelheim, 1 976;  Chavance, 1 9 7 7 ;  Sweezy , 1 9 7 7a,  1 97 7b ;  and Szymanski , 1 9 7 7 .  
6 .  B y  quoting Engels here,  i t  i s  unl ikely that Marx's theory o f  estrangement 
will be misinterpreted, since Marx supporte d and cooperated with Engels in writ­
ing Anti-Dubring and is himself the author of a chapter. ( See also Engels'  preface 
for the edition of 1 88 5 ;  MEW, 20, p. 9.) 
In his Critique of the Go t ha Program, Marx also points to the n ecessity of 
abolishing class differences: 
Instead of the indefinite conclu ding p hrase of the paragraph-"the removal 
of all social an d  political equality "-it ought to have been said that with 
the abolition of class differences all the social and political inequ ality aris­
ing from them would disappear of itself (CGP, pp. 1 5-16 ;  MEW, 1 9 , p. 26) .  
Abolishing inequality is  n o t  Marx 's only goal. For example,  i n  the Manuscripts 
he makes a distinction between crude commun ism and "true" communism. Crude 
communism stands for that phase in which private property has become abolished ,  
b u t  in which society has n o t  eliminated coercion a n d  t h e  bare leveling of every­
one's position :  
Co mmunism is the positive expression of annulled private property -at first 
as universal private property • . • •  This type of communism-since it negates 
the personality of man in every sphere-is but the logical expression of private 
property, which is  this negation.  General envy constituting itself as a power is 
the disguise in which greed re-establishes itself and satisfies itself, only in 
another way • • • •  Crude communism is only the culmination of this envy 
and of this levelling-down proceeding from the preconceived minimum. It has 
a definite, limited standard. How l ittle this annulment of private p roperty is 
really an appropriation i s  in fact proved by the abstract negation of the entire 
world of culture and civil isation,  the regression to the unnatural simplicity 
of the poor and cru de man who has few needs and who has not o nly failed to 
go beyond private property, but has not yet even reached it" (CW, 3, p p .  294-
29 5 ;  MEW, EB 1 .T., pp.  5 3 4-5 3 5) .  
T h e  first p ositive annulment of private property -crude communism-is thus 
merely a manifestation of the vileness of private property , which wants to set 
itself up as the positive co mmunity system (CW, 3, p. 296;  MEW, EB 1 .T., 
pp. 5 3 5- 5 3 6).  
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In addition to Engels' passage, we have also been able to demonstrate that Marx 
himself in his own writings was not endorsing just the abolition of the private 
ownership of the means of production.  We thus have been able to strengthen our 
argument that the division of labor is the central criterion deciding whether or 
not estrangement exists. 
7. In retrospect, it may be maintained that Marx and Engels were overly 
optimistic with respect to the ease with which class society could be abolished 
after the abolition of private property. This optimism is not, however, to be 
taken as evidence for the thesis that, for Marx and Engels, estrangement neces­
sarily is abolished with the abolition of the private ownership of the means of 
production.  
8. We do not endorse Ollman's view that Marx's theory of estrangement main­
tains its full meaning and analytical power only in the context of capitalism, a 
society dominated by market relationships. Rather, we reiterate that a distinction 
must be made between estrangement as such an d the consequences of such estrange­
ment. Because man is estranged, his life begins to be determined by forces he does 
not fully control. These forces at first appear in the form of personal domination 
and later in impersonal form, as exchange becomes universal. Regardless of the 
nature of the consequences, man remains estranged for Marx as long as an involuntary 
division of labor exists. It is our view that Marx only illustrated his theory of estrange­
ment when analyzing capitalist society. Even by giving examples as to how man is 
prevented from living according to his nature under capital, his theory of estrange­
ment does not become a theory bound to capitalism. Marx could have illustrated 
his theory just as well by choosing examples from feudalism, but this would have 
defeated his political intentions. Of course, new conceptualizations are needed for 
the study of the consequences of estrangement in "communist" countries and of 
the processes that continually prevent man from living according to his nature. 
But Marx's theory of estrangement need not be "adapted" since an involuntary 
division of labor remains an involuntary division of labor, although the coercion 
manifests itself in various forms and co mplexities. 
9. Or to argue from an ethical point of view as Oilman seems to think. 
1 0. It is inappropriate to speak of estrangement from nature under primitive· 
communism-as does Krader ( 1 9 7 5 : 2 37-2 38 ,  271-272) .  Although Marx does view 
primitive man as dominated by nature, his theory of estrangement refers only to 
social forms of domination. However, Marx holds that the division of labor under 
primitive communism was voluntary; hence, the absence of estrangement. To our 
knowledge, Marx also does not mention estrangement when referring to societies 
under primitive communism, although he views primitive communism as by no 
means ideal. 
1 1 .  Only the consequences of estrangement can be viewed in quantitative terms. 
Thus, the fact that man does not fully control his life�ituation-the fact that he 
is estrange d-may result in more wealth for some and more misery for others; a feel­
ing of strength in the bourgeoisie and a feeling of debasement in the proletariat. In 
contrast, estrangement as such remains a constant for all who are subject to an in-
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wluntary division of labor, as much as nonestrangement is the condition for man 
under communism where Marx envisioned a voluntary division of labor to exist. 
1 2. An event that has been "prepared" by the course of previous history, 
throughout which the consequences of estrangement are seen to have developed 
in such a way as to make communism realizable. 
1 3 . If "estrangement" is to be used in this way, it would be advisable either to 
drop the term altogether or to distinguish it clearly from Marx's use of the term. 
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